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Abstract
The United States Air Force and many of its Coalition partners have extended
the original service life of some of their aging aircraft due to fiscal constraints. This
life extension often requires increased periodic and in-depth inspections, increasing
maintenance costs and resulting in longer periods of aircraft downtime. An integrated
structural health monitoring system (ISHMS) for aging aircraft may reduce the cur-
rent inspection burden, and thus decrease costs and system downtime. This thesis
developed a generic systems engineering process to describe the system definition for
an ISHMS installed on a non-specific aging aircraft. The system definition developed
in this thesis followed the Vee Model for systems development and serves as a starting
point for future research and/or development efforts in this field. User analysis, user
requirements, system requirements, and some Department of Defense Architecture
Framework system architectures formed the basis for the generic systems engineering
process presented. Furthermore, mathematical simulations compared the failure rate
and number of inspections for a scenario without an ISHMS to a scenario with an
ISHMS. This simplified analysis demonstrated that a structural health monitoring
system for aging aircraft may have promising benefits with respect to both safety
improvements and decreased maintenance costs.
iv
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A Systems Engineering Approach to
Integrated Structural Health Monitoring
for Aging Aircraft
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Figure 1.1: Chapter 1 Decomposition
This chapter (Figure 1.1) introduces the background to the request from the
Office of the Undersecretary of the Air Force for International Affairs (SAF/IA) to
develop a systems engineering (SE) approach for an integrated structural health mon-
itoring system (ISHMS) for the Coalition Air Forces’ (CAF) aging aircraft. Chapter 1
also addresses the problem statement and the purpose of this thesis. In addition, it
states the reason this problem was selected and briefly describes how this problem
was solved.
1.1 Background
The United States Air Force (USAF) and many of its Coalition partners have
extended the original service life of some of their aging aircraft due to limited defense
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budgets. However, this service-life extension often requires additional expensive, peri-
odic, and in-depth inspections, resulting in the need to ground aircraft for long periods
of time. The main purpose of these inspections is to preserve safety-of-flight (SOF),
with emphasis placed on maintaining the aircrafts’ structural integrity. Despite the
relative success of these rigorous inspections, the aging aircraft community is in dire
need of a more efficient way of monitoring and maintaining the SOF of their fleet.
For example, the USAF has developed an integrated monitoring system on newer air-
craft to help screen the aircraft’s structural health, allowing the required maintenance
inspection criteria to be tailored to each specific aircraft. As a result, this tailored
inspection criteria has reduced the current inspection burden, decreasing costs, and
system downtime.
Since trends have revealed a pattern of operating military aircraft beyond the
original design life, there is a distinct need for a type of ISHMS that can be used
not only on newer aircraft that have not reached the end of their service life, but
also on aging aircraft. “Structural health monitoring refers to the use of in-situ,
non-destructive sensing and analysis of structural characteristics for the purpose of
detecting changes that may indicate damage or degradation [40].”
1.2 Thesis Proposal
The CAF currently flies many of its A-37 aircraft past the original service life
and the rest of the A-37 fleet will soon exceed the service life. As a result, the CAF
is experiencing significant A-37 aircraft (Figure 1.2) downtime (4 - 6 months) due
to required structural inspections every 300-flight hours [59]. This situation was the
original driving force behind the thesis proposal because the CAF A-37 fleet was
considered a suitable candidate for demonstrating the feasibility of an ISHMS for an
aging aircraft. Moreover, the CAF has expressed interest in and agreed to support
future efforts in this area.
2
Figure 1.2: A-37 Photo [39]
1.3 Problem and Purpose Statement
The problem the thesis team faced is that a systems engineering approach has
not been applied to the development and implementation of a cost-effective, near
real-time, integrated structural health monitoring system on aircraft that did not
have such a system in place. The CAF needs this type of system in order to continue
the use of their A-37 aircraft beyond the designed service life while maintaining SOF.
The purpose of this thesis is two-fold. First, this thesis provides an SE process
to help identify the top-level operational concept and stakeholder requirements of an
ISHMS for a generic aging aircraft. In creating this SE process, the thesis team wore
two hats, that of the user and of the systems engineer. The methodology for the SE
process generally followed the systems engineering Vee Model (Figure 1.3). The thesis
team created baseline products to perform the initial iteration of system definition
and composition, up to, but not including, preliminary design.
Second, this thesis performed a preliminary analysis to demonstrate the poten-
tial benefit of developing an ISHMS for aging aircraft, using the A-37 aircraft as an
example. Basically, the calculations presented in this thesis are meant to provide
rough estimates that could be used to support a financial decision for funding the de-
velopment of an ISHMS, based on several assumptions that will be explained in future
3
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chapters. Using material analysis and crack growth modeling, simplified simulations
were created to compare the benefits of utilizing an ISHMS on aging aircraft to the
status quo of flying without an ISHMS installed. The potential benefit of an ISHMS
was determined from both the safety and cost perspectives. Cost savings achieved
from reduced maintenance inspections constrain the maximum limit of the ISHMS
development, procurement, and installation costs. From a purely cost standpoint the
ISHMS would not be beneficial if its life-cycle costs exceeded the cost savings it pro-
vided. Any additional positive and negative effects beyond the maintenance realm
were also considered. For example, if an ISHMS limited the aircraft performance
significantly enough to degrade aircraft mission effectiveness, then the ISHMS would
not be beneficial, even if the maintenance costs savings were favorable.
This thesis is organized in an attempt to walk you through the various steps from
identifying the problem to recommending further research areas to solve the problem.
The next chapter, Chapter 2, provides a more detailed description of the background
associated with the problem and summarizes the findings of the relevant literature
pertaining to the problem and its background. The team decided to concentrate on
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the development of an SE approach to an ISHMS. Chapter 3 explains the scope,
or boundaries, of the problem and the methodology used to solve it. The results
of implementing the methodology are presented in Chapter 4. Finally, Chapter 5
declares the conclusions drawn from this study and provides recommendations for
further research in this problem area.
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Figure 2.1: Chapter 2 Decomposition
This chapter (Figure 2.1) provides the background on the problem of aging air-
craft and structural health. The chapter begins with a look at aircraft structural
failures and how flight safety is determined, specifically with respect to aircraft struc-
tural failure. Next, it contains a review of aging aircraft and the associated issues and
problems. This leads to a summary of structural health monitoring implementations
to-date and an examination of solutions to maintaining the safety of aging fleets with
limited budgets. The chapter then provides a more detailed review of the issues as-
sociated with the aging A-37 and T-37 aircraft. Finally, a summary of the systems
engineering process is presented.
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2.1 Aircraft Structural Failures
Structural failure occurs when a structure breaks in such a way that it can
no longer carry as much load as it could before the failure [2]. A failure of any
aircraft structure can be catastrophic. Aircraft structural failures usually result from
design and manufacture flaws, maintenance damage, or damage occurring during
operational use. Structural damage resulting from maintenance actions is rare. In
fact, operational use exacerbating an existing flaw from design or manufacture is
most often the reason for aircraft structural failure. A complete understanding of
aircraft structural failure phenomenon enables engineers, maintainers, and other key
personnel to correct or mitigate problems before structural failure occurs.
While rare, maintenance personnel can cause damage to aircraft structures in
innumerable ways. Maintainers may perform improper maintenance, using the in-
correct maintenance practices, and wrong materials, parts, or tools. These foreign
parts or materials may not perform as required and can cause damage to neighboring
structural elements that may see increased loads as a result. When reassembling the
aircraft, maintainers cannot assemble the aircraft back to its precise configuration
prior to disassembly. This change in aircraft structural configuration can change load
paths on structural elements. The mere act of walking, leaning, or sitting on struc-
tural members may impart a load on a structural element not seen during operational
use. Maintenance is critical to the aircraft, and aircraft maintainers are skilled, tal-
ented individuals. As stated, rarely will maintainers cause any significant structural
damage to an aircraft; however, the possibility exists and must be considered.
The type of damage that causes structural failure usually is born during the
design or manufacturing stage. Similar to maintainers, the aircraft manufacturing
technician may unknowingly introduce damage to an aircraft. Again while rare, tech-
nicians may not assemble exactly to the design and introduce unintended loads. Air-
craft designers can also introduce flaws through poor design and poor selection of
materials. Even if a person could discount maintenance, all materials have internal
7
flaws due to design and manufacturing induced flaws, that are not perceptible during
manufacture and contribute to variability in material strength. It can be generally
assumed that these material flaws exist in all new aircraft, and these flaws will even-
tually become cracks. These imperceptible flaws will most likely be the eventual root
cause of structural failure when exposed to the punishment of aircraft operations.
Operational use is the main cause of structural damage. Occasionally, in-flight
damage such as bird strikes can contribute to structural damage. However, the main
causes of structural damage and, ultimately, failure are the repeated loading and
cycling that occurs on the structure from takeoffs, landings, flight maneuvers and
aircraft weapons and g-loads. The severity and frequency of the loading and cycling
directly correlate with how quickly and to what degree structural damage occurs.
Today, the operational use of many aircraft exceeds that for which it was originally
designed. This translates to quicker and more rampant structural damage than was
estimated during design.
The most probable locations for structural damage resulting from operational
use are known as fatigue critical locations (FCL). FCLs are where local stresses are
usually highest. Fatigue critical locations can also result from a particular structural
element’s material or design that makes it more susceptible to fatigue. Examples of
common FCLs are joints, rivet holes, and bolt holes.
Corrosion and fatigue represent the two highest concerns regarding structural
damage. Corrosion only occurs during operational use. Fatigue, as mentioned, is
an exacerbation, during operational use, of a previous condition. While corrosion is
theoretically preventable, fatigue is not. Fatigue will eventually lead to structural
failure. When failure occurs depends on the number of inherent flaws, the location of
the flaws in the aircraft, and the severity of operational use.
Typically, corrosion alone is not a cause for structural failure. Corrosion is
inspected for during maintenance and removed or structures are replaced wherever
found. Detection inside the aircraft is usually limited to visual means; therefore,
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corrosion may not be discovered on some structural elements. This undiscovered cor-
rosion can cause a significantly decreased damage tolerance in a structural element.
For instance, if a crack were to propagate in a corroded structural element, the com-
bination of the crack and corrosion would decrease the elements strength greater than
either one alone.
Structural fatigue resulting from repetitive operational use is the primary cause
of structural failure. For example, aluminum, a type of material used in aircraft
design, does not have an endurance limit; therefore, it accumulates damage with
use. Use generates fatigue, so to avoid fatigue would mean to avoid use. This is not
practical, thus fatigue is not preventable. Fatigue must be understood and monitored
to mitigate the potential catastrophic effects.
Fatigue generally results from two types of loading: low cycle and high cycle.
Flight maneuvering and aircraft loading generate low-cycle fatigue. Low-cycle fatigue
usually has a higher amplitude and lower frequency than high-cycle fatigue. Vibration
from aerodynamic, mechanical, or acoustic sources leads to high-cycle fatigue. The
loads generated from flight maneuvering and aircraft loading can be estimated quite
well during aircraft design. These estimations remain quite accurate as long as the
aircraft operates within the original design parameters for operational use. In contrast,
the high-cycle loads can also be estimated during aircraft design, but these loads will
most probably change later in the aircraft’s life. This phenomenon occurs due to
changes in the response of the structure due to wear, repairs, structural cracks or
variations in operational use or aircraft configuration.
Cracking is a result of fatigue. Since cracking can not be prevented, it needs to
be precisely predicted such that aircraft safety can be maintained. Crack prediction
encompasses timing of crack initiation and crack growth speed. Progress has been
made in the areas of crack initiation and small-crack growth, but predictive mod-
eling of these phenomenons still eludes the scientific community [61]. If initiation
and growth are accurately predicted, timing of critical crack length can be predicted.
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Critical length is defined as the crack length that will cause structural failure of the
fatigued element. This assumes a single crack in an element. Widespread fatigue
damage (WFD) complicates the problem further. The existence of multiple cracks
of sufficient size and density to decrease strength is WFD. The multiple cracks may
occur in the same structural element or adjacent structural elements. Whenever and
however cracking occurs, the more accurately it can be predicted and the effects on
structural strength analyzed; the longer aircraft can be safely flown prior to mainte-
nance action or aircraft retirement. [61]
Cracking is such a critical safety issue that aircraft designers account for its
occurrence during design. Typically, aircraft designers account for structural cracks
through two design approaches, safe crack growth design and fail-safe design. Safe
crack growth is typically used for high-performance combat aircraft where weight is
a considerable consideration. Safe crack growth design ensures that the maximum
probable undetectable initial manufacturing flaw will not grow to critical size in any
critical structure during the operational life of the aircraft. This requires a consider-
able engineering analysis using crack growth prediction models. Since the prediction
models are not precise, a large safety factor is introduced. Additionally, concerns
exist with not accounting for all possible FCLs in the original analysis. Other loca-
tions may also become critical in aging aircraft. Fail-safe design relies on multiple,
redundant load paths or crack arrest features to mitigate the effects of cracks. This
design approach is typically used in larger aircraft.
Understanding aircraft structural failures and their causes is a complex problem.
While work is still being done, predictive models are not always accurate. Detection
of structural damage can be difficult. Overall, structural integrity issues for aging
aircraft are particularly difficult because the damage under consideration consists of
multiple interacting flaws and the crack sizes are often in a range where the phe-
nomenon is complex and not well behaved [61].
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2.2 Flight Safety
Aircraft in-flight safety is critical. Obviously, a critical failure occurring dur-
ing flight affects flight itself, and thus could spell catastrophic consequences for the
aircraft, its crew, passengers, and cargo. As such, a balance is struck between the
accepted risk of critical failure and aircraft life. The accepted risk and aircraft life
calculations have varied over time and still vary among different aircraft users, man-
ufacturers, and stakeholders today. Often, the estimated aircraft life is based on a
very low level of probability of failure along with a high safety factor to account for
variability.
The aircraft’s life is calculated at several different intervals of time. When an
aircraft is first designed, a preliminary calculation sets the design life. This design
life is based on the expected flight profiles the aircraft will operate within, such as,
maximum g-loading, maximum flight speed, average flight speed, number of takeoffs
and landings, average flight altitude, static loads within the aircraft body such as
passengers and cargo, or any loads carried on the wings. The calculations translate
the flight loads down to local stresses on structural elements. Based on the expected
stresses over time, estimations are made on how long, often expressed in flight hours,
the highest stressed elements will last before critical failure. Typically, the safe life is
calculated as the design life. The safe life is defined as the estimated mean fatigue life
of the aircraft structure divided by a scatter factor [65]. The scatter factor ensures
the probability of failure is low. To maintain a high degree of confidence in this life
estimation, inspections are often performed on the structural elements that form the
basis for the design life, or the FCLs. If the inspections find damage occurring before
the expected timeframe, those structural elements may be replaced or redesigned.
This modification along with general aircraft maintenance will affect the original
design life, often extending the life. Additionally, inspections can be accomplished to
verify that the original design estimations regarding damage were accurate. This can
be quite challenging. Even when actual historical damage data is gathered, further
crack growth and critical crack length must be estimated.
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In general, the safe-life estimation led to aircraft being retired long before their
time. For example, if the accepted cumulative probability of failure was 99.9% over
the life of the aircraft, then for a fleet of one thousand aircraft, 999 were being
retired still having some useful life. This dilemma led to the fail-safe philosophy
where a planned inspection process was spelled out. Aircraft were allowed to continue
flying until damage discovered from planned inspections was enough to retire the
aircraft. This philosophy spawned the Aircraft Structural Integrity Program (ASIP).
The ASIP detailed the required inspections for varying aircraft. The ASIP also worked
to determine residual strength of structural elements given crack growth. It was during
this time non-destructive inspection (NDI) techniques became even more important.
Since the fail-safe philosophy was attempting to push the envelope on aircraft life,
the inspections, this philosophy required, needed to be able to detect as much of the
relevant structural damage as possible. [65]
Eventually, the fail-safe philosophy was abandoned under the ASIP and the
damage tolerance philosophy was adopted. The damage tolerance philosophy works
much like the fail-safe; however, it puts more of a focus on understanding opera-
tional stresses and loads and how they affect crack growth and structural fatigue.
This was beneficial because many aircraft users were exceeding the original operat-
ing parameters and the older methods did not consider this change would not be as
accurate. Damage tolerance assessments considered the different cycling loads, differ-
ent aircraft designs, and high-cycle and low-cycle fatigue. As such, different classes
of aircraft required different damage tolerance methodologies. Overall, the damage
tolerance approach calculates crack growth deterministically using constant material
properties and a known initial flaw size. This deterministic approach to the stochas-
tic problem of structural damage has led to new approaches being developed and
analyzed today. [65]
The probabilistic approach had been born to address the stochastic nature of
crack development and growth and variability in material properties. Additionally,
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the probabilistic approach may be able to safely extract more life from an aircraft in
today’s times of reduced budgets.
Today, the life of an aircraft fleet is no longer governed by its original design
life. To a great extent, the life is determined by the mission need, the maintenance
cost, and the economic considerations required for the fleet to continue its operational
requirements [65].
2.3 Aging Aircraft Trends
Structural health concerns are focused on aircraft with increasing age. Civilian
and military aircraft inventories have both experienced a gradual and continual in-
crease in the average aircraft age. In the civilian general aviation market, the high
cost of new aircraft reduced new aircraft purchases resulting in legacy aircraft usage
beyond the original design service life (Figure 2.2).
Civilian commercial and general aviation aircraft inventories have both increased
in average aircraft age. The high cost of new aircraft forced the civilian general
aviation market to purchase and maintain legacy aircraft beyond the original design
service life (Figure 2.3).
Similarly, the high cost of Operations and Maintenance (O&M) of legacy mili-
tary aircraft combined with the high cost of new aircraft purchase created an aging
military aircraft fleet. This trend showed that the United States was unable to pur-
chase enough new aircraft each year to reduce average aircraft age. This inability to
reduce the average age of the United States military aircraft has been coined a “death
spiral” by the Joint Council on Aging Aircraft (JCAA). The “death spiral” started
with deferring modernization and recapitalization due to constrained resources. This
resulted in the further increasing the age of weapon systems with an associated in-
crease in maintenance. This increased maintenance drove up O&M costs and reduced
readiness, which then required the shifting of funds from procurement accounts to
O&M to keep our existing systems mission capable. The Congressional Budget Office
13
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(CBO) estimated “spending on O&M for aircraft increases by 1 percent to 3 percent
for every additional year of age, after adjusting for inflation” [43]. These market forces
created an increase in the average age of military aircraft (Figure 2.4).
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Figure 2.4: Average Fleet Age [42]
One of the reasons average aircraft ages were increasing was the high cost of
purchasing new aircraft. The civilian general aviation industry incurred a large cost
risk from future aircraft liability litigation as well as regulatory cost of compliance.
The high cost of future legal defense, settlements, and regulatory compliance nega-
tively impacted the ability to produce general aviation aircraft at a low cost. The
Manufacturers Alliance (MAPI) estimated 90% of aircraft fatalities resulted in a law-
suit of the aircraft manufacturer, even though historically 85% of crashes were the
result of pilot error [52]. The rising cost of litigation parallelled the increase in lawyer
supply as well as a reduction in the burden of proof in aircraft liability cases. The
increasing numbers of lawyers (Figure 2.5) versus the number of United States citi-
zens coincides with the California Supreme Court initiated change in product liability
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laws in the 1960’s to the 1970’s. The product liability laws changed to the precept
of strict liability decreasing the burden of proof from having to show negligence to
only having to show a product defective. In 1978, “manufacturers of private aircraft
faced liability insurance expenses amounting to an average of $100,000 per aircraft
produced” [53]. This concept of strict liability spread throughout the United States
court system in the 1970’s to the 1980’s and, coupled with the increasing lawyer ca-
pacity, was widely blamed for the rise in the cost of general aviation aircraft and the
demise of the general aviation industry.
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The legal costs of the aviation industry worsened with increasing aircraft age.
Aircraft operating beyond original service life created a series of accidents and in-
cidents spurring Congress to mandate new regulations. The increase in regulations
increased the cost of regulatory compliance. New regulations enacted by Congress
occurred in waves after high profile aircraft accidents/incidents. One example of a
high visibility structural failure was that of the 1988 Aloha in-flight decompression.
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The fatigue failure of an Aloha Airlines Boeing 737 on April 28, 1988 (Figure 2.6)
resulted in Congress passing the Aviation Safety Research Act of 1988.
Figure 2.6: Boeing 737-200 Catastrophic Failure [37]
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) responded to the Aviation Safety
Research Act and concerns related to the increasing age of aircraft fleets by developing
the National Aging Aircraft Research Program (NAARP). The purpose of NAARP
was to ensure the structural integrity of high-time, high-cycle aircraft. The NAARP
cornerstone was the development of commuter aircraft supplemental structural in-
spections. The supplemental structural inspections were required by Supplemental
Inspection Documents (SID). These inspections were required for large aging trans-
port aircraft starting in the 1980’s and have successfully ensured the structural in-
tegrity of these aircraft. From 1980-1990, initiatives were created to extend this SID
process to conduct damage tolerance assessments on the airframes of small aging com-
muter aircraft. While the Aviation Safety Research Act of 1988 was successful, each
new wave of legislation increased the regulatory burden placed upon the aviation in-
dustry. Increasing the regulatory burden increases the cost of compliance, and results
in a higher cost of new aircraft. The regulations impacting the cost of new aircraft in-
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clude: The 1946 Federal Tort Claims Act which allows cases to be brought against the
federal government for the negligence of air traffic controllers, but limits liability of
military members (or survivors) to bring suit against the government. The 1958 Fed-
eral Aviation Act and Regulations which established the FAA and set minimum safety
standards for flight operations and aircraft manufacture. The 1976 Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act defined foreign states and limits suits against foreign governments and
foreign aircraft industries. Most importantly states dictate applicable law (i.e., prod-
uct liability rules). Additionally, the cost of litigation is heavily influenced by state
and federal laws; personal injury and wrongful death damage standards, “tort reform”
(limitations on recovery) measures, military contractor defense (limits manufacturer
liability), and workers’ compensation (limits the employer liability). The regulatory
cost of compliance in the aviation industry is ever increasing. The 1996 Aviation Dis-
aster Family Assistance Act required that airlines must offer crisis counseling, make
hotel rooms and food available, help family members retrieve dental records and X-
rays to identify the victims, provide transportation to and from the crash site, and
airlines should even consult family members about a memorial. Increased litigation
and regulation created an increased financial risk for general aviation industries. This
increased risk created an increased cost to mitigate the risk and resulted in an ever
increasing cost of aircraft (Figure 2.7). The increasing cost of general aviation aircraft
reduced the market demand and resulted in many general aviation aircraft builders
going out of business. [33]
In 1994, Congress moved to mitigate the external impact of increased litigation
on the general aviation industry. The United States Congress passed the General
Aviation Revitalization Act (GARA), which limited the liability of an aircraft manu-
facturer to 18 years after aircraft delivery. While this change in the legal system saved
the last few aircraft manufacturers, the number of general aviation aircraft manufac-
turers and aircraft manufactured had dwindled (Figure 2.8). The contraction in the
number of general aviation aircraft manufacturers reduced the free market ability to
keep aircraft prices down through open competition.
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A series of external liability and regulatory factors increased the cost of manu-
facturing an aircraft. This increase in new aircraft cost led many countries to conduct
a series of structural life extension programs to maximize service life of aircraft in their
inventory. The systematic process of extending aircraft service life coupled with low
numbers of new aircraft purchased created an overall increase in the average aircraft
age of both military and civilian aircraft.
The result of the increasing age of civilian and military aircraft can be broadly
categorized into increased downtime for large inspections and increased cost of inspec-
tions and repairs. Additionally, there is a hard-to-quantify effect on aircraft safety
as fatigue and environmental factors effects become wide-spread issues. Currently,
the National Transportation and Safety Board (NTSB) show only a small percentage
(∼10%) of aircraft accidents are caused by structural failures (Figure 2.9).
The potential for increased failures is caused by the aircraft age magnifying the
effects caused by: additive damage of improper usage, the compounding effects of
limited/improper maintenance, limitations in design beyond the original service life,
unforeseen material selection interactions (stress corrosion cracking), material im-
perfections becoming stress concentrations for fatigue critical locations, replacement
parts substandard micro structures/crystal structure/grain size/microvoids caused by
material impurity or heat treatment/processing deficiency. Additionally, early fabri-
cation errors may be lurking time-bombs with assembly error, machining error (stress
concentrations), welding heat treatment effects interacting with fatigue conditions,
creep, and combined loading.
2.4 Evolution of Health Monitoring Systems
In recent years, there has been an increasing effort in the aerospace domain
for the development of structural health monitoring systems for aircraft and aircraft
components. Aerospace manufacturers and numerous institutions around the world
have been working in this area and their research has been moving in many directions.
20
Figure 2.9: Aircraft Failure Causes [51]
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The traditional approach of aircraft maintenance is to conduct inspections peri-
odically based on a schedule. During the system’s design a number of critical locations
are identified and a maintenance schedule is developed with the purpose of inspecting
these locations. As the system goes into service, the periodic inspection schedule is
reevaluated and new areas requiring inspection may be identified, or the inspection
frequency for some other areas may be modified.
The periodic scheduled inspections are performed for some critical areas and se-
lected components of the aircraft, while other areas and difficult to reach components
are being inspected less frequently or whenever access to them is gained due to other
maintenance actions.
Approximately 90% of these conventional inspections [13] are visual inspections
and most of the remaining percentage are NDI. The visual inspections consist of
intensive checks using inspection aids (such as mirrors, lenses, etc) and require the
involvement of the maintenance technicians. During these inspections, the technicians
are trying to identify structural irregularities before they become critical and their
results sometimes depend on the technician’s ability to access the inspected area and
to correctly assess its condition.
The NDI and Non-Destructive Evaluation (NDE) techniques consist of some of
the following:
• ultrasound inspections, eddy currents
• Magnetic Particle Inspections
• Fluorescent Penetrate Inspections
• x-ray inspections
These techniques provide some level of automation of the inspection procedure
comparing to the visual inspections. A basic limitation of these methods is that
these techniques can only inspect and detect specific types of flaws. Ultrasounds,
for example, are efficient in detecting corrosion and flaws in composites and surfaces;
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Eddy currents are efficient for fatigue cracking detection. Also, these methods are
generally customized to inspect a specified area (e.g. different ultrasound probes
are developed to inspect different areas). Some NDE inspections may be performed
once while some others may require extensive preparation and/or significant system
downtime. Although these inspections can be more effective than conventional visual
inspections, they only provide a snapshot of the inspected area at the time of the
inspection.
According to the traditional approach, aircraft maintenance is based on record-
ing and monitoring parameters such as flight hours, mission type and duration, aircraft
configuration flown, etc. These parameters are used to schedule the maintenance for
each individual aircraft and also to manage the total fleet. A basic assumption is that
fleet average parameters match those of the individual aircraft.
As the experience and knowledge on aircraft use and maintenance practices
increased worldwide, it became understood that each aircraft operator has a different
system usage. There is different usage of each individual aircraft in the same fleet and
that the approach of conducting maintenance based on fleet wide average parameters
is not accurate enough. Especially, the operators of military aircraft (fighter, trainer,
attack aircraft) realized that there is substantial variability in their usage profiles and
that their aircraft cannot be tracked based only administrative parameters such as
flight hours. Also, the operators realized that the actual usage loading on their systems
was more severe than that predicted from the design models. More accurate methods
for aircraft systems management were developed but there is still a large variability
among the different operators. As a result of this understanding, the concept of a
fatigue management program and the idea of a Structural Health Monitoring System
(SHMS) have emerged.
2.4.1 Fatigue Management Programs. Fatigue management program follows
an integrated plan comprising of 4 factors [7]. These 4 factors are the fatigue manage-
ment process, an individual aircraft tracking program, a fatigue monitoring system,
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and the calibration of fleet results. The fatigue management process starts during the
design of the system and continues during the system’s operational life with fatigue
monitoring, which is the process of collecting operational loading data. The reason
for performing fatigue monitoring is to record the actual operational loading history
of the aircraft, to ensure that the aircraft is not operated beyond an acceptable risk
level, and to ensure that the aircraft will survive at least throughout its design life
under normal operating conditions. As part of the fatigue management program, the
collected loading data is used in order to improve the systems structural integrity.
The first fatigue management programs were mainly centered around load mon-
itoring. The reason is that operational loads are an essential parameter for describing
the aircraft usage and predicting the system’s residual life. The loads were monitored
by using strain gauges installed at various points on the aircraft or by recording flight
parameters and calculating (using mathematical models) the resulting loads for the
critical locations. The main advantages of this approach are that it allows the actual
usage to be determined, it helps the user operate the aircraft accordingly, and it allows
the residual life of the system to be fairly accurately estimated. This approach for
conducting fatigue management guarantees the safe-life performance of the aircraft
and is very popular among the operators of military aircraft.
The more current approach for managing the fatigue on an aircraft is by damage
monitoring. Fatigue management programs based on this approach are still in the
development stage. This type of program tries to record and monitor the initiation and
development of cracks at various points on the aircraft. The goal is to be able to detect
the degradation of the aircraft structure and to avoid critical failures. Monitoring
the crack length (measure of the damage), the crack growth (which defines the rate
of damage accumulation), and the prediction of the fracture point of a component
should be made with an accuracy that will allow the aircraft to be operated within
the acceptable risk levels. The basic idea behind damage monitoring is depicted in
Figure 2.10.
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Figure 2.10: Principle of Damage Monitoring [13]
The corrosion prevention plans are also part of the fatigue management pro-
grams. The prevention of corrosion is a major issue for aircraft manufacturers and
operators. The reason is that it is difficult to detect the initiation point of corrosion.
Also, the effects of corrosion on the system increase nonlinearly as the age increases.
The individual aircraft tracking program (IAT), used as part of the fatigue
management program, allows the development of a maintenance schedule, including
inspections, repairs, and modifications for each individual aircraft. It also allows the
maintenance to be scheduled and performed not based on flight hours but on the actual
fatigue loads and/or crack lengths of the aircraft. Such a program is very beneficial
especially when there is great variability in the operational use of the aircraft among
different users (e.g. different squadrons). It allows the identification of usage trends,
the controlled life consumption of the system, and the modification of the operational
usage (if necessary). Moreover, the operators do not need to rely on fleet-wide average
parameters since each aircraft is being monitored individually.
2.4.2 Health Monitoring Systems. The basic idea behind the health moni-
toring systems is a system that is installed on an aircraft and continuously monitors
parameters such as strain, vibrations, electrical signals, acoustic waves, temperatures,
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etc exercised on the components/systems during their operation. The health mon-
itoring system would allow the operators to obtain frequent views of the systems
condition instead of getting snapshots whenever an inspection is performed. These
frequent views of the system would allow the operators to diagnose the condition of
the aircraft at any moment during its life and make predictions about its future state.
A system performing this monitoring could consist of a set of sensors installed on
the components or the aircraft structure. Figure 2.11 represents a depiction of this
concept.
A health monitoring system is the most advanced NDE method. It allows non-
destructive inspections to be performed continuously on numerous points of the sys-
tem, even the most inaccessible areas, and (comparing with the conventional NDI)
provides frequent views of the system’s condition. This way the NDE technology
becomes an integral part of the aircraft structure.
Structure Wiring +Sensors Structure with Integrated 
Monitoring System 
Figure 2.11: Monitoring Integration on a Structure [7]
The first applications of monitoring systems were designed basically to moni-
tor the operation of electronic components found in avionics and flight control sys-
tems. Other early monitoring systems were capable of performing loads monitoring
of specific areas on the aircraft structure and the engine components. These sys-
tems collected loading and/or flight data from different points via sensors or through
the existing parts of the aircraft. For example, pressure sensors that are part of the
operation of an engine subsystem are being used also for collecting data for mon-
itoring purposes. These systems had limited analysis capabilities. They recorded
26
the collected data which was later downloaded into a workstation for analysis and
evaluation. The loads monitoring and flight data recordings were not continuous and
were limited by the processing capabilities and storage capacity of the monitoring
system’s electronic parts. From the characteristics of the monitoring systems as de-
scribed above, it is apparent that these early systems were not truly integrated with
the aircraft.
In those early monitoring systems designs, the gauges had to be very close to
the monitored area. The efficiency of these systems was largely dependent on whether
an area was monitored and the occurrence of the damaging event was recorded. This
means that, since only specific points were monitored, if a damaging event occurred
at another point, it might not have been recorded.
As the sensors technology advanced, new smaller, less expensive, and more
reliable sensing devices were developed. With the new technologies, it became feasible
for the sensing and actuation devices to be integrated with the components and the
structure. The most widely used types of sensing devices are piezoelectric and fiber
optic sensors.
Figure 2.12: Evolution of Fatigue Monitoring Systems [7]
Piezoelectric sensors are mainly used to monitor accelerations and vibrations.
New designs of ceramic piezoelectric sensors can be bonded on the structural surfaces
and can even be integrated into composite materials (smart layer concept). The fiber
optic sensors have the advantages of being lightweight, highly sensitive, and only
require low-power consumption. These sensors can have a long lifetime and low costs
but, on the other hand they are difficult to repair [13].
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Together with the progress in the sensors design came a shift towards the concept
of an ISHMS. The purpose of such a system is to continuously monitor the aircraft’s
hot spots and to be able to perform an analysis of the recorded data and generate
maintenance recommendations. With an ISHMS, it is not necessary to monitor the
entire aircraft; only the most critical locations need to be monitored. Networks of
sensors monitoring these critical locations are designed and improved diagnostics al-
gorithms are developed. The ultimate goal of these sophisticated ISHM systems is to
function as the nervous system of the aircraft.
The use of the existing health monitoring systems has shown that these systems
can help reduce the maintenance related costs during the life cycle of an aircraft and
can improve the systems reliability. They can also help to migrate from the schedule
based maintenance (the traditional approach) to conditional based maintenance on
the aircraft.
Currently, the community is at a turn in the evolution of SHMS. Manufacturers
and researchers from all over the world are working on the development of new types
of sensors, such as thermal, or sensors that are using acoustic or electromagnetic
waves, in order to improve the direct damage monitoring. They are, also trying to
combine the sensors into networks and to integrate the monitoring systems into the
new aircraft systems during the design phase. A higher degree of customization in
the maintenance of each aircraft and fleets being used for longer time (service lives
of 40-50 years will be more common) are expected as a result of the use of advanced
ISHMS.
In general, one can discern a trend towards the automation of the inspection
process and other maintenance actions. Besides NDI methods and the design of ad-
vanced monitoring systems, other efforts include the robot assisted inspections, where
specially designed and equipped robots are used instead of technicians to perform the
visual and NDI/NDE. The advantage of this concept is the use of these robots allows
the performance of inspections in areas hard to reach with small effort and minimum
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teardown. The data collected from the robots is transferred to a workstation where
the data is further analyzed.
2.5 Aging Aircraft Problem
In the recent years, an increase in the number of aircraft flying throughout
the world has been observed. A large number of these aircraft have become aging
(e.g. aircraft that have been flying for more than 15 years) [13]. This percentage is
continually increasing. There is also an increasing number of military aircraft that
have been flown for more than 40 years (e.g. F-4, C-135, B-52). Additionally, many
mature aircraft are reaching the end of their design life.
At the same time, many aircraft operators, both commercial airlines and gov-
ernments operating military aircraft, have to deal with financial hardships as a result
of budgetary restrictions. Since they have aging aircraft in their inventory, these
operators have to decide whether to choose the (usually) more expensive alternative
of purchasing new systems or continue using their existing aircraft. Very often, the
operators’ decision is to try to get as much benefit as possible out of their investment
before they retire their aircraft. Operators are also seeking a more efficient use of
their systems. This creates a worldwide demand for continued use of aging aircraft
fleets.
This demand, though, is not easy to satisfy. As the aircraft age increases,
the problems generated by fatigue and corrosion increase. Increased numbers of in-
spections and other maintenance actions (repairs, modifications) are required, which
usually leads to decreased system availability. The maintenance related costs (which
is the biggest cost driver) and the safety risks (mainly due to fatigue problems) are
also increasing while the increased age creates restrictions in the operational use of
the aircraft (e.g. configuration limitations, flight envelope restrictions). Therefore,
for aircraft that are reaching their design life, a life extension is needed.
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The aging problem became even more important after the Aloha airlines ac-
cident in the 1980’s. That accident resulted in stricter airworthiness requirements
and created pressure from the FAA towards the aircraft systems industry to deal
with the aging aircraft problem. The stricter requirements translated into increased
maintenance actions and costs.
This thesis mentioned that the problems generated by fatigue and corrosion are
increasing with the system’s age. Cyclic fatigue degrades the structural life capability,
and its effects are even more substantial when combined with corrosion. This is not
a big problem for the mechanical, or the high-cost electronic components, or even
the engines, since these parts can be easily replaced. However, when it comes to the
aircraft structure (which has a relatively low-cost), the effects of fatigue and corrosion
combined with the age, becomes a very serious problem. The reason is because the
structure cannot be easily modified, let alone replaced, after it has been designed and
manufactured.
There have been many different approaches, or design philosophies, that tried
to deal with the age generated fatigue and the life extension problems. Examples of
such design philosophies are the safe-life design, fail-safe design and damage tolerant
design. Several life extension concepts such as the SLEP and the ASIP have been
implemented. Each of these approaches has been used in different aircraft types.
Sometimes different approaches or combinations of approaches have been used for the
same aircraft type. Historically, one could say that both approaches have been used
equally on all the aircraft types that required a life extension.
2.5.1 Safe-Life Design. The main idea of the Safe-Life design concept is
that the components and the structures are designed in such a way so that they
can survive throughout their specified design life. This means that the components
are expected to function without any maintenance requirements (fatigue inspections,
repairs, modifications, etc), and are being replaced as soon as they reach a specified
time. The replacement at the specified time is being done in order to maintain the
30
desired safety level. In order to determine the inspection intervals and the replacement
time in the safe life approach, the designers are trying to forecast the crack initiation
and growth.
The replacement of the components at a predetermined time, though, is a rather
conservative approach. At the time of replacement, the components may not have
fatigue cracks long enough to justify their condemnation. As a result, the condemned
parts may still have some useful life remaining, which is wasted. If a crack has
initiated and has grown on a component before it reaches its design life, then, as soon
as the crack is discovered (during inspection), it has to be repaired resulting in aircraft
downtime and maintenance costs. The safe-life design approach, also, does not take
into consideration the corrosion, which, as it was mentioned earlier, combined with
the fatigue can have serious impact on the component.
According to the fail-safe design philosophy, the components or structures are
designed so that, if they ever fail, their failure will occur in such a way that it will
cause the minimum damage to the system. This philosophy is trying to overcome the
disadvantage of wasting useful life as experienced in the safe-life design.
2.5.2 Damage Tolerance Design. Another philosophy is the Damage toler-
ance design. This term is used to describe the design of a system that has the ability
to withstand damage. Safety-by-inspection is the main idea behind this design. The
objective of such a design is to ensure that cracks do not grow beyond a critical size
(i.e. a size that could affect the system’s safety level) during the component’s design
life. In order to design a component and a system using this philosophy, there are
some issues that need to be answered:
• What types of loads will be exercised on the component during its operational
life?
• What are the sizes of these loads?
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• How long can the component endure operating under this loading before a failure
occurs?
• Once a crack has initiated on the component, how long will it take until it
reaches a critical size?
The other part of the aging aircraft problem, besides dealing with the age gen-
erated fatigue, is how to extend the aging aircraft’s service life. Using the results of
aircraft loading analysis, corrosion and fatigue testing, and damage tolerance analy-
sis, the engineers can extend the aircraft’s service life for a number of flight hours.
The goal is to determine inspection intervals that will guarantee the required safety
level. This extension is usually accompanied by some restrictions on the operational
use (e.g., limitations in the flight envelope) and by more detailed and more extensive
inspections.
2.5.3 SLEP. One solution that has been developed to achieve this service-
life extension for various aircraft types is the SLEP. This solution involves the iden-
tification of the fatigue critical structural components on an aging aircraft and their
subsequent replacement or modification before the service life can be extended. The
purpose of these replacements and modifications is to ensure that the affected com-
ponents will be able to operate throughout the extension period without the require-
ment for any additional maintenance (inspections, repairs, modifications, etc), an idea
which is encountered in the safe-life design concept. The identification of those fatigue
critical areas and the replacement or modification of the components is usually a time
consuming process and requires a lot of effort to assess the effects of these mainte-
nance actions to the safety level. The mid-life upgrade programs that are developed
for the various aircraft types are also in the same direction as the SLEP.
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2.5.4 ASIP. The other major concept that has been implemented in order
to extend the service life of various aging aircraft is the ASIP. The basic idea of ASIP
is to perform a major structural inspection after a number of flight hours or, even
better, a number of fatigue cycles have accumulated, instead of replacing the critical
components based on their accumulated operation time as in SLEP. The time this
inspection will be performed differs for each individual aircraft. The areas where
problems (fatigue cracks, corrosion) are identified can be either repaired or replaced.
ASIP is more related to the damage tolerance design philosophy.
In order to develop and apply an ASIP, the identification of the structural critical
locations is required. This is being done by using the results of the Major Airframe
Fatigue Test (MAFT) conducted during design. Information obtained from periodic
scheduled maintenance performed, after the aircraft goes into service, is being used
to update the MAFT results. Based on this information, the areas where WFD in
aging aircraft occurs, are identified. These areas require special attention during the
structural inspection to ensure timely detection of fatigue damage.
Subsequently, a structural inspection program is developed with the purpose to
inspect and, if necessary, repair the critical areas. Extensive teardown inspections are
included in the structural inspection program as well as NDI (ultrasound and eddy-
current inspections are essential actions in ASIP), component testing, and full-scale
fatigue tests. Theoretical models are also being used to estimate and forecast the
fatigue effects.
A result of the above analysis is a customized inspection schedule for each
individual aircraft. Other results are major modifications and/or repairs aiming to
improve the structural integrity of the aircraft. These modifications/repairs are also
customized for each individual aircraft. This customization refers to both the extent
of the inspections/repairs/modifications and the timeframe these maintenance actions
are going to be performed.
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In the early ASIP plans, that were developed for various aircraft, only the effects
of fatigue were taken into consideration. The effects of corrosion on aging aircraft and
actions to deal with those were not included. This approach has changed in the recent
years and corrosion prevention and repair is now part of an ASIP plan.
After the installation of early SHMS on some aircraft types, obtaining and an-
alyzing loading data for each aircraft became possible. This data was also used to
assess the structural integrity of the aircraft and to develop the ASIP plan, simulta-
neously increasing the degree of customization in the maintenance of each individual
aircraft.
The application of the concepts discussed above by many manufacturers and
operators around the world allowed the safe service-life extension on many aircraft
types and provided some solutions for the aging aircraft problem.
2.6 T-37 and A-37 Historical Background
The A-37 aircraft is part of a long evolution of the T-37 trainer aircraft, which
was modified extensively to satisfy varying mission needs and engineering designs.
In order to fully understand the history of the A-37 aircraft, it is necessary to start
by explaining the development of its predecessor, the T-37 aircraft. During the early
1950’s the USAF decided that a lower performance jet trainer was needed to bridge the
gap between the propeller-driven trainers and Lockheed’s advanced jet T-33 Shoot-
ing Star being used in the pilot training curriculum [62]. In the fall of 1952, eight
manufacturers submitted a total of fifteen designs during the Request for Proposals
phase. The Cessna Aircraft Company won the contract with their Model 318 pro-
posal, designated the T-37 (nicknamed Tweet) by the USAF. The contract required a
total of three prototype aircraft and the first XT-37 prototype made its initial flight
on 12 October 1954. After extensive flight tests and several modifications, the USAF
ordered 11 pre-production T-37A aircraft. The first was delivered and accepted in
September, 1955. However, the T-37A did not enter USAF operational service until
the summer of 1957, when it was used by Air Education and Training Command
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to teach student pilots basic military maneuvers and techniques, excluding ordnance
delivery and in-flight refuelling [62].
2.6.1 T-37 (Tweet) Development. The original T-37A aircraft had an empty
weight of 3,870 pounds and a maximum gross weight of 6,400 pounds [62]. Each of
the twin-engines generated only 920 pounds of thrust. The T-37A aircraft impressed
USAF maintenance personnel for its ease of maintenance, easy access to all com-
ponents, and low overall maintenance requirements [62]. A total of 534 A-models,
including the 11 preproduction units, were manufactured by October, 1959. In early
1959, Cessna and the USAF agreed on a configuration update for the T-37 and on 6
November 1959, the first T-37B was introduced into the USAF fleet [62]. Among the
most significant modifications were:
1. New 1,025 pound thrust Continental/Teledyne J69-T-25 engines.
2. A very high frequency omni-directional navigation receiver.
3. Military-standard Ultrahigh Frequency (UHF) radio transceiver.
4. A redesigned instrument panel layout.
In total, 552 T-37B aircraft were produced between 1959 and 1968, many of
which were A-models retrofitted to the improved B-model standards. At the same
time, Cessna and the USAF engaged in a military sales campaign to deliver T-37
aircraft to several countries under the Military Assistance Program (MAP) [62].
The T-37’s flight control system is basic and conventional: all primary
flight controls (ailerons, elevators, and rudder) are operated via cables,
pulleys, cranks, and push-pull rods while secondary flight controls (aileron
trim tab, elevator trim tab, and rudder trim tab) are electrically operated
from the cockpit. The fuel system consists of three fuel tanks; one on each
wing and one in the fuselage. The aircraft’s onboard fuel capacity was
2,000 pounds (309 gallons) of fuel with a maximum range of 470 nautical
miles without external fuel tanks. [62]
As a trainer aircraft, the T-37 was considered a perfect introduction to military
jet aviation because of its outstanding safety record, its side-by-side seat arrangement,
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as well as for its maneuverability and stability throughout its flight envelope [62]. In
addition, the T-37’s acquisition and operating costs were the lowest on record.
2.6.2 A-37 (Dragonfly) Development. In 1961, Cessna used a T-37B as the
prototype for a new fighter aircraft model designated T-37C [62]. The concept resulted
from USAF interest in a small, cheap combat aircraft for counterinsurgency operations
against fast, well-armed guerrilla forces. The aircraft was intended primarily for
export to foreign air forces that could not afford the current front-line jet fighters. In
order to allow carriage of the external stores, Cessna had to increase the structural
strength of the wing spars. The new design included jettisonable 65-gallon wingtip
fuel tanks and a single weapons station under each wing. For weapons delivery, the
T-37C incorporated a K-14C computing gunsight and an AN-N-6 16mm gun camera.
Each pylon could carry a rocket pod, a gun pod, a bomb of up to 250 pounds, or an
AIM-9 Sidewinder air-to-air missile. However, the modified aircraft was 10% slower
because it used the same engines even though its gross weight was increased by 2,000
pounds. The T-37 fighter concept provided limited ground attack capability, but
according to Shiel, the aircraft was really suitable only as a ground attack training
aircraft [62]. A total of 273 T-37C aircraft were built and all were sold to foreign
countries under the MAP.
In 1963, the USAF Aeronautical Systems Division at Wright-Patterson Air Force
Base (AFB) issued a contract to Cessna for the development and evaluation of two
YAT-37D prototypes [62]. The most significant changes were:
1. Two General Electric J85-J-2/5 engines each generating 2,400 pound thrust.
2. A total of three weapon stations under each wing.
3. Armor plating (7/32-inch steel) on the cockpit floor and behind the seats for
protection against ground fire from up to 30 caliber weapons.
4. Self-sealing fuel tanks able to sustain penetration by up to 30 caliber weapons.
5. Vortex generators located on top of the wings
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6. GE GAU-2B/A 7.62mm Minigun mounted in the nose compartment with 1,500
rounds of ammunition.
7. Mk Mod 4 gun sight mounted in front of the pilot.
8. Wingtip mounted 95-gallon external fuel tanks.
9. Larger wheels and tires for use on unimproved runways.
10. Special avionics package for communication, navigation, and target acquisition.
After all flight tests and evaluations were performed, the prototypes did not
lead to a production contract and on December, 1964 the prototypes were retired [62].
Nevertheless, the USAF again became interested in the YAT-37 as a replacement for
the aging Douglas A-1E Skyraiders, which were performing well in the Vietnam War,
but were sustaining heavy combat losses [32].
In August 1966, the two retired YAT-37 were refurbished and a fourth external
weapons pylon was added under each wing [62]. The USAF issued a contract for
the delivery of 39 AT-37D aircraft, which were redesignated A-37A, to be tested in
combat in South Vietnam under Operation Combat Dragon. In the aircraft’s first
3,000 combat sorties, no A-37A aircraft were lost to hostile fire [32]. The Combat
Dragon Operation evaluated the aircraft on its performance on close air support,
escort, and armed reconnaissance missions. The evaluation identified several areas for
improvement, which led to the development of the A-37B Dragonfly (Cessna Model
318E) and a $3.6 million USAF contract for the delivery of 197 new A-37B aircraft.
In addition, the contract required the airframe to be strengthened to a maximum
gross weight of 14,000 pounds and to include in-flight refueling capabilities. However,
many of the basic systems on the A-37 aircraft, such as hydraulics and electrical
components, were the same as those found on the original T-37 aircraft [62].
Most A-37B aircraft Cessna produced were exported under the MAP, many of
those going to South and Central American countries (Table 2.1) [62]. Additional
A-37 aircraft were later provided to MAP countries as the aircraft were removed
from active USAF service. Some of the exported aircraft had the refueling probe
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Table 2.1: A-37 deliveries to the MAPA countries [62]
A-37 Deliveries to South and Central America
Country Quantity Year Notes
Chile 34 1974-75
Colombia 26 1980 including 12 for anti-drug efforts
Ecuador 12 1975
El Salvador 21 1983-84 including 3 replacements in 1991
Guatemala 13 1969, 1973
Honduras 15 1974-75
Peru 36 1974-75 including last production A-37B
Uruguay 12 1975
removed or replaced with a shorter probe for use as a single-point ground refueling
system. Since then, the A-37 aircraft has proved to be an ideal aircraft for operation
by countries with limited defense budgets and smaller, less technologically advanced
air forces [62].
Despite their success, many of the existing T-37 and A-37 aircraft are approach-
ing or have exceeded the end of their design life. During the last two decades, the
USAF has developed and implemented several programs designed to extend the life
of these aircraft without jeopardizing the safety of flight. Two of these programs are
the A-37 SLEP and the A-37 ASIP, both of which will be briefly discussed in the
following sections.
According to the 2005 Air Force Almanac, there are still 283 T-37 aircraft in
USAF inventory with an average age of 40.8 years [6]. There are only two older air-
frames in the USAF inventory, namely the B-52 with 42.8 and the C-135 with 42.6
years respectively. Even though these life extension programs have been quite success-
ful in accomplishing their goals, the reality is that the T-37 and A-37 airframes are
requiring an increasing amount of preventive maintenance and inspections. In most
instances, this means extensive grounding time and escalating maintenance costs,
which ultimately affects mission accomplishment. The USAF has decided to replace
their aging T-37 fleet with Raytheon’s T-6 Texan II aircraft. However, some MAP
countries have limited budgets and can not afford the replacement of their aging A-
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37 or T-37 fleet. These countries would prefer to see the development of an aircraft
structural health monitoring system that would allow the continued operation of their
aircraft without the increased maintenance burden.
2.6.3 Life Extension. Documentation on the service life of both the T-37
and the A-37 aircraft is quite limited mainly because these are outdated airframes.
In addition, information on the A-37 aircraft is usually harder to find because it
is no longer in the USAF’s inventory, nor is it easily accessible because of foreign
policies and clauses. Furthermore, there are many factors that can affect an aircraft’s
service life and those factors can vary drastically between countries, which further
complicates the task of accurately and precisely estimating the additional service life
of a fleet of aircraft. For example, environmental factors, aircraft loading factors, the
aggressiveness of the flying profiles, operational usage tempo, maintenance schedules
and procedures are only some factors that can have a tremendous impact on the service
life of each individual aircraft. Nevertheless, the thesis group was able to contact the
Ogden Air Logistics Center, Mature & Proven Aircraft Directorate (MAPA), Integrity
and Analysis Engineering Branch (OO-ALC/LCEI) at Hill AFB who provided some
information on the T-37 SLEP, the T-37 ASIP and the A-37 safe-life programs. The
following is a compilation of the procedures and findings.
2.6.4 T-37 SLEP. Cessna Aircraft Company initially estimated the T-37’s
original design life to be 8,000 flight-hours and 20,000 landings [60]. According to
the publication Cessna Warbirds, between June 1969 and December 1970, Cessna’s
Military Twin Division conducted an exhaustive fatigue life testing program on the T-
37B with the goal of extending the Tweet’s life to 15,000 flying hours. After extensive
testing, Cessna engineers identified several critical fatigue areas that were not being
monitored at that time. In addition, Cessna recommended three specific structural
modifications, all of which were approved by the USAF and allowed the T-37B fleet
to achieve the target 15,000-hour service life. In 1988, almost 20 years later, the
USAF completed a durability and damage tolerance analysis and determined that
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the T-37 fleet was flying at risk [18]. Later in August of 1989, with many T-37
aircraft approaching the 15,000-hour limit, Sabreliner Corporation was awarded a
contract to design and implement a SLEP that involved the modification of four
major structural components that included: (1) the forward lower wing spar, (2) the
fuselage forward carry-through structure, (3) the horizontal stabilizer and (4) the
horizontal stabilizer support structure called the banjo fittings. The objective of the
T-37 SLEP was to extend the life of the T-37 fleet such that it would be inspection-free
in the SLEP-modified areas for at least an additional 8,000 flight hours. Southwest
Research Institute (SwRI) served as principal subcontractor responsible for most of
the engineering work performed during the T-37 SLEP. SwRI identified and ranked
the T-37 FCLs in the SLEP-modified areas of the aircraft. As a result, the majority
of the FCLs originally documented by Cessna Corporation were eliminated. The
concluding remarks of the report indicate that:
The SLEP full-scale aircraft durability and tolerance testing, together with
the SLEP damage tolerance analysis, demonstrated that all modified areas
would be inspection-free for at least 8,000 flight hours. [18]
During the 1990s, six T-37 aircraft were instrumented with flight load data
recorders (FLDR) in an effort to characterize the way these aircraft were being flown
in the Undergraduate Pilot Training, Instructor Pilot Training, and Euro-NATO Joint
Jet Pilot Training programs. The data from the FLDRs was used to update the SLEP
damage tolerance analysis performed in October 1998 and indicated that the 8,000
flight hour inspection-free goal was still being met in most SLEP FCLs. The following
table shows a compilation of the FCLs identified in the 1998 SLEP study (Figure 2.13).
2.6.5 T-37 ASIP. The ASIP master plan was developed for the T-37 aircraft
and is revised annually by Ogden Air Logistics Center [60]. The purpose of the ASIP
master plan is to define and document the specific approach to accomplish the various
ASIP tasks throughout the life-cycle of each individual flight vehicle [60]. The plan
depicts the time-phased scheduling and integration of all required ASIP tasks for
design, development, qualification, and tracking of the airframe. The plan includes
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Figure 2.13: T-37 SLEP FCL List [18]
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discussion of unique features, exceptions to the guidance of military handbooks and
the associated rationale, and any problems anticipated in the execution of the plan.
The development of the schedule considers all interfaces, the impact of schedule delays
(e.g., delays due to test failure), mechanisms for recovery programming, and other
problem areas [60].
The success of ASIP was demonstrated when the initial 8,000 hours service life
of the T-37B aircraft was consecutively increased to 15,000 hours and ultimately to
18,000 hours; more than twice the original service life [60]. As previously mentioned,
the first fatigue tests and analysis on the T-37 A/B aircraft were conducted in the
1960s. The study focused on fatigue analysis of the wing, main landing gear, and
support structure. The early goal was to establish an 8,000 hour safe-life with a
scatter factor of two. However, early in the ASIP program the goal was increased to
15,000 safe-life hours using a scatter factor of two. This was further revised to 15,000
safe-life hours using a scatter factor of four. With the current program of inspections
and modifications, the T-37 aircraft can safely reach a service life of 18,000 flying
hours [60].
Recently, the ASIP recommended a sonic load analysis be performed on the T-
37 aircraft to identify any potential problem areas [60]. A sonic load analysis is a test
procedure to determine the effects of sonic fatigue reaction on the aircraft structure.
Such fatigue is caused by a magnification of the stresses due to noise operating at
or near the frequency of the structure. A sonic investigation of the T-37B was made
and compared to the YAT-37D. A problem, consisting of cracking rib flanges in the
horizontal stabilizer, was attributed to sonic fatigue. The proposed ASIP modification
resulted in retrofitting the aircraft with horseshoe clips. X-ray inspections validated
the effectiveness of this modification, which was then incorporated to the entire T-37
fleet. Put in other words, aircraft monitoring programs such as the SLEP and ASIP
have proven to be successful in elongating the life of aging aircraft. The goal of the
ISHMS is to provide a similar outcome while minimizing costs and maximizing safety
of flight.
42
2.6.6 A-37 SAFE-LIFE. Most of the information presented on the previous
SLEP and ASIP sections were based on documentation that the thesis team found
on the T-37 aircraft. As previously stated, even though the initial thesis target
was the aging A-37 fleet of the CAF, the thesis team had to re-direct the efforts and
broaden the scope of the thesis due to limited information availability and accessibility.
However, the thesis team did find one document that was relevant to the initial target
and is briefly summarized in the following paragraphs. Safe-life is a concept that
incorporates margins of safety based on probabilistic data to allow an aircraft be
operated to the design life limits without having to conduct fatigue crack inspections
[54]. In December 2002, representatives from 12th Air Force asked MAPA to organize
an effort to determine the flying hours remaining on a number of A-37 aircraft owned
by the CAF. The primary focus of the NDIs was to determine the structural condition
of the CAF A-37 aircraft. However, according to the report, the lack of data from CAF
flight spectrum prevented a safe-life or damage tolerance assessment [54]. Basically,
the engineering team could not collect enough statistical data to accurately quantify
initial or recurring inspection intervals. The conclusion of this inspection stated that
validation of the flying hours left on the CAF A-37 fleet was dependent upon:
1. Quantifying actual operational usage.
2. Establishing external loads and a usage spectrum.
3. Identifying FCLs and stress spectra through finite element modeling (FEM)
analysis.
4. Determining crack growth rates and critical crack sizes.
5. Determining initial and recurring maintenance inspection intervals.
Once the operational usage is known, external loads and a usage spectrum
can be developed, identifying FCLs and stress spectra through FEM analysis. The
analysis also indicates that along with material and crack growth properties, crack
growth rates and critical crack sizes need to also be determined and incorporated into
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the model [54]. The findings of this investigation were carefully considered during the
development of this thesis.
2.7 Background on Systems Engineering Process
Buede states “engineering involves the practice of applying scientific theories
to the development, production, deployment, training, operation and maintenance,
refinement, and retirement of a system or product and its parts” [17]. Systems engi-
neering discipline is focused on how to create a system that meets or exceeds the needs
of all of the stakeholders involved over the life cycle of the system. The International
Council on Systems Engineering defines Systems Engineering as “an interdisciplinary
approach and means to enable the realization of successful systems [3].” The stake-
holders of the system determine the objectives of the system to which the success
of the system is measured. These objectives usually include cost (cheaper), sched-
ule (faster), and technical performance (better). The systems engineer’s role is to
minimize the problems associated with resolving these conflicting objectives.
The systems engineer can use different methods to apply the interdisciplinary
approach for the design and integration process by using the Vee model. The Vee
model can also be used incrementally. The processes are iterative. The development
of the system can produce individual subsets that are eventually expanded until the
entire system is fully operational. The systems engineering Vee model starts with
understanding the user requirements to develop the system concept and validation
plan (Figure 1.3). This step begins the requirements decomposition and definition
portion of the model. It is similar to peeling an onion with each layer revealing the
required specifications for the system. Once the onion is fully peeled, the next step
is to develop the system performance specifications, system requirements, and the
system validation plan. At this point, the systems engineers must help facilitate the
design and system tradeoffs due to the complexity of the issues and the multitude of
stakeholders involved. The systems engineers then expand the performance specifica-
tions into the configuration items (CI) and design-to specifications and establish the
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CI verification plan. At this point, the systems engineer works with the discipline (de-
sign) engineers (e.g., electrical, mechanical, etc.) to evolve the design-to specifications
into build-to documentation and inspection plan. By isolating design decisions using
logical engineering principles to decrease development costs, the systems engineer can
justify spending the required amount of money to incorporate systems engineering
into the total system design and function [17].
The right-hand side of the Vee depicts the integration and qualification activi-
ties of the engineering of a system. Moving up this side of the Vee begins with the
fabrication, assembly, and coding to the build-to documentation. Integration involves
the assembly of the CIs into components, the assembly of lower-level components into
higher-level components, and the assembly of high-level components into the system.
This involves testing (or qualification) of the newly assembled system elements to
determine whether the assembled element meets the set of requirements or specifica-
tions that the design phase had established for that element; this qualification is called
verification. Verification addresses the following question: Did we build the system
right? Once the system is verified against the system requirements, the system must
be validated. Validation answers the questions: Did we build the right system? Or
does the system meet the user requirements? The systems engineer must demonstrate
and validate the system to the user validation plan. After validation, the stakeholders
determine whether the system is acceptable [17].
An additional systems’ engineering model that can be used is the waterfall
model. “The waterfall model is characterized by the sequential evolution of typical
life-cycle phases, allowing iteration only between adjacent phases [17].” However, this
model has a major problem because the iteration between the phases is often too
widely separated. The final model for systems engineering, which is primarily used
for software development, is the spiral model. This model has four major processes
starting with design, to evaluation and risk analysis, followed by the development and
testing, with the final step being planning with stakeholder interaction and approval.
The number of iterations of the spiral process can vary. The spiral model can also be
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used as a basis for rapid prototyping to produce early, partially operational prototypes.
The use of these operational prototypes by stakeholders generates new and improved
requirements, as well as provides the stakeholders with increased functionality via
early releases of the system [17].
The model that is most appropriate for the ISHMS is the Vee model. The model
encompasses the system’s operational concept and details three separate architectures
(functional, physical, and operational). “The functional and physical architectures are
developed in parallel to enhance the integration of them into the operational architec-
ture [17].” The functional or system architecture is the focus of this thesis. Once the
requirements are known, the functional architecture can be developed. There are sev-
eral types of requirements that are used to define the problem. They include mission
requirements, originating requirements, and derived requirements. Mission require-
ments are requirements that are stated in terms that the stakeholders can understand
and that show the tradeoffs between doing tasks cheaper, faster, and/or better. The
originating requirements are requirements that are focused on constraining system
characteristics to achieve the mission requirements [17]. These requirements are es-
tablished by the stakeholders. Systems engineers use a design process that develops
the requirements that define the problem while balancing the dividing the physical
resources of the system into components that will meet the requirements by perform-
ing certain functions to solve the design problem. Systems engineers must be aware
during this stage how each decision can have an affect on the performance and cost of
the overall system. The key points concerning the systems engineering design process
are:
1. Stakeholders have originating requirements that, taken together address every
phase of the system’s life cycle. Capturing the complete set of originating re-
quirements ensures a concurrent engineering process.
2. The set of originating requirements should ensure a decision-rich design process
by not over constraining the design. The following attributes of requirements
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are meant to ensure the process is not overconstrained: traced, correct, un-
ambiguous, understandable, design independent, attainable, comparable, and
consistent.
3. At the same time the originating requirements should not underconstrain the
design because the stakeholders should be happy with the system that is created.
Complete, verifiable, and traceable requirements should guarantee this [17].
Finally, the derived requirements are even more constraining but are developed
from establishing the system specifications. “Requirements are the cornerstone of
the systems engineering process [17].” This is because requirements define the design
problem. Having accurate and good requirements are crucial to producing a successful
system that meets the stakeholders’ needs.
The next step in the systems engineering process is to define the operational
concept. “The operational concept of the system provides the theme for the system as
viewed by the stakeholders and defines scenarios depicting how its users will employ
the system and how the system will interact with other systems [17].” The operational
concept for this thesis is to develop an ISHMS for any aging aircraft. ISHMS is de-
fined as an integrated monitoring system that is incorporated into the overall aircraft
systems (e.g., electrical, mechanical, etc.) to determine the overall structural health
of the system by detecting any anomalies in the critical fatigue structural areas of the
aircraft while maintaining or increasing the level of safety of flight. This system will
be cost-effective and provide real-time data to the pilots and maintainers for analysis.
An external systems diagram must be developed to show the interaction between
the inputs and controls that enter the system, as well as outputs that the system pro-
duces, and the mechanisms that are used to transform the inputs into the outputs.
Systems engineers must also concern themselves with the systems relevant to every
stage in the life cycle of the system throughout the entire development process. After
developing an external systems diagram, an objectives hierarchy of the system must
be developed to determine the criteria that the stakeholders will measure their satis-
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faction of the system performance, cost, and development schedule. Ultimately, the
systems engineers must work with the stakeholders to conduct performance, cost, and
cost-performance trade-off studies. The final step of integration and qualification is
acceptance by the stakeholders. The stakeholders compare the system to their needs
and decide if they will accept the system as is or if changes will need to be made. The
completion of this phase indicates that there is at least one feasible solution that will
satisfy the stakeholders’ needs and is verified and approved by the stakeholders [17].
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Figure 3.1: Chapter 3 Decomposition
In this chapter (Figure 3.1) the methodology used in order to deal with the
problem of this thesis is discussed. The scoping of the problem is explained and
the basic assumptions detailed. The steps of the system engineering methodology are
discussed and the methods to define the stakeholders’ perspective and the operational
concept are presented. The development of the system requirements and the various
architectural products is analyzed. The chapter concludes with a detailed explanation
of the material analysis and crack growth modeling used in the simulations which
helped to show the potential benefit of an ISHMS.
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3.1 Scope and Assumptions
3.1.1 Scope. In order to develop a systems engineering approach to es-
tablishing an ISHMS that can be applied to any aging aircraft, the thesis had to
be adequately scoped to provide a realistic example. SAF/IARL originally contacted
AFIT/ENY to request a thesis be accomplished to determine how real-time integrated
health monitoring could be accomplished for the aging A-37 aircraft used by CAF. The
thesis proposal stated that these CAF A-37 aircraft have very high flight hours and
are approaching or have already exceeded the originally designed service life. Their
primary concern came from finding structural cracks during scheduled inspections.
However, there is no current system on the CAF aircraft that could detect new cracks
on the structure or detect if the current cracks, which are within acceptable limits,
grow. The original goal of the thesis proposal was to develop a systems engineering
approach to design a system that would monitor the structural health of the CAF
A-37 airframe. By developing and implementing a monitoring system, the CAF air
forces aim was to reduce or eliminate extensive inspections and safely extend the orig-
inal designed service life. However, when the thesis team tried to obtain maintenance
history on these CAF A-37 aircraft, the team found that the necessary maintenance
data was not available. Therefore, the thesis sponsor suggested contacting the Ma-
ture And Proven Aircraft (MAPA) division at Hill Air Force Base, Utah to obtain
the data on the top 10 locations on the A-37 aircraft identified as showing signs of
critical fatigue. The MAPA division had assessed critical structural nodes, otherwise
known as FCLs, over the entire aircraft to determine which locations needed to be
monitored to maintain the same safety of flight standards after the aircraft passed
its designed service life limit. To scope this thesis to an achievable goal, the thesis
team narrowed its focus to developing a systems engineering approach to designing
an ISHMS for any aging aircraft but using the A-37 aircraft data provided by MAPA
to determine the FCLs. The ISHMS team chose to analyze the number one FCL.
The sponsor also requested cost estimates for installing a real-time, integrated
structural health monitoring system. Another aspect of scoping the problem was to
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determine that only the user of the system could determine the definition of real-
time and that the team would incorporate the request in the user’s requirements of
the systems engineering process for an ISHMS that is developed. The sponsor also
requested cost estimates for installing a monitoring system. The ISHMS thesis team
concluded that it does not have the expertise to establish specific cost estimates for
developing, designing, and installing an ISHMS. It is not the responsibility of the
systems engineer to determine costs, instead it is his/her responsibility to work with
the design engineers to meet the user requirements and therefore eventually the cost
estimates will be available. The ISHMS thesis team does have limited expertise in
certain areas. Three team members are experienced Aircraft Maintenance Officers,
two members are mechanical engineers, one member is an aeronautical engineer, and
one member is an electrical engineer.
Over the period of the thesis, the primary individual sponsor moved to a different
job and the team could not find an additional sponsor that would fund the original
request. Another limitation of this thesis was the time that was available to conduct
the data collection, analyze the data for the FCLs, and develop a systems engineering
approach that can be applied to all types of aging aircraft. Due to the limitations of
losing our sponsor, our advisors took an active role in guiding and focusing the team.
3.1.2 Assumptions. There are a number of assumptions that were required
to develop the systems engineering process to develop an ISHMS. They are:
• Appropriate technology has already been developed to monitor all of the FCLs.
• Equipment can be developed to capture the data from the sensors on the FCLs
• Enough maintenance history data will be available on any aging aircraft that
an ISHMS will be implemented
• The total life-cycle cost of the system is lower than the current maintenance
practices
• The ISHMS will maintain or increase the SOF for that specific aircraft.
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• Installation of the monitors on the FCLs will not cause additional damage
• Maintenance technicians can be trained to download and analyze the mainte-
nance data
The methodology used to define the system’s stakeholders is described in the
next section. Also, the methodology used to develop the system’s operational concept
is discussed.
3.2 Stakeholder’s Perspective of the System
An important step at the beginning of the design of a system using the Systems
Engineering methodology is to identify the stakeholders. As it is stated in the relevant
literature the more generic term stakeholders is preferred over the term users because
the term can describe multiple categories of users.
Some of the users categories are the bill payers, the developers, the operators,
the trainers etc. Each of these categories is involved in different ways at different
phases of the system’s life-cycle, so the use of term stakeholders can better describe
these differences than the term user.
As a result of the different ways the various stakeholders are involved in the
systems life cycle, each stakeholder has his own understanding and view of the sys-
tem. Depending on his/her role, the perception of the system design, development,
production, use, maintenance, retirement may differ significantly from the other stake-
holders.
According to the systems engineering methodology it is important for the sys-
tems engineer to identify (early in the process) all the stakeholders involved with the
system under development. It is also important that the engineer work with those
stakeholders and get a thorough understanding of each ones perspective and require-
ments. The importance of these actions lies in the fact that all stakeholders’ views
and requirements are equally significant. There are not views and requirements that
are right or wrong and the perspective and requirements of a specific stakeholder are
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not more significant than another’s. If the stakeholders are not properly defined some
requirements for a phase of the life cycle may not be addressed during the design.
This will result in an incomplete design.
It is the systems engineer’s role to work with all the stakeholders and based
upon their inputs to establish priorities, and to specify the final product’s design:
the one that will satisfy all mandatory requirements and will address as many of the
stakeholders’ views as possible.
In order to identify the stakeholders a critical question that must be answered
is who has the right to have a requirement for the system? [17]. Based on the answer
to the above question a system requirements team comprised of the systems engineers
and representatives of all the stakeholders categories is formed. Their goal is to derive
the operational concept and the originating requirements.
For the purpose of this thesis, the group members and the academic advisors
decided to have both the roles of the systems engineers, who are supposed to identify
all the stakeholders and form the system requirements team, and of the stakeholders,
who are supposed to provide the systems engineers with their operational needs and
their requirements. The factors that led this team to this decision were: the available
time for the elaboration of this thesis, the lack of specified stakeholders to work with
and the need to have a wider and more flexible scope for our problem. All these
factors were critical in conjunction with each other. The thesis team had to keep the
scope of our problem wide and flexible enough so that the thesis would be able to
show the applicability of the systems engineering methodology to the design of the
ISHMS. In order to achieve this goal the thesis had to define the stakeholders’ needs
and requirements that would be used as a basis for the development of the system’s
architecture. All that had to be accomplished within a specified period of time and
with additional constraints as to the availability of the team members.
The group members felt that the most appropriate way to achieve the thesis
goals given the above constraints would be to create a list of the ISHMS life-cycle
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phases and try to identify the stakeholders for each phase. This identification of
potential stakeholders was based on the diverse professional experience of the group
members. Also, based on the same experience and knowledge, the group members
tried to understand and describe each of the stakeholder’s view and requirements. The
final product, which is a set of assumptions, has not been validated, and restricted
the development of the originating requirements document.
3.3 Operational Concept of the System
The development of the operational concept is another essential step in the sys-
tems engineering process. By the term operational concept a description of the way
the system will be utilized is implied. In this description of the system’s utilization,
a vision of the system, its interactions with external systems and the main functions
of the system are included. An important aspect of the operational concept is that
it represents the agreement between the various stakeholders about the use of the
system and the needs it is going to serve. Usually the operational concept is written
in the stakeholders’ informal language. It is the systems engineers’ role to bring the
stakeholders to this agreement and produce the operational concept. The understand-
ing of each stakeholder’s vision for the system and the system’s mission requirements
are essential.
In order to define the operational concept there are several methods the systems
engineers can apply:
• A set of scenarios that describe the inputs to the system and the produced out-
puts at the various phases of the life cycle, is one way to develop the operational
concept. In these scenarios, the system is treated as a black box. That means
that only the inputs and outputs of the system are shown; the transformation
that occurs within the system is not visible. This allows the operational con-
cept not to influence and steer the system’s design. In each scenario the view
of a stakeholder about the production, use and maintenance of the system is
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shown. The scenarios are developed separately for each life-cycle phase and are
as many as to address all stakeholders groups that are involved in the specific
phase. These sets of scenarios describe the reason for the system’s existence and
result in the development of an operational concept for each life-cycle phase.
• A variation of the above method is the method described by Hunger [17]. The
term mission analysis is used by Hunger instead of the term operational concept
and the scenarios are called missions. The life-cycle phases of the system are
divided into operational and non-operational phases for which sortie and life
missions are generated respectively. Missions are developed for each life-cycle
phase while some scenarios may extend to more than one phases. These mis-
sions provide information about the system’s interaction with other systems and
define the system’s boundaries.
• Another method that can be used to produce the operational concept is the de-
velopment of use cases. The concept of use cases is more related to the software
engineering, but there is no limitation to their use in systems engineering. The
use cases are similar to the sets of scenarios but are differently structured than
the scenarios. The main difference is that the use cases are developed using
a specific goal as a basis. Variations in the use cases around that basis help
describe the different views of the stakeholders. The use cases can then be used
in the derivation of requirements.
• The input-output trace modeling technique can also be used in the development
of the operational concept. The model produced from this technique consists
of a vertical time line for each system involved in the scenario. Horizontal arcs
starting from the originating system and ending at the receiving system depict
the systems interactions. These models are focused on time based interactions
between the systems. Their advantage over the written scenarios is that they
provide a visualization of the sequence of actions which can be more helpful
during the system design.
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• Using the same concept as the input-output trace model the sequence diagrams
provide another modeling option that can be used in the development of the
operational concept. The sequence diagrams used in the Unified Modeling Lan-
guage (UML) have a lot more complexity than the input-output trace diagrams
but are also more explicit.
In order to develop the operational concept, the thesis group decided to create
sets of scenarios for the life-cycle phases of the system. The scenarios are developed
with the key stakeholder for each phase as the main actor. The other stakeholders
are also included in the scenario as needed while other constraining and complexity
factors are added in the scenario. Another reason for the selection of this method is
that, according to the thesis group members’ understanding, the sequence diagrams,
the input-output model and the use cases would require a greater involvement of the
stakeholders. Therefore the creation of scenarios seemed more suitable. Some aspects
that the thesis’ methodology was not able to achieve are the validation of the scenarios
and the agreement between the stakeholders aspect of the operational concept.
In the next section, the development of the systems requirements is discussed.
The assumptions made by the thesis group, and the detailed steps of the selected
approach are analyzed.
3.4 Requirements Development
Manpower intensive periodic maintenance inspections were driving up the cost
of operating legacy aircraft. An ISHMS was proposed as a solution to reducing the
cost of legacy aircraft operations. The constraints imposed on the design space were:
1. Legacy aircraft use would continue at its current pace
2. ISHMS would be retrofitted to the legacy aircraft
3. Current SOF would be maintained
The effective impact of the constrained design space was to bypass the initial
business case in favor of monitoring (versus repair or replace) the legacy aircraft.
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This was the starting point for a systems engineering approach to the development of
an ISHMS. The ISHMS development process began with the requirements definition.
The requirements definition was the baseline with the final system was compared with
to determine if a successful design was created. Requirements were the cornerstone of
the systems engineering process and the focal point of the ISHMS development [17].
Many of the requirements resulted from working within the physical constraints of
the legacy aircraft. The SE creation of an ISHMS on a legacy aircraft design yielded
a less streamlined and integrated solution than would be possible with a new aircraft
design. All phases of the ISHM system life-cycle were addressed (Figure 3.4).
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Figure 3.4: Originating Requirements Development Summary [17]
Assumptions were made to quantify the current aircraft flight profile, current
maintenance inspection costs, and to estimate installation costs. Flight data recorder
information was not available; therefore, a general fighter flight spectrum was used.
The baseline inspect and fix scenario was compared to the ISHMS modified scenario to
show improvement in operating cost. The ISHMS team had limited sponsor feedback,
thus based upon field experience team members served as stakeholders to clarify
the initial requirements as well as the SE to refine the requirements. There were
many stakeholders across the ISHMS life-cycle phases, but the primary stakeholders
referenced were: HQ AF, pilots, maintainers, and acquisition personnel.
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The method for creating the ISHMS requirements involved a seven step ap-
proach:
1. The first step consisted of developing the operational concept. The operational
concept created a general vision of the system, a statement of capability (or
mission) requirements, and how the system was expected to be used. The
operational concept was given by the sponsor.
2. The second step was the definition of the system boundary with an external
systems diagram (Figure 3.5).
System
External Systems
Context
are impacted by “System”
impacts, but not impacted by, “System”
Figure 3.5: Context Diagram [17]
3. The third step was the development of the weighted objectives hierarchy. This
hierarchy defined cost, schedule, and performance goals that the stakeholders
required for an acceptable system design (Figure 3.6).
4. The fourth step of developing, analyzing and refining the requirements required
taking the operational concept, system inputs and outputs, and combined with
the objectives hierarchy to refine the originating requirements into the system
requirements.
60
Monthly Operating Costs
$1,500 - $1,000, Wt = 0.1
Average Wait (Routine)
35 - 27 sec, Wt = 0.3
Average Wait (Priority)
35 - 30 sec, Wt = 0.35
Average Transit Time
90 - 60 sec, Wt = 0.35
Time in System
Objectives, Wt = 0.35
Max'm Acceleration
1.5 - 1.25 m/s2, Wt = 0.3
Max'm Accel'n Change
2 - 1.5 m/s3, Wt = 0.5
Floor Leveling Error
0.7 - 0.3 cm., Wt = 0.2
Ride Quality
Objectives, Wt = 0.30
Operational MTBF
1 - 1.5 yrs, Wt = 0.5
Operational MTTR
8 - 4 hrs, Wt = 0.5
Availability
Objectives, Wt = 0.35
Operational Performance
Objectives, Wt = 0.9
Operational
Objectives
Figure 3.6: Objectives Hierarchy Example [17]
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5. The fifth step was to ensure the requirements feasibility. Feasibility was deter-
mined if the requirement was verifiable with physics-based modeling, consistent
with general maintenance practices, or testable.
6. The sixth step was defining the qualification system requirements. The system
qualification involved establishing the requirements to; validate the operational
concept, verify the components & system, validate the system, and accept the
system. Extensive structural modeling and simulation was conducted of the
A-37 aircraft to qualify the system requirements (Figure 3.7).
7. The seventh and final step was obtaining the sponsor approval of the require-
ments.
The Buede process of establishing the ISHMS requirements was chosen because
of its structured method [17]. This structured approach was a consistent method for
both the originating and derived requirements. Finally, the structured requirements
method was compatible with the chosen Vee Model of SE design. In accordance
with the Vee model, system requirements became more specific as the development
process progressed. The ISHMS requirements were specified down to the third level
of the requirements pyramid (Figure 3.8). This meant the mission, originating, and
system level requirements were developed. The ISHMS team decided to stop the
requirements specification before the subsystem and component level. The subsystem
and component level was chosen as the line of demarcation because this was the point
where dedicated engineering specialists provide the engineering expertise necessary to
establish detailed requirements. Attempts to establish the component specifications
will unnecessarily limit the design space.
The requirements process began with the mission and originating requirements.
These requirements were the starting point of the ISHMS written by the user. The
user input was a capability needs document listing a need for an ISHMS to operate
legacy aircraft beyond their original design service life. Ideally, these originating re-
quirements were design independent. In reality, the initial business case was assumed
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already completed with the result of modifying a legacy aircraft with an ISHMS as
the result. This jump to an ISHMS as the solution to increasing maintenance in-
spection requirements had an effect of constraining the design space automatically
reducing options such as; maintaining the status quo, using automated inspections,
or replacing the wing on the legacy aircraft. The initial scoping of the design made
the benefit analysis very important to determining if installing an ISHMS yielded an
economic benefit.
The design requirements allowed the SE development team to apply a level of
engineering rigor to the originating requirements. The design requirements partitioned
the design problem. The partitioning of the design problem enabled the establishment
of a verification and validation plan. The design requirements were clarified with the
stakeholders and trade-space was established.
3.5 System Qualification First Look
Before beginning preliminary design, system engineers should consider how the
system requirements will be verified. This thesis analyzed each system requirement
and briefly detailed how each would be tested or verified for qualification. The analysis
64
done for this thesis does not constitute a full-up qualification or verification test
plan. The analysis assisted in showing requirements feasibility and could assist others
following the systems engineering process presented here with preparations for their
own qualification testing.
Verification of requirements can generally occur through four types of methods:
inspection, analysis and simulation, instrumented test, and demonstration. This the-
sis selected the appropriate method for each requirement. Of course, this analysis
occurred prior to design which does not allow for tailoring testing toward the specifics
of the system. As stated, the initial qualification review would be revised after system
design to best test and verify the system as designed.
The architectural framework and the architecture building process are discussed
in the next section. The methodology for selecting which architectural products, and
how they will be developed is analyzed. Also, assumptions, tools and the rationale
for this selection are discussed.
3.6 Architectures
Aircraft come in various shapes and configurations which are mostly determined
by the intended role or roles of the aircraft. However, all aircraft have at least one
thing in common and that is an intrinsic complexity which is carried through all of
the life-cycle stages (i.e., development, production, operations & maintenance, and
retirement). This complexity not only comes from the thousands of components
and specialized parts that must work together for the aircraft to function properly,
but also from the various external systems that are needed to support the aircraft
operations. Examples of external systems include personnel, tools, equipment, and
other support systems, for instance global positioning system (GPS) satellites for
navigation purposes. In the midst of this complexity, the systems engineer is expected
to provide clarity and simplicity needed for efficient and effective decision-making.
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The necessity for understanding and dealing with complex system interactions
is particularly applicable to USAF aircraft because a single decision may have far-
reaching implications into multiple systems and organizations. Often times, system
engineers use architectures as one of the preferred SE means of providing clarity and
simplicity to complex systems. Architectures, as defined in SE, are graphical, textual,
or tabular representations which are used to display information about a system in a
comprehensive way that facilitates decision-making [26]. The goal of this section is to
explain how system architectures were used to model the potential development and
integration of a hypothetical ISHMS into an aging aircraft. In addition, this thesis
will also explain the reasons for choosing specific architecture products as well as the
guidelines used for the development of the architectures.
System architectures come in different shapes, forms, and perspectives based
on the team’s decisions and on the personal preferences of the architect. However,
even though this flexibility in creating system architectures may promote innovation,
it also has the potential to further confuse the decision-makers that generally come
from different backgrounds. Fortunately, the DoD realized that lack of architectures
standardization may lead to miscommunication, or even worse, lack of communication
between stakeholders and developers. As a result, the DoD generated a standardized
solution which is now known as the DoD Architecture Framework (DoDAF). The
DoDAF, along with several other documents, provide guidelines and policies for the
development of system architectures within the DoD and is the source document for
the development of the architectural products.
3.6.1 DoD Architecture Framework. According to the DoDAF, an inte-
grated architecture is usually described in terms of three views: Operational View
(OV), Systems View (SV), and Technical Standards View (TV). Together, these ar-
chitectural views provide an organized and systematic way to gain understanding,
support analysis, provide logic for potential changes, specify requirements, or support
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systems level design and integration activities. The following paragraph provides a
brief description of each of the views.
The OV contains graphical and textual descriptions of operational activities,
or functions, and information exchanges [26]. Similarly, the SV also uses graphical
and textual products; however, the emphasis is placed on describing actual systems
components and interconnections in support of the functions or capabilities described
in the OV. The TV is defined as the minimal set of rules governing the arrangement,
interaction, and interdependence of systems parts or elements. The purpose of the
TV is to ensure that a system satisfies engineering specifications. Furthermore, the
DoDAF also identifies the All Views (AV) products which provide information relevant
to the entire architecture but do not represent a distinct view of the architecture [26].
Each of these views has a myriad of products from which the systems architects can
choose from. Table 3.1 lists each of those products.
3.6.2 Architecture Building Process. The DoDAF provides a generic six-
step process (Figure 3.9) of building an architecture description that was used by the
team. The first step was to determine the intended use of the architecture. In the case
of the ISHMS for aging aircraft, there were two fundamental purposes for creating
an architecture description. One of the purposes was to try to identify as clearly as
possible the overall requirements that should bound the development of the ISHMS.
The second purpose was to support an investment decision as to whether or not
the development of an ISHMS for an aging aircraft makes financial sense. Since the
target aircraft was the A-37 owned by the CAF, the thesis team wanted to interview
their personnel in order to gain insight of the actual user requirements. In addition,
the team had hoped to gain a better understanding of their maintenance procedures
and their flight profiles among other things which would greatly influence the final
ISHMS design. However, the thesis team did not have access to the CAF and as
such the thesis team had to collect the requirements from the group’s knowledge and
experience.
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Table 3.1: Architecture products defined in the DoDAF [27]
Applicable Framework Framework Product Name General Description
View Product
All Views AV-1 Overview Scope, purpose, intended users, environment depicted,
and Summary Information analytical findings
All Views AV-2 Integrated Dictionary Architecture data repository with definitions
of all terms used in all products
Operational OV-1 High-Level Operational High-level graphical/textual description of
Concept Graphic operational concept
Operational OV-2 Operational Node Connectivity Operational nodes, connectivity, and information
Description exchange needlines between nodes
Operational OV-3 Operational Information Information exchanged between nodes and the
Exchange Matrix relevant attributes of that exchange
Operational OV-4 Organizational Relationships Organizational, role, or other relationships
Chart among organizations
Operational OV-5 Operational Activity Model Capabilities, operational activities, relationships among
activities, inputs, and outputs; overlays can show cost,
performing nodes, or other pertinent information
Operational OV-6a Operational Rules Model One of three products used to describe operational activity
identifies business rules that constrain the operation
Operational OV-6b Operational State Transition One of three products used to describe operational activity
Description identifies business process responses to events
Operational OV-6c Operational Event-Trace One of three products used to describe operational activity
Description traces actions in a scenario or sequence of events
Operational OV-7 Logical Data Model Documentation of the system data requirements and structural
business process rules of the Operational View
Systems SV-1 Systems Interface Identification of system nodes, systems, and system items
Description and their interconnections, within and between nodes
Systems SV-2 Systems Communications System nodes, systems, and system items, and their
Description related communications lay-downs
Systems SV-3 Systems-Systems Matrix Relationships among systems in a given architecture; can be
designed to show relationships of interest, e.g., system-type
interfaces, planned vs. existing interfaces, etc.
Systems SV-4 Systems Functionality Functions performed by systems and the system data flows
Description among system functions
Systems SV-5 Operational Activity to Systems Mapping of systems back to capabilities or of system functions
Function Traceability Matrix back to operational activities
Systems SV-6 Systems Data Exchange Provides details of system data elements being exchanged
Matrix between systems and the attributes of that exchange
Systems SV-7 Systems Performance Performance characteristics of Systems View elements for
Parameters Matrix the appropriate time frame(s)
Systems SV-8 Systems Evolution Planned incremental steps toward migrating a suite of systems
Description to a more efficient suite, or toward evolving a current system to
a future implementation
Systems SV-9 Systems Technology Emerging technologies and software/hardware products that
Forecast are expected to be available in a given set of time frames and
that will affect future development of the architecture
Systems SV-10a Systems Rules Model One of three products used to describe system functionality;
identifies constraints that are imposed on systems functionality
due to some aspect of systems design or implementation
Systems SV-10b Systems State Transition One of three products used to describe system functionality;
Description identifies responses of a system to events
Systems SV-10c Systems Event-Trace One of three products used to describe system functionality;
Description identifies system-specific requirements of critical sequences of
events described in the Operational View
Systems SV-11 Physical Schema Physical implementation of the Logical Data Model entities,
e.g., message formats, file structures, physical schema
Technical TV-1 Technical Standards Profile Listing of standards that apply to Systems Views elements
in a given architecture
Technical TV-2 Technical Standards Description of emerging standards and potential impact on
Forecast current Systems Views elements, within a set of time frames
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3.6.2.1 Step One. This first step generated many important questions.
• What does the user really mean by integrated?
• Should the ISHMS be a plug-and-play device or should it be networked with
various internal aircraft components?
• Should the ISHMS have its own power source or should it be connected to the
aircraft’s power source?
• Which aircraft structures should be monitored?
• What types of sensors should be used for monitoring?
• How many sensors are required to satisfy user requirements?
• What should be the sampling rate of the sensors in order to satisfy the real-time
monitoring system requirement?
• How reliable should the ISHMS be?
• What will be the net result of having an ISHMS in terms of saving money?
• Should the current time between inspections be increased? If so, by how much?
• Should the number of inspection items be decreased? If so, by how many?
• Should the data be stored and downloaded after each flight or will it be moni-
tored in near-real-time?
• Which organizations should be responsible for maintaining and sustaining the
system?
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These and many other questions form the basis for the architectures. It is
important to always keep in mind the user’s perspective. Obviously, the user has two
primary objectives:
1. To save money by not having to replace their aging aircraft and reducing main-
tenance costs.
2. To minimize the impact to their operational mission by reducing the current
inspection burden.
The system architectures were built with these two objectives in mind.
3.6.2.2 Step Two. Once the purpose and content of the architecture
had been established, the second step in the architecture building process was to
determine the architecture descriptions scope, context, environment, and any other
assumptions considered. In terms of scope, the reader is referred to a previous section
which is entirely devoted to defining and scoping the problem. However, when scoping
the architectures the team was primarily interested in defining the ISHMS mission(s),
defining those activities that the user would classify as being necessary functions of an
ISHMS, and assigning responsibility to the potential organizations that would have
to interact with the ISHMS.
The mission of the ISHMS is to provide a near-real-time structural monitoring
of an aging aircraft’s FCLs while maintaining or improving the current SOF at an
affordable cost. The primary functions that the ISHMS must provide are included in
the architecture and will be explained in more detail in Chapter 4. The team had some
notional ideas as to which organizations will most likely be tasked to interact with the
ISHMS; however, because of our limited knowledge on the organizational structure of
the CAF, the architectures only show hypothetical entities. Nevertheless, the task of
matching these hypothetical organizations to the real organizations should be fairly
straight-forward.
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For the most part, the level of detail in the architectures was left intentionally
rather broad since the team was only dealing with the initial decomposition and
definition leg of the Vee-model. Moreover, the limited user involvement made it
impossible to go deeper into defining the physical configuration items of the ISHMS.
Future SE thesis groups that have the opportunity to interview or somehow collect
user requirements from the CAF will be able to narrow down the system design
requirements and perhaps propose a physical solution.
3.6.2.3 Step Three. Step three in the architecture building process is
to determine what information the architecture description needs to capture. Basically,
this step is about making sure that the information displayed in the architectures is
relevant and correlates with the information collected from the previous steps. DoDAF
explains that “if pertinent information is omitted, the architecture description may
not be useful; if unnecessary information is included, the architecture effort may prove
infeasible given the time and resources available, or the description may be confusing
and/or cluttered with details that are superfluous to the issues at hand.” [26]
Several MAPA reports on the ASIP, SLEP and safe-life programs became the
backbone of the thesis. However, policies regarding the distribution of foreign infor-
mation limited and almost prevented further research on the CAF A-37 fleet. After
several trials, the only way the team was able to by-pass this obstacle was by making
an assumption that the A-37 and the USAF’s T-37 aircraft shared similar structural
characteristics. Even though initially the team thought that this assumption was a
big leap from reality, the list of the top ten FCLs for both aircraft is nearly identical,
thus in a way verifying that this assumption is valid. The benefit of this assumption
should be obvious. There is more organic information available on the T-37 because it
is still in the USAF’s inventory. Nevertheless, the team realized that the architectures
were limited to a great extent by the information that was available and accessible.
3.6.2.4 Step Four. The next step is to determine the products to
be built. As previously stated, the DoDAF has a significant number of architecture
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products to choose from depending on the needs and preferences of the architect.
However, the DoDAF states that “an integrated architecture consists of AV-1, AV-
2, OV-2, OV-3, OV-5, SV-1, and TV-1 as a minimum [27]”. In addition, DoDAF
provides a list of various combinations of applicable architecture products depending
on the intended use of the architecture, which are shown in Figure 3.10.
Planning, Programming, Budgeting Execution Process
Capability-Based Analysis for IT Investment Decisions
Modernization Planning and Technology Insertion/Evolution
Portfolio Management
Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System
JCIDS Analysis (FAA, FNA, FSA)
ICD/CDD/CPD/CRD
Analysis of Alternatives (AoA)
Acquisition Process
Acquisition Strategy
C4ISP
System Design and Development
Interoperability and Supportability of NSS and IT Systems
Integrated Test & Evaluation
Operations (Assessment, Planning, Execution, …)
Operations Planning & Execution
CONOPS & TTP
Communications Plans
Exercise Planning & Execution
Organizational Design
BPR/FPI
All
View Operational View (OV)
Tech
Stds
View
Systems View (SV)
1 2 1 2 1 23 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
RECOMMENDED USES OF ARCHITECTURE:
APPLICABLE ARCHITECTURE PRODUCTS
=   Product is highly applicable
=   Product is often or partially applicable
=   Product is specifically addressed in policy
=   Product is required for an integrated architecture
=   Product is usually not applicableblank
Figure 3.10: Architecture Products by Use [27]
From the list of recommended architecture uses above, only two choices seemed
to fit to the project requirements: (1) System Design and Development or (2) an
Acquisition Strategy. After some thought, the team decided that it was not feasible
for the team to be involved in the physical design of an ISHMS. Instead, the goal was
to define and identify possible system requirements and hopefully demonstrate the
financial feasibility of incorporating an ISHMS into an aging aircraft. Thus, the team
concluded that the architecture products should resemble those of an acquisition strat-
egy. DoDAF suggests the following architecture products for an acquisition strategy:
AV-1, AV-2, OV-1, OV-2, OV-5, SV-1, SV-5, and TV-1. Even though there are slight
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differences between what policies require and what DoDAF recommends, the team
decided to concentrate the efforts on creating the required architecture products first.
Any other architectures that the team considered would add value and clarity to the
analysis would be generated later. All the architecture products will be presented in
Chapter 4. An aspect of system architectures development that may seem confusing
is the fact that the sequence of the products does not follow their logical numerical
sequence. Even though the actual sequence followed is a matter of preference and
convenience, Figure 3.11 depicts the suggested developmental sequence taught in the
Air Force Institute of Technology Systems Engineering 640 course. The team adhered
to this sequence for the architecture development.
AV-1 OV-1
OV-5 OV-2
AV-2
OV-4
SV-4
SV-1
SV-2 TV-1
Documents
Legend
Models
SV-8 SV-9
TV-2
Forecast
SV-10c
SV-10b
OV-6c
OV-6b
Scenario
OV-7
SV-11
Data
OV-6a
SV-10a
Rules
OV-3
SV-5
SV-6
SV-3 SV-7
Matrices
Figure 3.11: Architecture Products Sequence [48]
3.6.2.5 Steps Five and Six. The last two steps of the six-step architec-
ture building process are gather the architecture data and build the requisite products
and use the architecture description for its intended purpose. Both of these steps have
been briefly discussed in this section, and will be elaborated in Chapter 4.
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Finally, the team had to choose the format or language in which the team
were going to build the architectures. The DoDAF offers two alternatives: (1) the
Structured Approach and (2) UML. The team based the decision in convenience,
practicality, and personal preference of the architects. In all three categories the
Structured Approach came ahead of the UML. This was widely expected since UML
is mainly used for software development although its use has increased in popularity
in the recent years.
The structural model scope is presented in the next section. The assumptions
made, the purpose of this model, and the design goals are analyzed. Finally the
methodology used for the formulation of the problem is presented in detail.
3.7 Structural Model Scope of Work
Fatigue was a common failure mode of current aircraft structures. This was be-
cause the deterministic calculations of traditional fracture mechanics did not capture
the probabilistic nature of material properties, manufacture and assembly, mission
profiles flown, etc. This created a possibility of calculating a nonconservative fatigue
crack growth at a FCL (Figure 3.12).
One way to mitigate the possibility of a nonconservative crack growth prediction
was to conduct time consuming and expensive periodic inspections. The comparison of
the baseline Cessna A-37 300 hour inspection schedule versus the extended inspection
schedule with an ISHMS installed required the development of a structural model to
predict the stress occurring at a FCL. The FCL chosen was the wing attach fitting
at the wing root. The geometry of the fatigue crack growth was that of crack at an
edge of a hole in tension from combined loading (Figure 3.13).
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Figure 3.12: Effects of Deterministic Fatigue Crack Growth Prediction [49]
Figure 3.13: Wing Attach Fitting Crack Growth Geometry [28]
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Additionally, the FCL was assumed to be in a state of plane stress(membrane).
This required the additional assumptions:
1. Applied loads acted in the midplane direction and were symmetric with respect
to the midplane
2. Support conditions were symmetric about midplane
3. In-plane stresses, strains, and displacements were uniform through the thickness
4. Normal and shear stress components in the z direction were negligible
5. Plate was symmetric with respect to the midplane
6. Material was homogeneous [31]
An established aircraft usage profile (flight spectrum) was used along with a typical
Vietnam era weapons loadout of 2501 lb to estimate crack growth and determine air-
craft service life (how many cycles the wings can be loaded until fracture). Countries
can save maintenance resources by maximizing the inspection interval of the aircraft
currently in their inventory while maintaining safety at the same level as the 300
hour inspection interval. Flight profiles and the amount of weapons carried cannot
be modified without negatively affecting the mission, so the stress model at the FCL
was determined with the pylon weapon loads as the design variables. Each weapon
pylon location has maximum load ratings, but this structural model determines the
stress applied at a FCL from the applied weapons load and flight profile.
This analysis modeled (via I-DEAS R© Finite Element Analysis), metamodeled
(via JUMP R© response surface), and established a simple flight spectrum (via Excel R©
stepped approximation) the stress in the subsonic Cessna A-37 Dragonfly wing struc-
ture.
3.7.1 Introduction. The purpose of this structural modeling was to estimate
crack growth propagation at a FCL to facilitate an ISHMS benefit analysis.
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Due to the high cost of procuring new aircraft, many countries have extended
their current aircraft inventory service lives beyond the original service life. Service
life was determined by the calculation of cycles until failure, Nf (Equation 3.1).
Nf =
∫ af
ai
1
C (∆K)m
da (3.1)
The cycles until failure, Nf , was calculated based upon the crack growth rate,
da/dN (Equation 3.2).
da
dN
= C (∆K)m (3.2)
The Walker crack growth equation was used (Equation 3.3).
da
dN
= C
(
∆K
(1−R)1−m
)n
(3.3)
The crack growth rate, da/dN , was highly sensitive to the stress intensity range,
∆K, (Equation 3.4) and material constants, C & m.
The material constants were determined from the NASGRO database (Figure
3.14).
∆K = Kmax −Kmin = f(g) ·∆σ
√
pia (3.4)
The stress intensity range, ∆K, was based on the stress amplitude, ∆σ, the
boundary condition factor, f(g), and the crack length, a. The stress amplitude, ∆σ,
was the difference between the maximum and minimum stress (Figure 3.15).
Minimum stress, σmin, was assumed as the unloaded wing configuration i.e.,
σmin = 0. The aircraft flight load was assumed as Straight and Level Unaccelerated
Flight (SLUF). The goal was to predict the maximum stress, σmax, from the SLUF
and weapon loading configurations. The difference in the two stresses was the stress
78
1e-06
1e-05
0.0001
0.001
1 10
d
a
/d
N
[i
n
/ c
y
c
le
]
Delta K [ksi*SQRT(in)]
R     THK    REF   NASGRO Data ID_____________________________
NASGRO 4.0
WALKER FIT:___________
C = 0.130E-07
n = 2.791
m+ = 0.650
M7HB11AB01A2
M7HB11AB01D1
M7HB11AB01C1
M7HB11AB01I1
M7HB11AB01E2
M7HB11AB01J1
M7HB11AB01H2
M7HB11AB01G1
M7HB11AB01H1
M7HB11AB01A1
M7HB11AB01E1
M7HB11AB01J2
 0.02  0.250  C112
 0.02  0.500  C111
 0.02  0.150  C111
 0.10  0.200  368 
 0.10  0.500  29
 0.10  0.200  367 
 0.10  0.500  29
 0.33  0.250  C92 
 0.50  0.500  29
 0.50  0.250  C112
 0.50  0.500  29
 0.75  0.200  367 
R =  0.020
R =  0.100
R =  0.330
R =  0.500
R =  0.750
Figure 3.14: NASGRO Al 7075-T6 [30]
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amplitude used to calculate the crack growth rate and cycles until failure, Nf . The
maximum stress, σmax, on the wing was determined by the weight/location of the
weapons and the lift load.
The weapons point load stress was a function of gravitational force of the
weapons and distance from the wing root (Equation 3.5). The lift distributed load
magnitude was equivalent to the aircraft weight (SLUF assumption) and distributed
in an elliptical manner from wing tip to root and elliptically from leading edge to
trailing edge.
σ =
M · y
I
=
F · x
I
· y (3.5)
There was considerable research done in the areas low cycle fatigue, design of
experiments, (and to a lesser extent) simulation with finite elements, and regression re-
sponse surface metamodeling. Literature covering these modeling topics was listed in
this section. Dowling exhaustively examined the factors influencing low cycle fatigue
under constant amplitude stress [28]. Experimental design to minimize the number
of simulations was well known, and Central Composite Designs were available from
Draper [64] and demonstrated by Penmetsa [55]. Shih methodically presented the use
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of the I-DEAS R© finite element program to create structural simulation models [63].
Madu and Barton offered methodology useful to fit regression response surface meta-
models to simulations [46]. Finally, Miedlar described the procedure to estimate an
aircraft stress sequence [47].
3.8 Design Goals
The design variables were defined as the amount of weapon and fuel force (lbf)
loaded at each of the four pylon locations and wing tip (x1, x2, x3, x4, & x5) (Figure
3.16). Note: the location of the weapon pylons were fixed and could not be changed;
only the amount of loading at each pylon location was changed.
x1
x2
x3
x4
x5
Figure 3.16: Design Variable Definition and Location [67]
The cost function was the aircraft stress (psi) at the wing root spar connection
to the front spar carry-through frame (wing attach fitting) element 2815 (Figure 3.17).
3.9 Problem Formulation
Once a typical A-37 weapon load was determined, the development of the cost
function was broken down into six stages and four parts. The first stage consisted of
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Element 2815
Figure 3.17: Spar Element 2815 Location
researching the Cessna A-37 Dragonfly to gain an understanding of the structure and
forces at work. The second stage was making engineering assumptions to simplify
the complex A-37 system into a structural simulation model. The third stage was
distilling the simulation model down into a response surface regression metamodel to
estimate the stress experienced at the wing attach fitting. The forth stage created a
stepped approximation of a fighter flight spectrum to determine mission effects on the
stress at the wing attach fitting. The fifth stage was feeding the stress amplitude per
100 cycles per flight hour into the MATLABR© crack growth model to estimate crack
growth at the FCL over time. The sixth stage was using the crack growth model to
conduct a benefit analysis (Figure 3.7).
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3.9.1 Four Parts of Structural Model. The four parts to successfully execute
the structural model were:
1. Constructed a structural simulation model of the Cessna A-37 Dragonfly
• Created a simulation model of the wing using Finite Element (FE) analysis
• Used adaptive meshing to decrease element size until max stress converged
2. Constructed a Central Composite Design (CCD) for the response surface
• Generated orthogonal fractional factorial design to minimize confounding
• Determined design factor input ranges
3. Executed each of the I-DEAS R© finite element simulation runs
• Executed required simulations from the fractional factorial design
• Validated the simulation model results using hand calculations
4. Created a response surface regression metamodel of the FE simulation model
• Conducted sensitivity analysis to determine loading trends on stress
• Estimated stress at wing attach fitting using typical Vietnam weapon load-
out
5. Constructed stepped approximation of fighter flight spectrum
• Simplified flight spectrum for crack growth model
• Estimated mission effect on wing attach fitting stress per flight hour cycle
In the final section of this chapter the ISHMS benefit analysis is discussed.
The assumptions the thesis group made are presented. Also, the methodology used
to conduct the benefit analysis, using a baseline and a scenario with the ISHMS
installed, is explained.
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3.10 ISHMS Benefit Analysis
Utilizing the FCL material analysis and crack growth models discussed previ-
ously, this thesis performed a basic analysis to help verify and possibly quantify the
potential cost and safety benefits of an ISHMS over the current baseline which is
to continue to fly aging aircraft with the increased inspection profile. Monte Carlo
simulations were generated using MATLABR© to contrast the failure rate of a FCL
and number of inspections performed under two scenarios:
1. baseline - continue to fly with mandatory 300-hour inspections
2. to fly with the same 300-hour inspection interval but the additional protection
of an installed ISHMS.
The only difference between the two scenarios was the ISHMS monitors the FCL in
real-time and if the crack grows to 90% of critical length, the ISHMS provided warning
to either the cockpit or the ground that the aircraft must land and be inspected. This
design assumption helped to simplify the simulation model. Figure 3.18 provides a
graphical depiction of the perform simulation function.
3.10.1 Simulation Assumptions. Some simplifying assumptions were made
in order to accurately compare the two scenarios. The simulations assumed only
one crack growing in one FCL. The effects of corrosion were not included in the
model. Crack propagation was the only contributing factor to FCL failure. When
cracks are discovered through maintenance inspection, they are repaired and the new
crack length is assumed to be the longest length undetectable to the human eye.
This simulated the worst case of maintenance personnel installing a new part with a
material flaw, but, of course, that flaw is not seen by the maintenance personnel. The
maintenance inspections performed for both scenarios are identical. The ISHMS can
monitor the entire FCL for any size crack initiated in any location on the FCL and
growing in any direction. Both simulations assumed the same beginning crack length
and the crack growth was identical for each simulation. Each simulation simulated a
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Figure 3.18: Perform Simulation Function
fleet of 13 A-37s through 1000 trials with a life of 5000 flight hours for each aircraft.
One thousand trials were chosen to maximize the number of trials while keeping run
times reasonable. The team selected 5000 additional flight hours as an appropriate
life extension timeframe for an A-37 aircraft.
3.10.2 Baseline Scenario. In the baseline scenario, the FCL began with one
crack set to the initial length predetermined from the material analysis performed
on the FCL. The crack grew according to the growth model and at intervals of 300
flight hours the aircraft was inspected. A probability of the maintenance inspection
detecting the crack was applied to the simulation. The thesis team estimated that
maintenance inspection would detect 97% of cracks. This probability was based on the
experience of the maintenance officer group members. Additionally, any error in this
estimate would be mostly negated because both simulations used the same probability
estimate. If the crack was detected, repair was accomplished that effectively removed
the crack and the crack length was reset to the longest crack length undetectable by
human sight. A critical crack length was defined from the material analysis performed
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in the previous sections. If the crack length ever exceeded the critical crack length,
due to lack of detection during inspection or growth prior to inspection, then failure of
the fatigue critical location and, subsequently, aircraft failure was considered a result.
As stated 1000 trials of the simulation were run simulating a fleet of 13 aircraft for
each trial. The resulting failure rate per million flight hours and total number of
inspections were calculated.
3.10.3 ISHMS Installed Scenario. As in the baseline scenario, the fatigue
critical location began with one crack at the initial length and crack growth was
modeled. A design assumption for the ISHMS had to be made. It was assumed that
the ISHMS provides near-real-time feedback to the either the aircraft pilot or ground
control on the status of the monitored structures. The ISHMS signaled when the crack
length had reached 90% of critical length. For the simulation, the aircraft will undergo
inspection either at a given flight hour interval or whenever the ISHMS indicates 90%
critical length. If the ISHMS indicated a crack had grown to 90% of critical length
causing an unscheduled inspection, then the inspection interval clock was reset and
the next inspection occurred after the requisite flight hours. There was a probability
of detection associated with the ISHMS detecting the crack (99.9%) and a separate
probability of detection with the inspection detecting the crack, if not tipped off by
the ISHMS (same as baseline - 97%). These probabilities were considered by the
model. However, if the ISHMS indicates a crack near critical length, the probability
of detection by maintenance inspection was 100%. As in the baseline scenario, if the
crack length exceeded the critical crack length, due to lack of detection by ISHMS
and/or inspection, then aircraft failure resulted. Again 1000 trials were run simulating
a fleet of 13 aircraft for each trial. The resulting failure rate per million flight hours
tested and total number of inspections were calculated.
3.10.4 Sensitivity Analysis. The probability of detection for both the main-
tenance inspection and the ISHMS were selected rather arbitrarily. To examine what,
if any, changes in the results might occur if the probabilities of detection were differ-
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ent, a sensitivity analysis was performed on the maintenance probability of inspection.
If the probability of detection for maintenance were decreased, the safety benefit of an
ISHMS would certainly increase; therefore, the sensitivity analysis only examined the
effect of increasing the maintenance probability of inspection. The sensitivity analysis
did not vary the ISHMS probability of detection, because the thesis team believed
that 99.9% probability of detection would most likely be the minimum acceptable
probability of an ISHMS by a user.
87
IV. Results
Results
Scope
ISHMS
Stakeholders
Life Cycle
Phases
Operational
Concept
Requirements
Results
Structural
Model
DoDAF
Architectures
Design Goals
Problem
Formulation
ISHMS
Benefit
Analysis
Scope and
Assumptions
Stakeholder’s
Perspective
Figure 4.1: Chapter 4 Decomposition
The results of implementing the methodology detailed in Chapter 3 are pre-
sented here. The systems engineering products which help to define the system are
shown. The aircraft wing attach fitting material analysis and modeling is detailed.
The chapter concludes with the output of the benefit analysis comparative simulation
runs to quantify the potential cost avoidance provided by installing an ISHMS on
aging aircraft. (Figure 4.1)
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4.1 Scope
The ISHMS thesis team considered many different aspects of the problem to
adequately scope this thesis. Scoping the thesis resulted in two basic deliverables.
The first product was the ISHMS SE design process. The second product was the
benefit analysis of installing an ISHMS.
4.1.1 ISHMS SE Design Process. The ISHMS SE design process involved
a significant challenge in defining the problem and determining the problem state-
ment. After several iterations, the problem statement converged to develop a systems
engineering approach for a near real time, cost-effective, integrated structural health
monitoring system for an aging aircraft while maintaining or improving the safety of
flight parameters. The original scope was to execute the SE process through devel-
opment of the ISHMS physical architecture. However, limitations of time, funding,
sponsorship, and test aircraft availability determined the scope of the SE design pro-
cess to the functional architecture. Therefore, this thesis focused on developing a
systems engineering approach to developing the functional architecture.
Each aspect of the problem statement was defined.
1. Near real time
2. Cost-effective
3. Integrated structural health monitoring system
4. Safety of flight
4.1.1.1 Near Real Time. Defining near real time was broken into two
parts. The first part was determining the sampling rate of the sensors at the FCLs.
The second part was determining the communication interval of the ISHMS system
to the aircraft operator and aircraft maintenance technicians.
The sampling rate of the sensors of the ISHMS was estimated by dynamically
modeling the first bending natural frequency mode of a Cessna A-37 wing using
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an I-DEAS R© finite element structural model. This modal frequency was used to
determine the Nyquist sampling rate of the sensors. The Inquest sampling rate was
the minimum sampling rate of the ISHMS sensors at the FCLs to capture the cyclic
vibration loading.
The communication interval of the ISHMS system was determined differently
for the operators and maintainers. The aircraft operator was notified by the ISHMS
when crack length sensors estimated only 10% of the fatigue life was remaining. This
impending failure pilot notification allowed a reasonable amount of time to land the
aircraft for inspection and repair. The communication interval for the maintenance
personnel was based upon the extended maintenance interval for the installed ISHMS
(approximately every 600 flight hours).
4.1.1.2 Cost-effective. Defining cost-effective for this thesis was very
difficult. The total life-cycle cost of the ISHMS must be less than the cost of continuing
the current course of action of inspecting at a predetermined amount of flight hours
flown (i.e. 300-hour inspection interval). The ISHMS life-cycle costs include every
cost from cradle-to-grave:
1. Cost of design
2. Cost of acquisition
3. Cost to install the ISHMS
4. Additional Cost of disposal
5. Cost of transmitting the data (if commercial satellites used)
6. Training to use equipment
7. Cost to maintain the ISHMS
Unfortunately, costs for the baseline 300 hour structural inspections, as well as, the
additional cost of installing the ISHMS sensors and components were not available.
90
Cost-effective was defined by the cost avoidance of utilizing the ISHMS versus
the baseline 300 hour inspection scenario. The ISHMS was determined cost-effective
if there was an estimated cost avoidance from utilizing the ISHMS versus the current
300 hour inspection intervals.
4.1.1.3 Integrated. Defining integrated for the ISHMS was much easier
than determining the level of integration required. Ideally, the ISHMS was integrated
among the FCL sensors and throughout the aircraft subsystems. However, the expense
of a new ISHMS subsystem integration into existing legacy aircraft subsystems (e.g.
power, avionics, etc.) was considered cost prohibitive. The ISHMS different types
of sensors (i.e. strain gauges, peizo-electric, etc.) were integrated to monitor fatigue
and crack growth. The ISHMS was assumed to detect all types of fatigue/cracks
growing in any direction at all lengths for all of the critical locations that were being
monitored. All the FCL sensors must be integrated to provide a high level of accuracy
and reliability.
The advantages of installing an ISHMS were weighed against the increased costs.
The ISHMS thesis group decided to minimize ISHMS integration with the existing
legacy aircraft subsystems to avoid increased design, installation, and testing costs.
The ISHMS was defined as integrated if the ISHMS had the ability to collect and
synthesize the various FCL sensor data and provide structural health cuing to the
pilot while storing the data for maintenance retrieval.
4.1.1.4 Safety of Flight. Safety of Flight was defined as the USAF
standard of 10−7 probability of fracture per flight hour [65]. The acceptable level of
risk was one loss per 1000 aircraft over the life of the weapon system.
4.1.2 Benefit Analysis. Previous attempts to quantify the benefit of in-
stalling an ISHMS on legacy aircraft were not found during the team’s review of
relevant literature on the subject. The primary purpose of installing an ISHMS was
reducing the operating cost of flying legacy aircraft. The ISHMS team decided that
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estimating the cost avoidance and safety benefit of installing an ISHMS was an im-
portant deliverable adding to the current body of knowledge. The ISHMS team used
the Cessna A-37 as the benefit analysis example aircraft. A finite element wing struc-
tural model was constructed and a static stress analysis was conducted to determine
an FCL location at the front spar wing attach point. This FCL was chosen for the
analysis because of the high stress at the front wing spar attach point. The FCL
location was verified with current A-37 maintenance data as a fatigue crack growth
location. The wing attach fitting geometry and structural simulation model were used
to predict stress at the FCL location for level flight. A-37 mission profile data was not
available, so a general fighter aircraft stress sequence was used to determine the stress
effect per flight hour cycle. The results were inserted in the Walker crack growth
equation. Two MATLAB R© crack growth and detection simulations were performed
to gain a rudimentary analysis of the benefit of an installed ISHMS with respect to
both safety and cost. Maintenance interval was incrementally increased on the ISHMS
to determine cost avoidance possible on an ISHMS aircraft at an equivalent level of
safety to the baseline 300 hour inspection aircraft.
The SE process and benefit analysis were discussed in following sections of the
thesis. By focusing the scope to a Cessna A-37 example, the amount of assumptions
made actually increased. The ISHMS team realized that the definition of the physical
architecture by follow-on thesis groups will improve the fidelity of utilizing an SE
process for the design of an ISHMS.
The results of the SE process life-cycle phases are presented in the following
section. Analogous to the life cycle phases of an aircraft, the SE process is grouped
into periods that allow the methodical discovery and refinement of the ISHMS re-
quirements.
4.2 Life-cycle Phases
The term life-cycle is used to represent a series of stages through which a system
passes from its inception to its retirement. Life-cycle is also characterized as “birth
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to death” [17]. The life of any system begins with the emergence of a need for the
users. The next step is the definition of this need and of the system requirements, so
that the stakeholders’ expectations from the system are reflected in the design. This
step is the beginning of the development period where the systems engineers and the
stakeholders are working together. Following the completion of the design phase is
the integration phase, the production, the operational use, the refinement and finally
the retirement, disposal or replacement phase [17]. During the design phase all these
phases must be taken into consideration otherwise the design may end up being a
failure.
These phases can be grouped into four periods. First is the development period,
where the requirements, architecture and models are developed. Production, training
and deployment take place during the second period. During the third period the
operational use of the system takes place along with the maintenance and (if needed)
the refinements/improvements. Retirement, disposal and replacement take place at
the end of the life-cycle and consist the fourth period.
Figure 4.2 shows one way to depict the life-cycle phases and the periods de-
scribed above.
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Figure 4.2: Life-cycle Phases
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The thesis team can see that there is a fifth period, which is shown on the left
side of the figure. This period is not clearly part of the life-cycle of the system since
the design has not started and the system does not exist yet. However, it is during
this time that the need for the system emerges (usually imposed by a problem that
needs to be solved or a situation that must be improved) and the system concept
(a high level definition of the system’s function) starts taking shape. Therefore, this
period is depicted in the figure.
Although the life-cycle phases are shown as distinct and separate items in the
figure, in fact they are not. Each phase is a continuation of the previous one. Also,
this categorization of the life-cycle phases and their grouping into four periods is not
a unique approach and it is not generally applicable to every system. Differences in
the categorization of the life-cycle phases are very common among different products,
customers and industries [20]. However, for the purpose of this thesis, this is the
categorization of the life-cycle phases that will be used for the ISHMS.
4.3 ISHMS Stakeholders
The thesis team mentioned in the methodology that it created a list of the
ISHMS life-cycle phases and tried to identify the stakeholders for each phase. Then,
by playing the role of the stakeholders, the thesis team tried to understand and
describe the viewpoint and the requirements of each category of stakeholders.
In order to identify the stakeholders, a critical question the thesis team had to
answer was “who has the right to have a requirement for the system?” [17]
For the first phase, identification of need, the thesis team identified the Coali-
tion Force’s Ministry of National Defense, and the Coalition Air Force as the main
stakeholders. Both these stakeholders are part of the country’s government who is
the ultimate stakeholder. The government, however is a more conceptual stakeholder
(who needs to ensure the safety of the country and organize its defense) who does
not pose requirements directly related to the system. Both these stakeholders can be
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further broken down (based on their organizational structure and the hierarchy) into
smaller groups of people who have a need for the ISHMS.
The stakeholders on the Ministry of Defense side are the Joint Operations Plan-
ning agencies. They need to ensure enough air strike capabilities are available in order
to accomplish the defense operational plans. Since the A-37 aircraft are undergoing
long inspections, are not mission available and are also close to the end of their design
life, these stakeholders have the problem that they cannot achieve their capabilities
goals. Usually, the Ministry of Defense is controlling the defense budget so the Fi-
nance and Acquisition agencies can be considered as the bill payers and subsequently
as stakeholders.
At this point, the thesis team should note that for the analysis in this thesis a
basic assumption was the two main stakeholders, Ministry of Defense and the CAF,
have already conducted an analysis for the problem they are facing and have identified
the ISHMS as the most beneficial solution. Therefore, further analysis is centered on
this solution only.
The CAF has a number of airplanes and weapons in its inventory and trained
personnel to operate, maintain, and support those airplanes in order to be able to
satisfy the Ministry of Defense requirements. Also, it has a budget that limits its
ability to maintain and/or increase this force. The CAF has a limited level of support
capabilities (facilities, equipment, personnel) that put restrictions on the amount of
maintenance it can be performed. As the thesis team discussed the problem for
the CAF arises from the fact that some of their A-37 aircraft are approaching their
design life limit and are either unavailable due to extensive maintenance or about to
be retired (thus reducing the total amount of operational capabilities). This situation
consumes a larger than the normal amount of the CAF’s financial resources and
consumes additional support capabilities thus creating more problems.
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On the CAF’s side, the thesis team can distinguish four groups of people/a-
gencies that are affected by this problem and are in need of a solution: Operations,
Maintenance, Logistics/Acquisitions, Flight Safety.
The operations agencies can be broken down into:
• Headquarters Operations (HQ) agencies (whose purpose is Mission Planning)
• Base Level Operations (who are involved with pilot training and mission execu-
tion)
• Squadron Level Operations (namely the pilots)
The HQ Operations agencies are responsible for maintaining a certain level of
air-power readiness in order to be able to execute the defense plans assigned to the
CAF by the Ministry of Defense, their customers. These agencies set the acceptable
aircraft availability limits the Base Level Operations must maintain. Base Level
Operations must, also, maintain a certain level of training and expertise for their
pilots and be able to execute the missions assigned. The Squadron Level Operations
needs to execute the training program and maintain their readiness at the level their
customers (Base Level Operations) require.
The situation created by the aging of the A-37 aircraft (reduced availability,
possible restrictions in the operational use of the aircraft, reduced number of air-
craft due to life exhaustion, etc) prevents all these agencies from accomplishing their
goals. Therefore, these agencies need a solution that will permit them to achieve the
availability and accomplish the training requirements.
From the viewpoint of this category of stakeholders (especially the pilots), the
health monitoring system should relieve the current restrictions in the operational use
of the aircraft (e.g., configuration, flight envelope restrictions) and they do not want
new restrictions imposed because of the system.
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The people involved with aircraft maintenance that can impose requirements
on the system can be categorized as follows:
• CAF engineers
• Maintainers at the CAF HQ
• Maintainers at the Base Level
• Maintainers at the Squadron level
The CAF engineers must deal with the aging A-37 problem. They need to decide
whether to retire the aircraft that reach their design life or extend their operational
use. If they decide the latter, they need to decide how this will be accomplished
and how long this extension will be. From their viewpoint an ISHMS that records
and analyzes aircraft usage data will allow them to assess the aircraft condition,
predict the remaining useful life and make decisions on the aircraft life extension
and maintenance. They expect that this system will permit the development of a
customized maintenance schedule which will have as a result the increase of the aircraft
availability. At the same time, they expect high reliability from the system that will
be a valuable tool for achieving their goals.
The maintainers at the HQ need to find a solution to the problem created by
the A-37 aircraft. There is increased downtime and reduced number of operational
aircraft due to the extensive inspections and repairs. Also, these inspections consume
more resources (facilities, equipment, personnel) than expected, and hinder the main-
tainers at the Base and Squadron Levels from satisfying their customers’ (Operations)
requirements: provide mission ready aircraft on time. The maintainers expect a sys-
tem that will be able to track the actual usage of the A-37 and monitor the structural
damages. They expect that, if they have this information they will be able to inspect
and repair only the problem areas on the aircraft that must be inspected/repaired.
This will reduce the amount of teardown and the maintenance effort overall. Also,
they want to be able to perform inspections when it is required and not according
to a preset schedule which may not reflect the true condition of the aircraft. At the
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Base and Squadron levels this will allow better use of the resources (especially the
personnel).
Another assumption that the thesis team made was that the CAF does not have
an aircraft depot facility and any depot maintenance required is accomplished at a
commercial aircraft depot either in the same or in another country.
Because many of these structural inspections are being conducted at a depot
facility the CAF has to pay for this maintenance. The maintainers at the HQ believe
that the installation of a health monitoring system will reduce this portion of the
maintenance costs.
The Logistics agencies are coping with problems in the support of these aged
aircraft. Currently, they have a hard time getting the required structural parts in
a timely manner when a repair is needed. They found out that by ordering parts
based on the preset maintenance schedule of the structural inspections, they end up
paying for and receiving parts that are not truly required on every aircraft (which
means wasted resources). The reason is that the preset schedule assumes that some
parts will be defective and will require replacement. However, when some aircraft are
inspected they may not exhibit the expected findings and there may not be a need for
replacement parts. On the other hand, parts required for a specific aircraft based on
its condition may not be immediately available because there was no prediction for
this requirement, and that increases the aircraft downtime. They perceive the ISHMS
as a system that will allow for better predictions in the maintenance requirements and
will result in more accurate parts order and less waste.
The CAF Acquisition agencies have a problem because the A-37 aircraft inspec-
tions consume an increased portion of the budget due to higher maintenance costs.
They have already done their analysis and expect the acquisition of this new system
will help better control the A-37 fleet’s direct operating costs. They have their esti-
mates for the ISHMS costs and expect a physical realization of the system to meet
these estimates.
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Flight Safety agencies are probably the stakeholders with the strictest demands.
They are in charge of setting the acceptable safety limits and ensuring the limits
are being followed. They have a hard time with the A-37 fleet: the increased age
is translated into increased risk. They want to be sure that if an A-37 is allowed
to continue flying (especially beyond its original design life) this is done without any
compromise or any violation of the required safety level. They expect from an ISHMS
to maintain at least the same level of safety as the current solution of performing the
structural inspections. All these stakeholders, for the first phase of the life-cycle, are
shown in Figure 4.3.
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Figure 4.3: Stakeholders Identification of Need
The second phase of concept definition cannot be separated from the first. There
is not any major change in the stakeholders but now the systems engineers (develop-
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ers) are required to work with the representatives of the stakeholders detailed above
and transform their generic needs into an operational concept. They also need to
identify the subsequent phases and the stakeholders involved in these phases.
In the following phases (preliminary system design, configuration item design,
system integration), which consist the development period, the main stakeholders are
the systems engineers (developers) and the system designers. The manufacturers have
also a role while the regulatory agencies and the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD)
may impose requirements. The stakeholders for the development phase of the system
are depicted in Figure 4.4.
Identification of Need Production Retirement
Training
Concept Definition
Deployment
Operation
Preliminary System 
Design
System Integration
Maintenance
Detailed Configuration 
Item Design
Refinement
Time
Stakeholders
Systems Engineers
System Architects
System Designers
Manufacturers
Regulatory Agencies
U.S. Dept. of Defense
Figure 4.4: Development Phase Stakeholders
The developers at this phase want to define the system requirements based on
the concept definition they created previously. They also want to define the architec-
ture of the system and make sure it reflects the other stakeholders’ views. At the same
time they must pay attention in treating the system as a black box (which is quite
difficult to do). This means they should not direct the designers towards a specific
realization of the system at this time but instead, they should keep their focus on
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the functions of the system. They are responsible for envisioning the evolution of the
system through its life-cycle. The schedule constraints, the availability of funding,
the operational requirements, the system’s performance and the technology applied
should be balanced by these stakeholders.
The designers are another group of stakeholders since they are involved with the
transformation of the requirements and architectures into a physical solution. Their
vision of the system may be different than the vision the other stakeholders may have.
But the designers must keep in mind that it is the customers’ needs they are trying
to satisfy with the design and not their personal visions or goals. In this sense the
technologies they are going to use for the design should not be selected on the basis
of “technology for the technology’s sake” [1].
The manufacturers start getting involved during these phases. They expect
that the system design they will have to materialize will be feasible. This means that
the technology involved and the resources required will be within their capabilities.
Also, their financial goals (from the manufacturing of this system) will create some
requirements for the system design. Clear definition of the requirements is expected
in order to avoid misunderstandings later on. The manufacturers view this phase as
the preparation stage for their more extended involvement later on.
By the term regulatory environment the thesis team refer to all those agencies
that can impose requirements and rules that affect the design, production and opera-
tion of the system. These agencies usually are external to the system’s environment.
Rules regarding the use of hazardous material in manufacturing and operation and
the production of toxic waste for example should be taken into account during the
design. In this sense, the regulatory environment is another stakeholder at this phase.
During the design phases as well as in the subsequent phases (i.e. Production,
Operation) the U.S. DoD is another significant stakeholder. The reason is that the
CAF has coordinated the development of their A-37 ISHMS with the U.S. DoD. The
DoD has the right to limit the amount and the types of technology that can be
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released to other countries, and because the development of the ISHMS will be done
by researchers in the United States, therefore the DoD can impose some requirements
(restrictions) for the capabilities of the system.
In the production, phase the manufacturers (contractors) are the main stake-
holders. Other stakeholders are the CAF engineers and acquisition officers, and, as
the thesis team mentioned, the US DoD and the regulatory agencies.
A part of the manufacturers’ view of the system at this phase was described
earlier. Their main expectation is that the undertaking of producing the system will
be beneficial for them. The system’s production requirements should not create addi-
tional difficulties in their activities. Their investment for this production in additional
equipment needed is expected to pay off. Along with setting up the production line,
the manufacturers must consider during this phase the support they will provide to
their customers (i.e. training, technical support). They should not forget, though,
the regulatory agencies and their restrictions when organizing the production line in
order to avoid any conflicts that might affect the timely production of the system.
A problem related with the production is the selection of suppliers. Very often
this decision at this phase will affect the system’s support in the subsequent phases and
the manufacturer should take into consideration factors such as the life expectancy of
the system, the technology involved, and the ability of the various suppliers to provide
the parts needed in the long term.
The CAF Acquisition officers need to ensure at this phase that contractual
obligations are being met by the manufacturer. The Air Force engineers are working
with the manufacturer and are monitoring the production process to verify that the
technical specifications are followed. Their feedback is expected by the acquisitions
officers in order to verify that the production proceeds according to the schedule and
the contract.
As the production of the first systems goes to its completion, the final prepara-
tions for the next two phases begin. Training as well as the system’s deployment is
102
organized at this time. In the training phase, the two large categories of stakeholders
are the trainers and the trainees. In the trainers category the manufacturer and the
CAF training agencies are the main stakeholders. The category of trainees consists
of the system operators, the system maintainers, and the aircraft operators (pilots).
The manufacturer’s technical personnel involved with the support of the system in
subsequent phases, have also requirements for training.The groups of stakeholders
during the training phase are depicted in Figure 4.5
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Figure 4.5: Training Phase Stakeholders
Usually, the manufacturers of systems complex and expensive such as the ISHMS
have their own training personnel to provide training to their customers. These train-
ers produce the training material and organize the training requirements. Duration
of training, location of training (manufacturer’s facilities or customer’s site), type of
training (theoretical in class training, hand-on training, combination) and training
aids are factors that must be considered by the trainers.
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The CAF internal rules impose requirements on the form of training. The CAF
training agencies need to ensure that the training provided by the manufacturers is
according to their requirements. Most importantly they must ensure that the training
goals are accomplished and the trained personnel are knowledgeable enough to operate
and support the new system.
The trainees expect from the training to provide them with the necessary knowl-
edge to support the system once it becomes operational. Each group of trainees (op-
erators, maintainers, pilots) has different expectations from this training. That is
translated into a requirement the development of training programs adapted to the
needs of each group.
The deployment phase cannot be clearly separated from the production and
training phases. Essentially, the completion of the first systems and the beginning of
the personnel training initiate the deployment phase. During this phase the groups of
people that have the right to have requirements for the system are the manufacturers,
the groups within the CAF described earlier (i.e. Headquarters, Base, Squadron,
Operations, Maintenance) as well as the developers. The stakeholders for this phase
are shown in Figure 4.6.
At this phase, the manufacturers have completed production and, in coordina-
tion with the CAF organize the installation of the system on the aircraft. Details
such as where the installation will take place, who will perform it, how integration
testing will be done need to be clarified before the deployment begins. The manufac-
turers’ expectation is that the system could be installed during another scheduled or
unscheduled maintenance in order to reduce the installation time. They would like to
be able to perform testing within a relatively short period of time and even combine
this testing with other operational tests performed on the aircraft. They would like to
minimize the potential problems that could arise during the installation. Their basic
goal is to minimize their portion of the costs related to the system’s deployment.
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Figure 4.6: Deployment Phase Stakeholders
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On the CAF’s side decisions concerning the location, the personnel, and the
support equipment required, should have been made at the beginning of this phase.
Their participation in the installation of the system as well as the requirements for
the acceptance of the new system must be clearly defined in order to avoid delays and
conflicts with the manufacturers. Their main expectation is that the integration of
the system on the aircraft will have minimum impact on the operational use of the
aircraft.
The developers, on the other hand, are eager at this phase to see the results of
their work. Their main expectation is that the design they produced and the planning
they have done will permit the deployment of the system to be completed with the
minimum impact to the other stakeholders (manufacturers, CAF agencies).
During the operation phase the stakeholders are the same as in the very first
phase identification of need. As the thesis team discussed the reason for the design
and production of the ISHMS for the CAF A-37 fleet was a problem that affected
the stakeholders such as the country’s Ministry of Defense, the CAF, and a number
of agencies in these two organizations: the Operations agencies, the Maintenance
organizations, the Flight Safety agencies, etc. All these categories of stakeholders
were affected by the main problem in different ways, and therefore they had different
expectations and visions for the system. The expectations and the vision of each
stakeholder from the operation of the system have already been presented.
As the system becomes operational each category of stakeholders is evaluating
to what degree this system satisfies their needs. This is essentially the phase where
the stakeholders decide whether all the effort, the expenses, and the wait were worth
it.
Hopefully, the stakeholders identified by the systems engineers in the initial
phases was complete and everyone’s vision was captured in the design. If this was
true it is possible that the system will be accepted by the stakeholders. Otherwise
some of them may view it negatively.
106
The operational phase occurs simultaneously with the maintenance phase. The
maintainers are the main stakeholders in this phase. These are the Base and Squadron
level maintainers but the technicians involved with the repair of the system at the
manufacturer’s depot facilities can also be considered stakeholders.
The CAF maintainers’ vision of the system at this phase is that it is a highly
reliable system which performs all the functions they initially requested. They would
like the system to be easy to maintain (i.e. to experience a low number of failures,
to require small amount of teardown to gain access for repair, and to require a small
amount of downtime). Self-diagnostics capabilities of the system are viewed as a
highly desirable feature.
The manufacturer’s technical personnel have similar expectations from the ISHMS.
They would like the system to experience few serious failures that require their inter-
vention. In case some of the system’s components are sent to them for repair, they
would expect that the necessary testing and repair equipment is available and the
repairs feasible.
As the system stays longer in operation, the need for some improvements or
upgrades may arise. This need may be created by the feedback provided to the devel-
opers and manufacturers from the operators. These groups are the main stakeholders
in this phase.
The developers envision a system that will operate smoothly throughout its
design life. However, after the system has been deployed and put into operation there
might be problems they did not anticipate. In order to be able to deal with these
problems, the developers would like to receive frequent and accurate feedback from the
operators. Therefore, they would like to have a communications scheme to permit this
information to flow back and forth from the field back to them. Also, they envision the
ISHMS as a system that can perform self-diagnosis and provide accurate data about
its condition. Thus the feedback from the field can be automated and independent
of the maintainers. The improvements during this phase should consist of software
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upgrades and modifications of parts due to obsolescence. Their initial design should
be as complete as possible so that these modifications are not extensive.
The manufacturers would like to produce a system that will require a mini-
mal amount of refinement during its lifetime. The costs they will have to incur for
these refinements should be kept at a low level. Many refinements translate for the
manufacturers into resources committed to the support of the system. Also, many
modifications and upgrades are perceived by the customers as quality problems and
hurt the manufacturers’ reputation.
The CAF maintainers, also, would like the system to operate without the need
for major modifications. Very often the modifications on a system mean additional
downtime. The maintainers view the system as a solution to the problem of increased
downtime due to structural inspections on the A-37 aircraft; they would not like a
new source of downtime to be installed on their aircraft.
In the final phase of the system’s life-cycle, the main stakeholders are again the
country’s Ministry of National Defense and the CAF. Other stakeholders the team
identified for this phase are the manufacturers and the regulatory agencies.
For the purpose of our analysis, the thesis team assumed that the life of the
ISHMS will be at least as long as the remaining life of the A-37 aircraft (i.e. the
ISHMS will not be retired before the A-37’s are). As the ISHMS (and the A-37
aircraft) reaches its design life a new problem arises for the Ministry of National
Defense and the CAF. The problem is how will the system be retired and disposed,
and how will the lost capabilities be replaced.
Both these stakeholders will need to develop a plan for the retirement of the
system. If the system has still remaining useful life could it be removed from the
retired aircraft and used on other aircraft? Could it be sold to another operator who
could still use it? Is the system completely useless and needs to be discarded? Are
there any restrictions in the disposal of the system? These are some of the questions
that need to be answered by the stakeholders. The CAF as the customer would prefer
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the retirement and the disposal of the system to have as little effect as possible in its
operations.
The manufacturers are another group of stakeholders in this phase. Very often
they are involved in the disposal of their products. They have to make sure that the
requirements of another stakeholder, the regulatory agencies, for this phase are being
met.
4.4 Operational Concept
As the thesis team discussed in chapter 3, the development of the operational
concept for the ISHMS will be done by creating sets of scenarios for the life-cycle
phases of the system. The purpose of these scenarios will be to describe the view of
the main stakeholders and its interaction with the system at the different phases of
the system’s life-cycle. The focus in these, relatively simple, scenarios is on what the
stakeholders and the system are doing and not how this is being done.
For the first two phases identification of need and concept definition the thesis
team developed scenarios that applied to both of them. The reason is that in the first
phase, as the thesis team already mentioned, the system exists only as a vague idea
in the mind of the stakeholders; this idea starts taking shape in the second phase.
Scenario: The systems engineers identify the stakeholders for the first phase
of the system. The systems engineers enter the customer’s environment and get a
clear understanding of the customer’s needs and how they will use the system. They
prepare and discuss with these stakeholders a concept for the system. Agreement is
achieved among the stakeholders on the proposed concept. The systems engineers
continue the development in the next phase.
Scenario: The systems engineers try to identify the stakeholders for the first
phase of the system. The CAF Flight Safety agencies are not identified as stakehold-
ers. The proposed concept does not include the views and requirements of the Flight
Safety agencies. Agreement cannot be achieved among the stakeholders. The system
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engineers revise the stakeholders to ensure all involved groups are represented in the
operational concept of the system.
For the next phase the preliminary design a possible scenario describing what
the system and the stakeholders do is as follows:
Scenario: The systems engineers develop the Systems Engineering Plan (SEP)
and define the “who, what, when, where, why, and how of the applied SE approach”
[23]. They develop the integrated master plan and schedules as well as the technical
performance measures. They organize system engineering, design and integration
teams and define detailed roles for their members. At the same time, they translate the
operational concept into the users’ requirements and develop the system architectures.
Scenario: The systems engineers develop the SEP. They develop the integrated
master plan and schedules as well as the technical performance measures. They
organize system engineering, design and integration teams but the responsibilities and
the roles of the integration team are not explicitly defined. This omission results in
miscommunication between the teams and reporting problems in subsequent phases.
In the next phase detailed configuration item design a possible scenario unfolds
as follows:
Scenario: The system design team develops the configuration item list and the
design for each item. The integration plan and verification-validation requirements
are defined. The physical solution of the system takes shape as the designers are
considering the technologies that are going to be used. The configuration items’ design
is influenced by the requirements set by the manufacturers, who are also involved
during this phase.
A possible scenario for the final phase of the development period, the system
integration, is the following:
Scenario: A prototype of the system is built. The integration of this prototype
proceeds as planned. During the validation testing the designers identify that some
of the requirements were not addressed satisfactorily. The design team reviews the
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design of the unsatisfactory configuration items. The validation tests are revised to
reflect the design changes. The validation is successful and the design is approved for
production.
In the production phase the manufacturers (contractors) and the CAF engineers
and acquisition officers are the main stakeholders.
Scenario: The manufacturers get into contract with the CAF, develop a produc-
tion plan, acquire the special equipment needed for the new production line, contract
suppliers for the required parts and begin production. CAF engineers are checking
periodically the production progress. The production proceeds as planned and the
systems are completed in time.
Scenario: The manufacturers get into a contract with the CAF, develop a pro-
duction plan, acquire the special equipment needed for the new production line, con-
tract suppliers for the required parts and begin production. The suppliers cannot
meet the delivery schedule. This situation causes delays in the ISHMS production.
CAF engineers and acquisition officers are dissatisfied. The manufacturer is trying
to find other supply sources while renegotiating the ISHMS production plan with the
Air Force.
As the production of the first systems goes towards completion the training
phase begins.
Scenario: The CAF training agencies and the manufacturer’s training division
agree on a training schedule for the customer’s personnel. They decide that the
training will take place at the manufacturer’s facilities. Training courses are developed
for each group of operators (i.e. maintainers, pilots, etc.) The training facility is
arranged and a dummy system is built for educational purposes. The training starts
and proceeds according to the schedule. The CAF operators are satisfied with the
level of knowledge and practical application provided.
Scenario: The CAF training agencies and the manufacturer’s training division
agree on a training schedule for the customer’s personnel. They decide that the
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training will take place at the customer’s facilities. The training material and aids will
be developed and provided by the manufacturer; different courses are developed for
each group of operators (i.e. maintainers, pilots, etc.) The training facility is arranged
and a dummy system is built for educational purposes. The training begins but the
trainees consider the knowledge provided to them inadequate. The manufacturer’s
personnel revise the training material and the schedule. The training is completed
with a delay that causes the system deployment schedule to slip behind.
Scenario: The manufacturer’s personnel and the CAF training agencies come
to agreement for the provision of training in the next years after the deployment.
During the deployment phase the main stakeholders are the CAF and the man-
ufacturers. Some scenarios describing this phase are the following:
Scenario: A deployment plan is arranged between the CAF agencies and the
manufacturer. The location of the system installation, the equipment required, the
task performance (who is going to do what), and the time schedule are defined. The
deployment proceeds according to the schedule. The system is delivered and accepted
on time.
Scenario: A deployment plan is arranged between the CAF agencies and the
manufacturer. The location of the system installation, the equipment required, the
task performance (who is going to do what), the time schedule are defined. As the
installation of the system on the first aircraft is completed and the CAF personnel
performs the acceptance inspection, system operation problems are revealed. The
manufacturer’s engineering department is involved and is trying to find a solution.
The deployment schedule slips. The cause of the problem is traced to the production
phases. The manufacturer comes up with a solution and the deployment resumes.
Scenario: A deployment plan is arranged between the CAF agencies and the
manufacturer. The location of the system installation, the equipment required, the
task performance (who is going to do what), and the time schedule are defined. As
the installation of the system on the first aircraft begins problems are revealed. The
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manufacturer’s engineering department is involved and is trying to find a solution.
The problems are traced to the design phase. The designers are involved while the
deployment is cancelled. The designers find a solution to the problem. The production
of the redesigned parts starts and the deployment resumes after a long delay.
Once the deployment is completed the operation phase begins. The CAF and
the country’s Ministry of Defense are the main stakeholders in the phase who are
expecting the system to relieve their problem.
Scenario: The A-37 aircraft start flying with the ISHMS installed. The system
functions as designed and as desired. The monitoring of the cracks and the corrosion
is continuous; the data acquired from the system are accurate. The analysis per-
formed at the ground workstation helps the engineers to assess the individual aircraft
condition. The warnings generated for some aircraft prove to be accurate. After a
short period of data collection a customized inspection plan for each aircraft is gen-
erated. The engineers’ assessment of the fleet’s condition allows them to develop a
plan for the service life extension. The customized inspections have shorter duration
while the components needing replacement are significantly reduced. The A-37 fleet
availability increases to the desired level.
Scenario: The A-37 aircraft start flying with the ISHMS installed. The sys-
tem’s operations is not as desired. The monitoring of the cracks and the corrosion is
problematic; the data acquired from the system are very often corrupted. The analysis
performed at the ground workstation creates difficulties to the engineers in assessing
the individual aircraft’s condition. The warnings generated for some aircraft prove
to be inaccurate. Maintenance is performed based on the ISHMS indications, which
proves to be unnecessary. The engineers’ assessment of the fleet’s condition does not
allow them to extend the A-37 aircraft service life. The maintainers are still per-
forming the structural inspections. As a result the anticipated improvement in the
aircraft availability is not achieved. The maintenance and operations agencies are
dissatisfied. The manufacturers and the designers are investigating the root cause of
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these functional problems. The development of a corrective action is time consuming
and creates additional problems to all stakeholders.
Simultaneously with the operation phase begins the maintenance phase. The
main stakeholders now are the CAF maintenance groups.
Scenario: After the completion of the system installation begins its operational
use. There are no effects caused by the ISHMS to other aircraft systems. The number
of system failures is small and the maintainers involved with its maintenance are
satisfied. They believe that the troubleshooting and repair procedures developed
by the manufacturer are effective, and the training provided to them adequate to
maintain the system.
Scenario: After the completion of the system installation begins its operational
use. The maintainers involved with its maintenance are dissatisfied. They believe that
the troubleshooting procedures are inadequate and the system is difficult to maintain
(i.e. components are hard to reach, a lot of teardown required). The downtime caused
by the ISHMS failures is significant. The manufacturer’s personnel are involved and
are trying to improve the troubleshooting procedures.
Scenario: As the system goes into operation and starts experiencing failures the
CAF Logistics agencies realize that its support is not an easy task. The parts ordering
system is ineffective with long lead times and delays. The cost of the replacement parts
is also high. These delays create problems in the support provided to the maintainers,
while the high costs put pressure on the budget.
As more experience from the system’s operations is accumulated the need for
some improvements/modifications may arise. This happens in the refinement phase.
Scenario: The data collected from the ISHMS are analyzed and feedback is
sent to the manufacturers and the designers. The system operates as designed and
no further refinement is required.
Scenario: The maintainers send feedback from the system operation to the man-
ufacturer. The manufacturer improves the ISHMS analysis algorithm and organize
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in coordination with the operator an upgrade. The operators expect this upgrade to
have minimal effect in the operational use of the aircraft.
Scenario: Some of the ISHMS parts supplied from commercial sources become
obsolete. The manufacturer identifies the need for a modification to the system in
order to replace the obsolescent parts. New supply sources are selected. The man-
ufacturer is trying to use replacement parts that are expected to have longer life.
The modification of the system is organized in coordination with the operators and
executed by a manufacturers’ field team. Additional training is required for the CAF
maintainers on the new ISHMS configuration after the modification.
Finally in the retirement phase the CAF and the country’s Ministry of Defense
are the main stakeholders. The following scenarios describe their involvement with
the system in this phase.
Scenario: As the ISHMS is approaching the end of its design life the CAF
engineers must evaluate the situation and make a recommendation for the actions
that will follow. They develop a plan for the retirement of the system. They examine
the regulatory restrictions in order to ensure that the system’s disposal will not create
any conflict with the regulatory agencies. The schedule is followed and the system
goes out of service.
Scenario: The CAF engineers determine that the A-37 aircraft must be retired.
However, the ISHMS has still remaining useful life. Arrangements with the manufac-
turer are made to purchase the retired (i.e. no longer needed for the CAF) systems.
The manufacturer can upgrade and resell these systems to another customer.
Scenario: As the ISHMS is approaching the end of its design life the CAF en-
gineers must evaluate the situation and make a recommendation for the actions that
will follow. They develop a plan for the retirement of the system. They agree with
the manufacturer to carry out the disposal of the retired systems. As the manufac-
turer is trying to dispose the systems they realize that there is a conflict with the
environmental regulations due to toxic material contained in the ISHMS parts. The
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manufacturer is searching for a solution to neutralize the toxic substances and dispose
the retired systems.
The results of the SE requirements process are presented in the following sec-
tion. A structured process seven step approach is used. User provided originating
requirements allow the methodical discovery and refinement of the ISHMS require-
ments.
4.5 Requirements Results
Manpower intensive 300 hour periodic maintenance inspections were driving up
the cost of operating Cessna A-37 legacy aircraft beyond original safe life [41]. Buede’s
structured method of requirements definition was used to develop the originating and
derived requirements for the A-37 ISHMS to reduce this maintenance cost while main-
taining SOF. The structured method for creating the ISHMS requirements involved
a seven step approach.
The first step developed the A-37 ISHMS operational concept. The ISHMS
operational concept was the general vision of the system, a statement of capability
requirements, and how the system was expected to be used (Figure 3.4). The user
provided the operational concept with a series of originating requirements.
4.5.1 Vision. The generic Major Command Headquarters needed an inte-
grated system that reduces the cost of safely operating Cessna A-37 legacy aircraft
beyond design safe life.
4.5.2 Originating Requirements. The implementation of an ISHMS will re-
duce the current aircraft inspection burden on the maintainers. The burden shall be
reduced, not necessarily all inclusive, by increasing the mean time between inspec-
tions, decreasing mean time to inspect, and/or decreasing number of inspection items,
as well as reducing the risk of damage due to performing the inspections. Ideally, such
system will alert the user of current and/or impending aircraft structural health fail-
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ures. The system shall be reliable and accurate such that it does not adversely impact
aircraft safety or maintenance. The addition of the system should maintain the SOF
within the allowable parameters. Ideally, the addition of the ISHMS should not re-
duce the performance nor impose restrictions on the operational limits of the aircraft.
The presence of the system on the aircraft should not limit the use of the aircraft in
current and anticipated operational environments. The total life-cycle cost (develop-
ment, acquisition, installation, operating/maintenance, and disposal) of the ISHMS
should not exceed the total aircraft maintenance costs (inspections and repairs) of the
structural components being monitored by the ISHMS for the extended service-life
period. The average A-37 fleet flight hours are 5958 (Figure 4.7).
The estimated A-37 aircraft design life is 8000 flight hours allowing the aircraft
to operate up to 10,000 total flight hours (8 years of additional usage). The impact to
aircraft availability shall be reduced, when possible, by installing the ISHMS during
scheduled aircraft downtime. Additionally, the need for specialized tools or additional
support equipment should be kept to a minimum. The ISHMS should have a low mean
time to repair and a high mean time between failures. System calibration should be
required no more than once annually. Once installed, the system should be easily
accessible for maintenance purposes. Additionally, maintenance of the ISHMS should
not induce damage to the aircraft. The system will include an internal component
failure test, i.e. self-test. The system design life should exceed twice the remaining
expected aircraft life. The system should not require hazardous material handling
nor disposal. Minimize ISHM integration with current legacy aircraft subsystems. As
much as possible, the ISHM system shall be self contained with minimum connections
to aircraft avionics and power.
4.5.3 Expectation of Use. The system should be intuitive and easy to
operate. System data should be available and formatted such that it can be analyzed
efficiently and easily at any maintenance or operating location. Any generated data
will be archived in an external system and retrievable at a later time. Structural health
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Figure 4.7: CAF A-37 Flight Hour Distribution
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data will be used for extending time between inspections and facilitate planning.
Industry standards for hardware connections and data formatting should be used.
The second step was the definition of the system boundary with an external
systems diagram. A context diagram was created to distinguish the ISHMS boundary
from the external systems (Figure 4.8).
External Systems Impacted by System
Cessna A-37 ISHM System
Time Stamp
MaintainerOperator
External Systems not Impacted by System
Planner
Figure 4.8: ISHMS Context Diagram
The third step was the development of the weighted objectives hierarchy and
performance indices (Appendix C). This hierarchy defined cost, schedule, and perfor-
mance goals the stakeholders required for an acceptable system design (Figure 4.9).
The fourth step of developing, analyzing and refining the requirements required
taking the operational concept, system inputs and outputs, and combined with the
objectives hierarchy to refine the originating requirements into the system require-
ments.
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ISHM Operational
Objectives
Development Cost
10%, Wt = 0.02
Performance
Objectives, Wt = 0.8
Total System Cost
100%, Wt = 0.2
Acquisition Cost
30%, Wt = 0.06
Installation Cost
35%, Wt = 0.07
Operation Cost
20%, Wt = 0.04
Added Disposal Cost
5%, Wt = 0.01
Crack Detection>90%
95% Conf, Wt = 0.2
Crack Signal Sample
>4Hz, Wt = 0.1
ISHM Reliability>99%
, Wt = 0.05
-30<Temp<200°F
, Wt = 0.05
MTBF>5 years
, Wt = 0.1
24Hr Fix Rate>80%
, Wt = 0.05
TMDE >= Annual
, Wt = 0.05
<10 Step Analysis
, Wt = 0.05
Pilot Cuing
, Wt = 0.1
Store 600+ Data Hrs
, Wt = 0.05
Figure 4.9: ISHMS Objectives Hierarchy
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4.5.4 System Requirements.
1. Extend Service Life
2. Reduce Inspection Burden
3. Reduce Inspection Induced Damage
4. Maintain Safety of Flight
5. Reduce Cost
6. Collect Data in Real Time
7. Minimize Impact on Aircraft Operations
8. Easy to Maintain
9. Easy to Use Pilot and Maintenance Cuing
10. Minimize Development and Installation Time
11. Streamline Acquisition
The fifth step was to ensure the requirements feasibility. Feasibility was deter-
mined if the requirement was verifiable with demonstration, analysis and simulation,
inspection, or instrumented test.
4.5.5 Requirements Feasibility. The Extend Service Life requirement was
observed by analysis and simulation utilizing structural finite element analysis to
predict crack growth with operations for an additional 5000 flight hours beyond design
life.
The Reduce Inspection Burden requirement was observed by analysis and sim-
ulation utilizing the structural metamodel with a Monte Carlo simulation to predict
feasibility of extending 300 flight hour inspections to a 600 hour inspection interval.
The Reduce Inspection Induced Damage requirement was observed by analysis
and simulation tabulating the difference in number of inspections from the baseline
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to the extended inspection interval with the ISHMS. The reduction in the number of
inspections correlates to a reduction in the amount of inspection induced damage.
The Maintain Safety of Flight requirement was observed by analysis and simula-
tion comparing the single flight hour probability of fracture of the baseline inspection
interval versus the extended inspection interval with the ISHMS installed. Both val-
ues were compared to the USAF standard of 10−7. The crack probability of detection
of the ISHMS was observed by instrumented test.
The Reduce Cost requirement was observed by analysis and simulation compar-
ing the difference in the number of 300 hour inspections of the baseline versus the
status quo multiplied by the expected cost of the inspection.
The Collect Data in Real Time requirement was observed by analysis and simu-
lation utilizing finite element analysis dynamic model to predict the modal frequencies
of the A-37 wing.
The Minimize Impact on Aircraft Operations requirement was observed by in-
strumented test of the modified system during environmental and acceptance testing.
The Easy to Maintain requirement was observed by demonstration during ac-
ceptance testing.
The Easy to Use Pilot and Maintenance Cuing requirement was observed by
demonstration of maintenance personnel using the system and instrumented test of
the pilot cuing function.
The Minimize Development and Installation Time requirement was observed by
inspection of the system design.
The Streamline Acquisition requirement was observed by inspection of the ISHMS
design.
The sixth step was defining the qualification system requirements. The sys-
tem qualification involved establishing the requirements to; validate the operational
concept, verify the components & system, validate the system, and accept the system.
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4.5.6 Qualification Requirements. Extend Service Life ISHMS will extend
operation of A-37 service life beyond original design life of 5000 flight hours.
Reduce Inspection Burden ISHMS should reduce operations and maintenance
cost by extending 300 hour inspections to 600 hour intervals.
Reduce Inspection Induced Damage The ISHMS shall reduce overall number of
inspections proportionally reducing inspection induced damage from disassembly and
inspection.
Maintain Safety of Flight The single flight hour probability of fracture should
not exceed the USAF standard of 10−7. The fleet total probability of fracture should
not exceed 1 in 103 [65]. The crack detection ability of the ISHM system should meet
or exceed the USAF standard of 90% detection with 95% confidence. The ISHMS
should notify maintenance and operations personnel of impending failure prior to
fracture.
Reduce Cost ISHMS must produce cost avoidance greater than the development,
installation, and operation cost of the ISHMS.
Collect Data in Real Time ISHMS should collect crack growth data in real time
at a Inquest rate of at least 4.034 Hz to enable the capture of bending vibration effects
on crack growth. ISHMS should have capability to store greater than 600 flight hours
of sensor readings.
Minimize Impact on Aircraft Operations Installation and operation of the ISHMS
should provide a less than 10% impact on aircraft performance (weight, max speed,
etc). The ISHMS modification should not impact aircraft operational requirements.
The ISHMS should not reduce the number and types of mission profiles flown. The
ISHMS impact to mission capability should be minimized by installation during sched-
uled maintenance, depot, or 300 hour inspection periods. ISHMS should not reduce
the mission capable rate due to system reliability during operation. The ISHMS
should operate in all environments from -30 to 200 degrees Fahrenheit.
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Easy to Maintain The ISHMS should be easy to maintain with a Mean Time
Between Failures aligned with projected depot schedule of once every five years. Mean
Time To Repair should be should be minimized by maximizing the use of Line Re-
placeable Units (LRU) in the ISHMS. The LRUs should be as easily accessible as
the current A-37 avionics subsystems. The 24 hour fix rate should be greater than
80%. The system should be easy to maintain without specialized tools and Material
Handling Equipment. Periodic maintenance of the system should also be minimized
by restricting calibration by Test Measurement and Diagnostic Equipment to no more
than once annually. The ISHMS should also include a self diagnosis function to verify
the status of the sensors, wiring, multiplexing, pilot cuing, and data storage.
Easy to Use Pilot and Maintenance Cuing The ISHMS should be easy to use
by novice 3-level maintenance personnel. There should be no more than 3 steps to re-
trieve the crack growth data from the A-37 aircraft. The data should be automatically
analyzed resulting in user friendly outputs of flight hours remaining until maintenance
required. The ISHMS should be based on a 2-level maintenance concept with flight
line maintenance troubleshooting the system and replacing LRUs. The ISHMS tasks
should be easily trained with the standard tasks of downloading, uploading and inter-
preting the crack growth data taking no more than 10 steps to accomplish. The crack
growth data should auto archive compiled data and make it available for a period
of 5 years. The ISHMS should provide instant pilot cuing indicating crack growth is
approaching structural failure.
Minimize Development and Installation Time The ISHMS integration with cur-
rent aircraft subsystems should be minimized to reduce the effect on aging wiring and
reduce requalification testing of the A-37 aircraft. The ISHMS should be self powered
with no requirement for aircraft power. The ISHMS should not connect to the aircraft
electrical system. The modification time and cost should be minimized to expedite
installation of the ISHMS on the A-37 aircraft. ISHMS install shall be accomplished
in coordination with current scheduled maintenance activities to minimize the impact
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on aircraft availability. Expertise required to install the ISHMS should be no greater
than that of a contractor/depot field team.
Streamline Acquisition The ISHMS design life should be greater than the pro-
jected remainder of A-37 aircraft life (i.e. 4000 flight hours). ISHMS should uti-
lize commercial connections and industry standards wherever practical. The ISHMS
should not significantly increase the hazardous waste disposal requirement of the A-37
aircraft. Finally, the basic system design should be general enough to use on other
aircraft.
The seventh and final step was obtaining the sponsor approval of the require-
ments. The primary sponsor was unavailable so the requirements were validated
through thesis advisors, AFRL, and SAF/IARL.
The results of the SE process architecture products are presented in the fol-
lowing section. Decomposition of the requirements into: inputs, outputs, controls,
mechanisms, and functions forms the basis of the architectures.
4.6 DoDAF Architectures
In Chapter 3 the team discussed what are system architectures, their impor-
tance, and the methodology used to develop the architecture products. During this
section of Chapter 4, the architecture products will be presented along with a brief
description on the development process for each. Most architecture products were
created using the System Architect software known as Popkin. There are a number of
existing computer-aided system engineering software tools that facilitate architecture
development. For example, the software package known as CORE is very popular
among the SE community for its ease in the creation of IDEF0 diagrams. However,
the thesis team decided to use the Popkin software because it has built-in rules for
creating most of the DoDAF architecture products, thus simplifying significantly the
whole architecture design process.
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4.6.1 All-Views Architectures. The first products required by DoDAF were
the AV-1 and AV-2, which are not exactly architectures, but rather textual definitions
and description of the problem, purpose and scope of the architecture products to
follow. Basically, the AV-1 places the boundaries of the architecture and is depicted
in Figure 4.10. The AV-2, also known as the Integrated Data Dictionary, is a glossary
with definitions of terms used in the architectures. For the most part, each item in
the graphical architectures has an entry in the AV-2, which is presented in Appendix
B.
Identification
Architecture Title:  ISHMS Requirements Identification
Architects:  AFIT GSE-06M, Section 1, ISHMS Thesis Group
Purpose
Problem Description: aging aircraft are approaching or exceeded the end of their design life;
users want to safely extend the life of these aircraft while minimizing the downtime due to
inspections and maintenance; a low-cost integrated structural health monitoring system
that provides at near real-time feedback has been identified as the potential solution.
Purpose:  to apply the systems engineering approach to the process of requirements
identification for the development and acquisition of an ISHMS for aging aircraft
Scope: This architecture depicts broad ISHMS requirements and information exchanges
Figure 4.10: AV-1 Architecture
4.6.2 Operational Architectures.
4.6.2.1 OV-1: Archi-toon. The first architecture product the thesis
team produced is the OV-1, also known as the archi-toon. The OV-1 (Figure 4.11)
depicts an A-37 at the center symbolizing the target aircraft for which the ISHMS is
being developed. The circle around the A-37 represents the system boundaries that
will be directly affected by the development and implementation of an ISHMS. Notice
that the circle is divided into four different areas, namely: aircraft monitoring, data
management, aircraft operations, and aircraft maintenance. The first two areas at
the top represent ISHMS design characteristics and their interaction is shown with
126
a lightning. The remaining two areas, shown at the bottom, represent systems that
would have to evolve and adapt to the new capabilities provided by the ISHMS. All
four areas will be thoroughly explained in subsequent paragraphs. Finally, the area
outside the circle is labeled external systems and symbolizes supporting systems that
may interact with the ISHMS, but will not be affected by the ISHMS. An example
would be GPS satellites providing GPS time for ISHMS data time-stamping or a com-
munications network relaying aircraft health status to a ground monitoring station.
The satellite and radar systems shown in the archi-toon were drawn only for artistic
purposes and by no means represent a pre-defined ISHMS concept.
Figure 4.11: OV-1 Architecture
4.6.2.2 OV-5: Operational Activity Diagram. The next architecture
is the OV-5, also known as the operational activity model or IDEF0. An OV-5 can
also be presented as a node-tree diagram. The main difference between the two
formats is the level of detail in the information presented. A node tree only presents
the functional decomposition whereas the operational activity diagram shows the
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decomposition as well as the inputs, controls, outputs, and mechanisms (ICOM) for
each of the functions. Both OV-5 formats will be shown for the benefit of the readers.
The node tree diagram (Figure 4.12) can be thought of as a roadmap of the IDEF0
diagrams.
The thesis team started the OV-5 development by first defining the main purpose
of the architecture, which is to provide a process that would help identify the ISHMS
requirements. As such, this activity became the context diagram and is shown in
figure 4.13. In other words, by the time the OV-5 is fully explained, the reader should
have a clear understanding of the activities the thesis team recommend be performed
when trying to identify design requirements for the development of an ISHMS.
At this point is worth mentioning that all OV-5 diagrams follow Popkin rules
which include not having more than four ICOM arrows on any one side of a function
box nor having more than six function boxes in any one diagram page. The purpose
of these rules is to avoid clutter and confusion in the architectures. Also, the reader
will notice some of the ICOM arrows contain parentheses. These parentheses denote
what is known as tunneling, meaning that the respective ICOM is not present in
its parent diagram. In most cases, tunneling becomes necessary in order to avoid
clutter in the parent diagram. Usually, tunneling increases as the number of layers of
decomposition increases.
Next the thesis team decomposed the context diagram into four major functions
or activities that a hypothetical ISHMS should be expected to perform, namely: the
structural monitoring requirements function, the data requirements function, the op-
erational requirements function, and the maintenance requirements function (Figure
4.14). The structural monitoring function refers to the user requirement of detecting
structural failure of an aging aircraft without human intervention. The thesis team
determined that the only feasible way to automate this process and satisfy this user
requirement was by using sensors onboard the aircraft. All decisions about the sensors
(i.e., placement, quantity, properties, sensitivity) fall under the monitoring function.
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Another major function is the data requirements function, which deals with decisions
about data acquisition, handling and processing. Next is the operational function,
which captures user preferences about the operational use of the hypothetical ISHMS.
Lastly, the maintenance function has to do with decisions about sustaining, validat-
ing, and maintaining the system. Initially, the thesis team thought that operations
and maintenance requirements could be lumped into one single function, especially
when considering the CAF A-37 fleet of only 13 aircraft. However, the integration of
an ISHMS to a larger fleet of aircraft and a more complex organizational structure,
such as that of the USAF, would certainly justify the separation of the two functions.
Thus, the thesis team decided to separate the two functions so the architecture would
fit into a larger number of possible operational scenarios.
Next, the thesis team decomposed the monitoring requirements one more layer
(Figure 4.15). The thesis team determined that the best way to implement an ISHMS
would be through the use of a sensor network capable of detecting structural failures
in various FCLs of an aging aircraft. Based on this assumption, the monitoring
requirements were decomposed into three main functions. First function was to de-
termine the location of each sensor of the ISHMS sensor network. Second function
was to determine how many sensors were needed. The last function was to determine
requirements for the type of sensor needed on each of the sensor locations.
The monitoring requirements were decomposed one more time (Figure 4.16)
starting with determining sensor location requirements. Possible sensor locations
were divided into two general categories: fatigue critical locations and other critical
locations. By doing this, the thesis team purposely opened the door to monitor other
aircraft components that may capitalize on the ISHMS development. Sensor loca-
tions will most likely be determined by compiling historical data on the maintenance
and inspections performed on the airframe, although some stakeholders may provide
justification for other specific locations. Using the A-37 as an example, historical
data can be found at Hill AFB through the MAPA Engineering Analysis Division,
by compiling the data from flight-line maintenance records, through interviews of pi-
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lots and maintainers, and/or contacting the depot or equivalent services organization.
The list of potential critical locations will depend on the thoroughness of the research
conducted, the quality of the maintenance practices, and the level of aggressiveness of
the flight profiles being flown. In addition, specific aircraft design characteristics may
limit the ISHMS options as well as the budget may impose a limit on the amount of
locations being monitored. The overall goal of this activity should be to end with an
accurate list of critical locations and prioritize the list in order of importance. Ob-
viously, emphasis should be placed on those locations that have a higher probability
of occurrence and a higher level of risk. A risk management analysis of all critical
locations should be appropriate to accomplish this activity. The mechanisms respon-
sible of accomplishing this task are the stakeholders and any engineers hired to do
the research job.
In addition to finding which locations should be monitored, it is necessary to
find out how many sensors are adequate to get the job done since it may be necessary
to place more than one sensor per critical location. This introduces the next decom-
position diagram (Figure 4.17). The amount of sensors will most likely be dependent
upon the desired SOF, accuracy, and reliability of the ISHMS in detecting failures.
By accuracy of the ISHMS the thesis team refer to the confidence level on detecting
a failure. Users may have an input in this activity, but the weight of the decision will
rely primarily upon engineering analysis backed up by established safety regulations
and policies. Cost will most likely be one of the most limiting factors in this decision
since there is a direct proportional relationship between the amount of sensors and
the total cost of the system.
The last function within the monitoring requirements was the determination of
sensor properties requirements. This is a very important function because it deals
with tailoring each sensor of the network according to the failure mode that needs to
be detected and the environmental conditions (both internal and external) that the
sensor must withstand. Failure modes can be due to a number of conditions including
corrosion, stresses, torques, extreme temperatures, vibration, or any other condition
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that weakens a structural member to the point of catastrophic failure. For example, if
a sensor is placed near the wing root attachment on an A-37, then the sensor must be
able to work properly under extreme temperatures and vibration of its surrounding
environment as a result of the proximity to the engine.
The decomposition of the sensor properties function (Figure 4.18) start with
determining the failure mode that needs to be detected, since different failure modes
will most likely require different sensors. The next step is to identify the internal and
external environmental factors to which the sensor will be exposed for each of the loca-
tions. An example of an internal or localized environmental factor would be a critical
location that is submerged in hydraulic fluid, or any other condition that results from
the sensor being placed onboard the aircraft. External factors refer to the external
operational environment to include weather conditions. For example, proximity to
sea water may promote corrosion problems, or a dusty environment may require a
sensor with additional protection from the elements, and extreme temperatures may
affect the electronic properties of the sensor, thus resulting in false readings. Another
activity within the sensor properties function is to determine the technologies that
will be incorporated into the ISHMS. As a result, sensor selection will certainly be
limited by the monitoring technologies available. Existing technologies would be more
readily available on the market and most likely be cheaper than emerging technolo-
gies. Finally, after taking into consideration the failure mode, environmental factors,
and available technologies, then a sensor can be tailored and matched to a specific
location with cost being another limiting factor. The stakeholders must realize that
there is enormous potential for trade-off opportunities to be considered when making
decisions about sensor selection and placement.
Once the sensor network is in place, then the next major ISHMS function to
be decomposed is the data requirements function (Figure 4.19). The thesis team di-
vided data requirements into three sub functions: data storage requirements, data
processing requirements, and data analysis requirements. Data storage requirements
are directly correlated to the quantity of sensors that compose the ISHMS; therefore,
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data storage requirements will increase as the quantity of sensors increases. Each
sensor outputs raw data that must be stored and sorted for future processing. The
limiting factor in the data storage requirements may come from various sources, but
at least bandwidth availability is definitely a potential limiting factor. Once the data
has been properly and securely stored, then it needs to be processed. Data process-
ing requirements may include sorting, synchronizing, and filtering the raw data. In
other words, each data string must be identified with information such as the sen-
sor it came from, the time of the measurement, and determining whether the data
string falls within the range of possible or acceptable values. The processed data must
then be manipulated and analyzed. Data analysis could be automated, manual, or a
combination of both. Particular attention must be given to identifying data analysis
requirements since these decisions will greatly influence the ISHMS development and
design. Furthermore, if the ISHMS must interact with any legacy systems, then there
will be a greater potential for unintended circumstances such as data compatibility
issues. Considering the vast amount of possibilities for performing data analysis, the
thesis team decided to create several hypothetical operational scenarios. The main
purpose of the operational scenarios was first to investigate the various ISHMS real-
izations and second to avoid steering the ISHMS design in any particular direction.
For example, one operational scenario may be that the ISHMS provides continuous
real-time measurements and a dummy-light or visual display in the cockpit signals the
pilot that there is a potential structural problem. In this scenario, the pilot is imme-
diately aware of the problem and can react according to the emergency procedures.
Another scenario is one where the sensor data is up linked via a communications
system (i.e., satellite, Link-16, etc.) and down linked to a central processing ground
station. In this scenario if a problem is detected, then the control tower personnel
will be notified and they will take action to safely ground the aircraft by providing
pilots with emergency procedures. Another possible operational scenario is one where
the ISHMS is passively collecting sensor data and at the end of the flight or mission
a data logger would be responsible for downloading the ISHMS from the aircraft and
140
into a database for an automated analysis. In this scenario, any potential problems
will be known and handled after the fact, thus limiting the potential for immediate
risk avoidance. However, this last scenario may be the cheapest and simplest option
to implement. Many other scenarios are possible, but it will be up to the stakehold-
ers and engineers to make those trade-off decisions, which will be constrained by the
amount of money available.
The third major functional decomposition (Figure 4.20) deals with determin-
ing ISHMS operational requirements. The team’s main concern within this function
was exploring the events unfolding after the ISHMS data had been analyzed. This
involved determining potential information exchanges and responsibilities among or
within organizations. This external activity was included because the decisions made
in this step may influence the final outcome of the ISHMS design. Again, given the
wide range of possibilities, hypothetical scenarios were developed to avoid the risk
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of suggesting a specific solution. A possible scenario is one in which the ISHMS is
used to assess the structural health of individual aging aircraft as a way to shift from
preventive to condition-based maintenance. In other words, instead of inspecting and
performing preventive maintenance every number of flight hours, continuous struc-
tural monitoring may eliminate the need for inspections and delay maintenance for
when it is really needed. In this scenario, the benefits of having an ISHMS can be
measured from the potential for savings (i.e., cost avoidance) on operations and main-
tenance in addition to the resulting increase in aircraft availability. A more complex
scenario would be an ISHMS data repository that analyzes usage trends of a fleet of
aircraft and suggests the rotation of aircraft between different organizations to keep
the wear and tear of the fleet even. For example, ISHMS may suggest that specific
F-15C tail numbers from Air Combat Command be rotated with specific F-15 tail
numbers from Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC) in order to even out and main-
tain an optimal safety and operational status throughout all organizations; assuming
AFMC aircraft flight profiles are less severe. Obviously, the latter scenario would
require extensive strategic and tactical planning as well as the buy-in of higher man-
agement before being implemented. In addition, an ISHMS may be used to introduce
more efficiency and control in the planning and scheduling of aircraft maintenance
activities. For example, data analysis may be able to forecast the amount of flight
hours left on an aircraft before it is due for maintenance. Maintainers and flight com-
manders can then plan accordingly the flying schedule. In addition, the ISHMS may
be able to point out those locations that will require maintenance in the near future
so that all maintenance can be performed at once; without the need for inspections
that usually involve lengthy invasive procedures.
Finally, the last functional decomposition (Figure 4.21) was determining the
ISHMS maintenance requirements. This includes installing, repairing, validating,
calibrating, and other maintenance of the ISHMS. Depending on the complexity and
technology of the ISHMS, some of these services may be performed on-site or they may
require mobilizing the aircraft to specialized facilities. The level of maintenance of
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the ISHMS will mostly depend on the level of reliance on the ISHMS. If for example,
the time interval between inspections is to be increased as a result of having an
ISHMS then this would require a more robust system and probably a stricter ISHMS
maintenance schedule. One way to increase the robustness or reliability of a system
is by adding redundancy, which in turn demands a higher cost and complexity.
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4.6.2.3 OV-2: Node Connectivity Diagram. Next architecture devel-
oped was the OV-2 (Figure 4.22), also known as the Operational Node Connectivity
Description. This diagram depicts the overall system nodes and the information ex-
changes between the nodes. The OV-2 shows five operational nodes, namely: the
monitoring node, the data management node, aircraft operations node, aircraft main-
tenance node, and the external systems node.
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Notice the similarity between the ISHMS operational functions in the OV-5 and
the operational nodes in the OV-2. Also shown in the OV-2 are the information need-
lines connecting the nodes; six needlines were identified. The first needline connects
the monitoring and data management nodes. This represents the raw sensor data
going into the data acquisition unit. Data processing and analysis are assumed to
occur in the data management node, which could be a system or organization. The
external systems node is feeding the data management node with a data processing
needline. This particular needline may represent external data used for time-stamping
of the raw sensor data (e.g., GPS time) or it could represent data logger feeding into
an ISHMS repository. The actual meaning will depend on the final ISHMS solution.
Then the data management node is responsible of alerting the aircraft operations node
of potential structural failures. The aircraft operations node could be either the pilot
flying the aircraft, control tower, an ISHMS data analyst, or a combination of these;
it will all depend on the final ISHM design. In addition, the data management node
will pinpoint the aircraft maintenance node the specific locations that require main-
tenance. In some instances, aircraft repairs and/or inspections may require external
involvement (e.g., aircraft depot or contracted experts) and for this reason there is a
needline shown going from the external systems into the aircraft maintenance node.
4.6.2.4 OV-3: Operational Information Exchange Matrix. Then the
thesis team developed the OV-3, also known as the Operational Information Exchange
Matrix. This architecture product is textual and provides information about the OV-
2 needlines. Basically, this matrix shows the same information that was described in
the previous paragraph. Thus, the OV-3 is shown in Figure 4.23 and the reader is
referred to the previous paragraph for its interpretation.
4.6.2.5 Remarks. So far, the thesis team have shown the development
of the AV-1, AV-2, OV-1, OV-2, OV-3, and OV-5. According to the DoDAF require-
ments for an integrated architecture, the thesis team would still be missing the SV-1
and TV-1. In addition, the DoDAF suggests the SV-5 matrix for an acquisition de-
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velopment. However, all these remaining products require knowledge on the physical
systems and interfaces that make up the ISHMS, all of which is out of the scope of this
thesis study. As such, the thesis team decided to limit the architecture development
to the products that have been developed so far. As a final note to the reader, even
though this may seem like a straight-forward architecture, its development was far
from straight-forward. There were several false starts and iterations before arriving
to its current state. Ensuring that the OV-5 was balance was not an easy task, even
when Popkin pinpointed the errors. Furthermore, some necessary activities, such
as the training activity, were intentionally omitted because they would require more
knowledge on the physical characteristics of the system in order for the architecture to
provide insightful information. Nevertheless, the requirements identification process
streamlined in this architecture should be able to guide the reader to ask the right
questions to the proper stakeholders. Eventually, the identification of ISHMS design
requirements would reduce the number of possible ISHMS realizations and lead into
trade-off studies for ultimate determination of the final ISHM solution.
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The results of the structural model are presented in the following section. The
benefit analysis is composed of a structural model that feeds into both a baseline 300
hour simulation and ISHMS modified simulation.
4.7 Structural Model Scope of Work
The comparison of the baseline Cessna A-37 300 hour inspection schedule versus
the extended inspection schedule with an ISHMS installed required the development of
a structural model to predict the stress occurring at a FCL. The aircraft usage profile
(flight spectrum) was established along with a typical weapons loadout to estimate
crack growth and determine aircraft service life (how many cycles the wings can be
loaded until fracture). Countries can save maintenance resources by maximizing the
inspection interval of the aircraft currently in their inventory while maintaining SOF
at the same level as the current 300 hour inspection interval. Flight profiles and
the amount of weapons carried cannot be modified without negatively affecting the
mission, so the stress model at the FCL was determined with the pylon weapon loads
as the design variables. Each weapon pylon location has maximum load ratings,
but this structural model determined the stress applied at a FCL from the applied
weapons load and flight profile.
This analysis modeled the stress at the front spar wing attach fitting of a sub-
sonic Cessna A-37 Dragonfly using:
1. I-DEAS R© FE Analysis model
2. JUMP R© response surface metamodel
3. Excel R© flight spectrum stepped approximation
The purpose of this structural modeling was to estimate crack growth propagation at
the front spar wing attach fitting FCL to facilitate an ISHMS benefit analysis.
The stress intensity range, ∆K, was based on the stress amplitude, ∆σ, the
boundary condition factor, f(g), and the crack length, a. The stress amplitude, ∆σ,
was the difference between the maximum and minimum stress (Figure 3.15).
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Minimum stress, σmin, was assumed as the unloaded wing configuration i.e.,
σmin=0. The aircraft flight load was assumed as SLUF. The goal was to predict
the maximum stress, σmax, from the SLUF and weapon loading configurations. The
difference in the two stresses was the stress amplitude used to calculate the crack
growth rate and cycles until failure, Nf . The maximum stress, σmax, on the wing was
determined by the weight/location of the weapons and the lift load.
4.8 Design Goals
The design variables were defined as the amount of weapon and fuel force (lbf)
loaded at each of the four pylon locations and wing tip (x1, x2, x3, x4, & x5) (Figure
3.16). Note: the location of the weapon pylons were fixed and could not be changed,
only the amount of loading at each pylon location was changed.
The cost function was the aircraft stress (psi) at the wing root spar connection
to the front spar carry-through frame (wing attach fitting) element 2815 (Figure 3.17).
Typical Vietnam era weapon and fuel load-out was 2501 lbs.
4.9 Problem Formulation
Once a typical A-37 weapon load was determined the development of the cost
function was broken down into six stages and four parts:
1. The first stage consisted of researching the Cessna A-37 Dragonfly to gain an
understanding of the structure and forces at work.
2. The second stage was making engineering assumptions to simplify the complex
A-37 system into a structural simulation model.
3. The third stage was distilling the simulation model down into a response surface
regression metamodel to estimate the stress experienced at the wing attach
fitting.
4. The fourth stage created a stepped approximation of a fighter flight spectrum
to determine mission effects on the stress at the wing attach fitting.
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5. The fifth stage was feeding the stress amplitude per 100 cycles per flight hour
into the MATLAB R© crack growth model to estimate crack growth at the FCL
over time.
6. The sixth stage was using the crack growth model to conduct a benefit analysis
(Figure 3.7).
4.9.1 Four Parts of Structural Model. The four parts to successfully execute
the structural model were:
1. Constructed a structural simulation model of the Cessna A-37 Dragonfly
• Created a simulation model of the wing using FE analysis
• Used adaptive meshing to decrease element size until max stress converged
2. Constructed a CCD for the response surface
• Generated orthogonal fractional factorial design to minimize confounding
• Determined design factor input ranges
3. Executed each of the I-DEAS R© FE simulation runs
• Executed required simulations from the fractional factorial design
• Validated the simulation model results using hand calculations
4. Created a response surface regression metamodel of the FE simulation model
• Conducted sensitivity analysis to determine loading trends on stress
• Estimated stress at wing attach fitting using typical Vietnam weapon load-
out
5. Constructed stepped approximation of fighter flight spectrum
• Simplified flight spectrum for crack growth model
• Estimated mission effect on wing attach fitting stress per flight hour cycle
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4.10 Solution Approach
4.10.1 Modeling Issues and Simplifying Assumptions. This analysis modeled
the right wing of the Cessna A-37 Dragonfly (i.e. half-wing model) (Figure 4.24)
and consisted of a linear static maximum stress analysis. The flight spectrum was
truncated into a stepped approximation and distilled into a weighted average effect
on the wing attach fitting stress per flight hour cycle.
Figure 4.24: A-37 Right Wing: Half-wing Model
The structural components modeled consisted of: two spars, the wing root and
tip ribs, and the aircraft skin (Figure 4.25). The spars were modeled without spar caps
and the stringers and landing gear were ignored for simplicity. The airfoil geometry
was a (NACA) 2418 with a chord length of 67 in at the wing root and 52.8 in at
the wing tip. The span of the wing was 158 in with a 3◦ dihedral and a 3◦ counter
clockwise twist [44].
The spars, skin, and ribs were modeled with 7075-T6 aluminum FE shell meshes
of thickness (1 in, 0.25 in, and 1 in respectively) (Figure 4.26). These material and
thickness selections where accurate for the spars and ribs, but an assumption for the
wing skin.
The interior ribs were only used as weapon pylon reference points to attach
weapon point loads. Weapon pylon locations consisted of the five rib locations farthest
from the fuselage (to include the wing tip) (Figure 3.16).
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Figure 4.25: A-37 Right Wing
4.10.2 Loading Conditions. The loading conditions consisted of distributed
and point loads (Figure 4.27).
The point weapon loads were divided between the front and rear spars at each
of the five rib locations nearest the wing tip. The total force (SLUF assumption) of
each weapon load (from the wing root outward) was: 870 lb, 870 lb, 600 lb, 500 lb,
and 817 lb. The lift load pressure distribution surface along the chord from leading
edge to trailing edge was calculated using DesignFoilR©, a subsonic simulation program
utilizing NACA airfoil and aircraft performance data (Figure 4.28). Elliptical equa-
tions for the chord pressure distribution were solved via MathematicaR© and manually
iterated until they approximated the DesignFOILR© data surface.
The lift load pressure distribution surface along the span from wing tip to wing
root was approximated with normalized elliptical equations. The span elliptical pres-
sure distribution equations were also solved in MathematicaR© (Figure 4.29).
The chord distributed pressure surface and span distributed pressure surface
were multiplied together to create a single pressure surface that would describe the
distributed pressure surface on the wing (Equation 4.1).
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Figure 4.26: 7075-T6 Aluminum Properties [9]
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Figure 4.27: Cantilever Beam Loading Conditions [19]
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Figure 4.28: NACA 2418 Chord Lift Pressure Distribution [44]
L(z) · L(x) = 0.00805848 ·
√
1− Z2
1582
·
((
(−0.15328 + 0.030656) ·X
16.31
)
+ 0.15328
)
(4.1)
This single distributed pressure surface equation was applied over the wing box
in conjunction with the SLUF lift pressure load of 0.656 psi (i.e. 6211 lbs of aircraft
empty weight divided by 9464.2 in2 wing box surface area) to simulate the lift loading
on the A-37 wing in flight (Figure 4.30).
4.10.3 Constraints (Boundary Conditions).
1. The A-37 half-wing simulation model was constrained as a cantilever beam (i.e.
Fixed-Free) with all displacements and rotations at the wing root set to zero
(Figure 4.31).
2. The element size reduces the accuracy of the max stress. The original coarse FE
mesh was iterated (twice) until the max stress approached a constant maximum
stress value (Figure 4.32).
3. Idealized: All loading, material constants, and geometry is exact
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Clear[L, a, z]
L=
∫ 158
0
(
a ∗
((
1− z2
1582
)0
.5
))
dz
Solve[L == 1, a]
124.093a
{{a→ 0.00805848}}
Clear[M, P, Q, eqns, b, c, x]
M=((-(b+c)*x)/16.31)+ b
P=
∫ 16.31
0
Mdx
Q =
∫ 16.31
0
(x ∗M)dx
eqns = {P ==1, Q == 16.31/4}
Solve[eqns, {b,c}]
b + 0.0613121 (-b-c) x
8.155 b - 8.155 c
44.336 b - 88.672 c
{8.155 b - 8.155 c == 1, 44.336 b - 88.672 c == 4.0775}
{{b→ 0.15328, c → 0.030656}}
Figure 4.29: Elliptical Pressure Distribution Calculations
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Figure 4.30: A-37 Right Wing: Typical Deformed Geometry
Figure 4.31: A-37 Finite Element Mesh with Cantilever Boundary Conditions
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Figure 4.32: Effect of Refining A-37 Finite Element Mesh Size with Adaptive Mesh-
ing
4.10.4 Performance Measure (Criteria for Successful Structural Model De-
sign). Maximum von Mises stress at element 2815, σmax, was the performance
measure and criteria for successful structural model design:
σmax = σlift + σweaponx1 + σweaponx2 + σweaponx3 + σweaponx4 + σweaponx5 (4.2)
4.10.5 Constructed CCD for the Response Surface. There was a design
factor (x1, x2, x3, x4, & x5) for each of the four wing pylon loading locations and the
wing tip tank location. These five factors had three levels, 1 when the pylon was
loaded, -1 when the pylon was left empty, and 0 at the midpoint (Figure 4.33).
Complete enumeration of the solution space required 35 = 243 FE model simu-
lation runs to be executed. An orthogonal 1/4 fractional factorial design was chosen to
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Figure 4.33: Design Factor Levels for the Central Composite Design
reduce the number of required simulation model runs to 27 (with 2 midpoints making
28) while not introducing confounding between main effects (Table 4.1).
The design factor range was the maximum allowable pylon load if the fractional
factorial design was 1, 0 if the fractional factorial design was -1, and half the maximum
pylon load for the fractional factorial design midpoint 0.
The A-37 FE simulation model was executed for each of the 28 fractional fac-
torial design runs and the maximum stress results at element 2815 were tabulated.
Due to the geometry of the FE model the highest stress location was consistently on
the bottom edge of the front spar at the wing root (Figure 4.34).
The FE simulation model von Mises stress (psi) results were tabulated for ele-
ment 2815 (Table 4.2).
4.10.6 Simulation Model Validation with Hand Calculations. Validation of
the FE model required the A-37 wing to be simplified as a hollow cantilever rectan-
gular box beam (with the two spars added back into the second moment of inertia).
The beam was 158 in long, with a 52.8 in width, height of 5.82 in, and skin thickness
of 0.25 in. The weapon location point loads were kept at the original magnitudes but
the distributed lift load magnitude of 6211 lb was reduced to 1/9
th to simulate the
effects of the two elliptical distributions on the loading and moments. The smaller
outer wing tip dimensions were projected down the length of the beam to create a
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Table 4.1: Central Composite Design
Simulation Number CCD Pattern X1 X2 X3 X4 X5
1 - - - - - -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
2 - - - + + -1 -1 -1 1 1
3 - - + - + -1 -1 1 -1 1
4 - - + + - -1 -1 1 1 -1
5 - + - - + -1 1 -1 -1 1
6 - + - + - -1 1 -1 1 -1
7 - + + - - -1 1 1 -1 -1
8 - + + + + -1 1 1 1 1
9 + - - - + 1 -1 -1 -1 1
10 + - - + - 1 -1 -1 1 -1
11 + - + - - 1 -1 1 -1 -1
12 + - + + + 1 -1 1 1 1
13 + + - - - 1 1 -1 -1 -1
14 + + - + + 1 1 -1 1 1
15 + + + - + 1 1 1 -1 1
16 + + + + - 1 1 1 1 -1
17 a 0 0 0 0 -1 0 0 0 0
18 A 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
19 0 a 0 0 0 0 -1 0 0 0
20 0 A 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
21 0 0 a 0 0 0 0 -1 0 0
22 0 0 A 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
23 0 0 0 a 0 0 0 0 -1 0
24 0 0 0 A 0 0 0 0 1 0
25 0 0 0 0 a 0 0 0 0 -1
26 0 0 0 0 A 0 0 0 0 1
27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Highest Stress
Figure 4.34: Max Stress on Bottom Edge of Front Spar
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Table 4.2: Central Composite Design Results
Simulation Number CCD Pattern X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 Y
1 - - - - - -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 2907
2 - - - + + -1 -1 -1 1 1 4569
3 - - + - + -1 -1 1 -1 1 3679
4 - - + + - -1 -1 1 1 -1 1805
5 - + - - + -1 1 -1 -1 1 2765
6 - + - + - -1 1 -1 1 -1 1993
7 - + + - - -1 1 1 -1 -1 2018
8 - + + + + -1 1 1 1 1 4569
9 + - - - + 1 -1 -1 -1 1 2515
10 + - - + - 1 -1 -1 1 -1 1773
11 + - + - - 1 -1 1 -1 -1 3459
12 + - + + + 1 -1 1 1 1 4348
13 + + - - - 1 1 -1 -1 -1 1986
14 + + - + + 1 1 -1 1 1 4536
15 + + + - + 1 1 1 -1 1 4561
16 + + + + - 1 1 1 1 -1 3789
17 a 0 0 0 0 -1 0 0 0 0 2285
18 A 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 3167
19 0 a 0 0 0 0 -1 0 0 0 2175
20 0 A 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 3277
21 0 0 a 0 0 0 0 -1 0 0 2269
22 0 0 A 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 3183
23 0 0 0 a 0 0 0 0 -1 0 2281
24 0 0 0 A 0 0 0 0 1 0 3171
25 0 0 0 0 a 0 0 0 0 -1 1895
26 0 0 0 0 A 0 0 0 0 1 3557
27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2726
28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2726
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smaller simplified wing that sets a maximum possible stress that cannot be exceeded
with a valid model (Figure 4.35).
It was a good sign that the maximum stress achieved in the fully loaded simu-
lation model did not exceed the maximum theoretical stress. Additionally, the maxi-
mum stress achieved in the simulation model was within a power of 10 of the maximum
theoretical stress so there was confidence that the FE simulation model was valid.
4.10.7 Response Surface Regression Metamodel.
• The original A-37 simulation model boundaries were identified.
• The weapon pylon factors (x1, x2, x3, x4, & x5) contributing to the simulation
model were identified and the range of the factors (0 to maximum pylon load
rating) was established.
• CCD Fractional factorial design was used to cut down the number of simulation
runs. Each of the 5 factors had 3 levels (high, mid, and low value) so the
number of simulation model runs required was 35. Conducting 243 runs would
have been time consuming so a fractional 1/4 factorial design was used to reduce
the number of runs to 28 (27 + 1 additional midpoint).
• The max von Mises stress FE simulation model was solved in I-DEAS R© for the
CCD factor configurations.
• The form of the A-37 response surface regression model was established as a
quadratic regression to include main effects, quadratic terms, and two factor
interactions (Equation 4.3 [64]).
Yi = β0 +
k∑
h=1
βhxih +
k∑
h=1
βhhx
2
ih (4.3)
+
k−1∑
h=1
k∑
h′=h+1
βhh′xihxih′ + Ei,∀i = 1, ..., n
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Figure 4.35: Maximum Stress Hand Calculations
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The response surface regression metamodel was calculated with a R2 value of
0.970 indicating a metamodel that accounts for the vast majority of the factors that
are influencing the max stress on element 2815 of the A-37 wing (Figure 4.36).
Figure 4.36: Regression Metamodel Results
Only parameter estimates with an F-ratio greater than one were included as
significant in the response surface metamodel (Table 4.3).
This inclusion of significant factors resulted in a response surface model (Equa-
tion 4.4 [64]). Even though the quadratic effects were included in the response surface
model, the F-ratios show that these second order terms were not as significant as the
first order and two-factor interactions.
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Table 4.3: Regression Parameter Estimates
Term Estimate F-Ratio Probability>t
Intercept 2635.04 23.86 <0.0001
X1&RS 198.56 2.66 0.0326
X2&RS 124.11 1.66 0.1408
X3&RS 337.11 4.51 0.0028
X4&RS 241.78 3.23 0.0144
X5&RS 750.22 10.04 <0.0001
X1*X2 272.63 3.44 0.0109
X1*X3 342.5 4.32 0.0035
X2*X3 135 1.7 0.1324
X1*X4 20.5 0.26 0.8034
X2*X4 228.25 2.88 0.0237
X3*X4 -117.13 -1.48 0.1831
X1*X5 -117.25 -1.48 0.1827
X2*X5 90.5 1.14 0.2912
X3*X5 20.63 0.26 0.8022
X4*X5 342.63 4.32 0.0035
X1*X1 113.7 0.56 0.5923
X2*X2 113.7 0.56 0.5923
X3*X3 113.7 0.56 0.5923
X4*X4 113.7 0.56 0.5923
X5*X5 113.7 0.56 0.5923
σ = 2635 + 199x1 + 124x2 + 337x3 + 242x4 + 750x5
+273x1x2 + 343x1x3 + 135x2x3 + 228x2x4 (4.4)
−117x3x4 + 91x2x5 + 343x4x5
4.10.8 Sensitivity Analysis. A sensitivity analysis was performed on the
response surface model (Equation 4.5). The sensitivities were calculated to determine
which factor had the greatest effect on the stress induced in the aircraft wing attach
fitting (element 2815).
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∂σ
∂x1
= 199 + 273x2 + 343x3 − 117x5
∂σ
∂x2
= 124 + 273x1 + 135x3 + 228x4 + 91x5
∂σ
∂x3
= 337 + 343x1 + 135x2 − 117x4 (4.5)
∂σ
∂x4
= 242 + 228x2 − 117x3 + 343x5
∂σ
∂x5
= 750− 117x1 + 91x2 + 343x4
Figure 4.37: Regression Graphical Sensitivity
4.10.9 Fighter Flight Spectrum.
4.10.9.1 Stress Sequence Development. The sequence and intensity of
stress cycles applied during the life of the aircraft structure was needed to estimate
crack growth at the wing attach fitting FCL. This flight spectrum was usually recorded
as gravitational loads per flight hour cycle (Figure 4.38).
This spectrum was a general fighter repeated load history due to ground han-
dling, flight maneuvers, gusts, landing, store ejection, and other load sources. A-37
data was not available, so this general fighter spectrum was used to estimate the
effect on stress per flight hour cycle [66]. The stress effect at any given flight hour
cycle was determined from the spectrum load & stress relationship [47]. Each aircraft
mission type was divided into segments which were characterized by the type and
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Figure 4.38: General Fighter Flight Spectrum [66]
frequency of load sources (Figure 4.39 [66]). Multiple mission profiles and segments
were combined to determine the flight spectrum. Specifically, the flight spectrum was
constructed from aircraft service life data. Flight hours, calendar years of service,
number of missions flown, mission types, and number of landings were included in
service life data.
The flight maneuver spectrum was determined by summing the number of times
the gravitational load factors (g-loads) were exceeded per flight hour cycle. The g-
loads were converted to percent of limit load (stress) (Figure 4.40).
The number of exceedances were truncated logarithmically. The stresses and
cycles were distributed among A-D decreasing severity mission profiles (Table 4.4).
The stresses generated per flight hour cycle were combined in a weighted average for
simplification of the crack growth model and inserted into the benefit analysis.
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Figure 4.39: General Aircraft Mission Profile [66]
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Figure 4.40: Flight Stress Sequence Stepped Approximation [66]
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Table 4.4: Stress and Cycle Distribution
Composite
1 (Level) 2 (Exceedances) 3 (Occurrences)
1.39 10 10
1.35 100 90
1.15 1000 900
0.9 10000 9000
0.75 100000 90000
0.52 500000 400000
Mission A
4 (Occurrences) 5 (10x) 6 (Remain=3-5)
1 10 0
3 30 60
15 150 750
48 480 8520
300 3000 87000
1900 19000 381000
Mission B
7 (Occurrences) 8 (60x) 9 (Remain=6-8)
0 0 0
1 60 0
3 180 570
17 1020 7500
200 12000 75000
1500 90000 291000
Mission C
10 (Occurrences) 11 (570x) 12 (Remain=9-11)
0 0 0
0 0 0
1 570 0
10 5700 1800
100 57000 18000
400 228000 63000
Mission D
13 (Occurrences) 14 (360x) 15 (Remain=12-14)
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
5 1800 0
50 18000 0
175 63000 0
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4.11 Structural Model Discussion of Results and Summary
Simulation and response surface modeling worked well. The FE simulation
correlated reasonably well to the hand calculations. This analysis showed that weapon
loading correlates highly with wing attach fitting stress. The wing pylon location that
had the most detrimental effect on the A-37 maximum wing stress is the wing tip tank
location (x5). The stress sensitivities showed an increasing significance of x5 on the
induced stress of the wing root front spar (element 2815). Additionally, the sensitivity
analysis shows that the optimum loading configuration is to put the heaviest weapons
on the inner pylons first. Following these weapon pylon loading guidelines resulted
in a maximum von Mises stress, smax, of 4790 psi at the wing attach fitting element
2815. The effect of applying the flight maneuver spectrum was significant. The limit
load for fighter aircraft was 7.33g which resulted in a weighted stress of 20,152 psi for
100 cycles per flight hour. This was the stress per cycle values input into the Walker
crack growth model for the benefit analysis.
The results of the benefit analysis are presented in the following section. The
benefit analysis is composed of a structural model that feeds into both a baseline 300
hour simulation and ISHMS modified simulation.
4.12 Benefit Analysis
As written in Chapter 3, two MATLABR© simulations were performed to gain a
rudimentary analysis of the benefit of an installed ISHMS with respect to both safety
and cost. The results of running these two simulations while varying the interval
between maintenance inspections are presented in this section. For reference, the
MATLAB R© code for the two simulations is included in Appendix A.
4.12.1 Baseline Simulation. Currently, CAF A-37 aircraft flown past the
design service life are subject to maintenance inspections every 300 flight hours. The
baseline simulation simulating the current status quo was run with inspection inter-
val times of 100, 200, 300, 400, 500, 600 and 700 flight hours. The 700 hour interval
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Table 4.5: Baseline Simulation Results
Run Inspect Interval Fleet Failures Fleet Failures Failure Rate Total Max Fleet Total
(Flight Hrs) Average Std Dev (per Mln Flt Hrs) Failures Failures Inspects
1 100 0 0 0 0 0 650000
2 200 0.007 0.0834 0.1077 7 1 324932
3 300 0.159 0.3998 2.4593 159 3 206912
4 400 3.721 1.5785 66.6713 3721 8 132434
5 500 3.126 1.5161 54.5228 3126 8 113650
6 600 2.767 1.4632 47.3156 2767 10 93769
7 700 13.0 0 1626 13000 13 90666
resulted in every aircraft failing prior to scheduled inspection. Any interval greater
than 700 hours will also result in every aircraft failing prior to inspection, thus the
simulations were not performed at intervals greater than 700 flight hours. The re-
sults of these seven runs are presented in Table 4.5. These baseline runs helped to
characterize the baseline behavior such that it could be compared with the ISHMS
simulation.
The results showed that the failure rate for the 300 hour inspection is 2.4593
failures per million flight hours. This exceeded the current acceptable USAF goal
of one failure per million flight hours. The maximum fleet failures was three which
would amount to 23% of the fleet failing during the 5000 flight hour life; this occurred
in 0.001% of the trials. Additionally, results showed that the failure rate increased
dramatically between 300 and 400 hour inspection intervals. At intervals greater than
400 hours, the failure rate dropped some before hitting a peak when all aircraft failed
at 616 hours.
Since the crack growth was deterministically estimated and would reach the
critical length at 615 flight hours, any inspection interval beyond 615 flight hours
for the baseline resulted in failures for all aircraft. The drop observed from 400
flight hours to 615 flight hours can be attributed to the probability of maintenance
detection. After each maintenance inspection, roughly three percent of the cracks do
not get repaired and continue growing. At inspection intervals greater than 308 flight
hours (half the time until critical crack length), these missed cracks will certainly fail
before the next inspection. Since the total time considered by the model was limited
to 5000 flight hours, the total number of missed cracks will decrease as the inspection
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interval increases from 400 to 616 flight hours. For example, at 600 flight hours there
will be fewer total inspections and fewer opportunities to miss cracks than at 400 flight
hours. This results in fewer failures for the 600 flight hour interval as compared to
the 400 flight hour interval. See Figure 4.41 for a plot of failure rate versus inspection
interval.
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Figure 4.41: Baseline Simulation Failure Rate vs. Inspection Interval
Along with the failure rate, the standard deviation increased significantly be-
tween 300 and 400 hours, then decreased some until 615 flight hours when all aircraft
failed and standard deviation was zero. As expected, total number of inspections
decreased when inspection interval increased, due to a combination of the increased
inspection interval and the increased number of failures.
4.12.2 ISHMS Simulation. Since it would not be desirable to decrease the
inspection interval from a cost standpoint, the thesis team began our simulations for
the ISHMS at 300 flight hour intervals, the current inspection interval. The thesis
team then increased the interval until every aircraft failed or until the scheduled
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Table 4.6: ISHMS Simulation Results
Run Inspect Interval Fleet Failures Fleet Failures Failure Rate Total Max Fleet Total
(Flight Hrs) Average Std Dev (per Mln Flt Hrs) Failures Failures Inspects
1 300 0 0 0 0 0 208164
2 400 0.004 0.0632 0.0615 4 1 156840
3 500 0.001 0.0316 0.0154 1 1 130406
4 600 0.017 0.1293 0.2618 17 1 106595
5 700 0.107 0.325 1.6522 107 2 103525
6 800 0.103 0.3201 1.59 103 2 103555
7 900 0.094 0.3054 1.4509 94 2 103576
8 1000 0.106 0.3207 1.6373 106 2 103490
9 1100 0.105 0.3195 1.6211 105 2 103542
10 none 0.105 0.3195 1.6215 105 2 103514
inspection interval was greater than the remaining aircraft life. The latter ending up
being the case for this simulation; the only inspections performed during run 10 were
when the ISHMS indicated a crack length greater than 90% of the critical length. For
different runs, the thesis team increased the inspection interval by 100 hours until
the failure rate exceeded the failure rate for the baseline simulation at 300 hours.
This never occurred, even with zero scheduled inspections the failure rate was 1.6215
failures per million flight hours. The ISHMS simulation was run with inspection
interval times of 300, 400, 500, 600, 700, 800, 900, 1000, 1100 and none. The results
of these 10 runs can be seen in Table 4.6.
The failure rate increased dramatically between 600 and 700 scheduled inspec-
tion intervals. For inspection intervals greater than 700 flight hours, the failure rate
remained fairly constant, even when relying solely on the ISHMS (i.e., zero sched-
uled inspections). The standard deviation of the total failures also remained constant
during those same simulation runs. Never did the maximum number of fleet failures
exceed two. When it did, it never occurred in more than 0.003% of the trials. The
total number of inspections which included both scheduled and unscheduled (i.e.,
tipped off by the ISHMS) decreased from the 300 to the 500 flight hour interval, but
then remained relatively constant thereafter. See Figure 4.42 for a plot of the failure
rate versus inspection interval with a trendline added.
A hypothesis on the reason for the leveling off above 500 flight hours is that the
crack grows to near critical length at 615 flight hours and, at that time if the scheduled
inspections do not catch it then the unscheduled ISHMS induced inspections will,
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Figure 4.42: ISHMS Simulation Failure Rate vs. Inspection Interval
resulting in an inspection interval for both scheduled and unscheduled inspections to
be relatively constant despite the scheduled inspection interval.
4.12.3 Discussion of Results. The simulations had many simplifying as-
sumptions, however, since many of the assumptions were constant through the two
scenarios, the thesis team believe some basic conclusions can be made. Installing a
structural health monitoring system that provides real-time monitoring and feedback
will most definitely improve safety for a given scheduled inspection interval. Consid-
ering the 300 flight hour inspection interval, the ISHMS reduced the failure rate from
2.4593 failures per million flight hours to zero failures. However, there was a tradeoff.
The number of inspections performed with the ISHMS was slightly greater than the
number of inspections for the baseline.
If an ISHMS was developed and installed, then, of course, the CAF would take
advantage of this system and subsequently increase the scheduled inspection interval.
Assuming 2.4593 failures per million flight hours is an acceptable failure rate then
172
the inspection interval with the ISHMS could eliminated. This might seem to be
the course of action, but eliminating all scheduled inspections would then require
that the fleet inspections, roughly 103 per fleet, would all be based on warnings from
the ISHMS and thus unscheduled. Having all maintenance inspections unscheduled
would not be ideal from a planning perspective. Since the failure rate for no scheduled
inspections does not differ much from the 700 flight hours and greater, the optimal
scheduled inspection interval with the ISHMS would be closer to 700 flight hours.
With a 700 flight hour inspection interval, most of the 103 inspections per fleet would
be scheduled and just a few would result from an ISHMS warning. This strikes a
balance between safety, cost and planning considerations.
As an example, if the 700 flight hour inspection were selected to implement
with an ISHMS installed, then the failure rate would decrease from 2.4593 failures
per million flight hours to 1.6522 failures per million flight hours, a safety improvement
of 32.8%. Additionally, total number of inspections would decrease from 207 to 104,
a reduction of 49.8%. Assuming a fixed cost for each inspection, then the cost savings
realized from installing an ISHMS system could be calculated as the fixed cost of each
inspection times the number of inspections saved, 103, less the annualized life-cycle
cost of an ISHMS (includes development, procurement, installation, maintenance, and
disposal). The ultimate decision on changing maintenance inspections and practices
would be set by the stakeholders to match their preferences and goals for the system.
4.12.4 Sensitivity Analysis. The sensitivity analysis reran the two simula-
tions but with the maintenance probability of inspection at 98%, 99%, and 100%.
For each variance in maintenance probability of inspection, the thesis team tried to
find the ISHMS inspection interval that most closely matched the failure rate of the
baseline with a 300 hour inspection interval, but was no worse than. For 98%, the ap-
propriate inspection interval for the ISHMS would be approximately 600 flight hours.
This would result in a safety improvement of 80.8% and a inspection reduction of
49.1%. For 99%, the appropriate inspection interval for the ISHMS would also be 600
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Table 4.7: Simulation Results Summary
Maintenance Approx ISHMS Safety Inspection
Prob of Detection Inspection Interval Improvement Reduction
97% 700 32.8% 49.8%
98% 600 80.8% 49.1%
99% 600 50.0% 49.6%
100% 550 0% 43.8%
flight hours. This would result in a safety improvement of 50% and a inspection re-
duction of 49.6%. For 100%, the appropriate inspection interval for the ISHMS would
be 550 flight hours. This would result in no safety improvement, since no failures
occur in the baseline simulation with a 300 hour inspection interval. However, there
was a inspection reduction of 43.8%. The results of the sensitivity analysis, including
the original estimate of 97% for maintenance probability of detection, are included in
Table 4.7.
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V. Conclusions and Recommendations for Further Research
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Further
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Benefit
Analysis
Conclusions
and
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Figure 5.1: Chapter 5 Decomposition
5.1 Conclusions
As introduced in Chapter 1 and further discussed in Chapter 2, the USAF and
many other nations continue to squeeze as much usable life out of aging aircraft as
possible. In order to do so, the military forces regularly extend the original aircraft
service life which often increases the inspection burden. To maintain flight safety,
increased periodic inspections are required. Increasing the inspections results in more
aircraft downtime and added maintenance costs.
This thesis first assumed that an ISHMS for aging aircraft may help lower the
resulting inspection burden and, as such, reduce costs while maintaining safety. To
begin to tackle the large problem of developing an ISHMS for aging aircraft, this thesis
took the first steps of a generic SE process that kick started the system definition.
Additionally, the potential benefit with respect to both cost and safety of an ISHMS
was quantified through the use of mathematical simulations.
5.2 SE Process Developed
The problem of structural health monitoring for aging aircraft is significant and
large. This thesis does not seek to solve the entire problem, especially not for specific
aging aircraft. This thesis scoped the problem by focusing on the system definition
175
piece of the SE process for a generic aging aircraft. The authors of this thesis hope
that the generic process developed will provide a starting point for future researchers
of the ISHMS problem or the developers of an ISHMS for a specific aircraft. When the
process required a specific aircraft for development of requirements or architectures,
the CAF A-37 was used, but most of the process considered a generic aging aircraft
platform. The system definition process roughly followed the SE Vee Model. The two
steps of (1) defining the system level design problem and (2) developing the functional
system architecture were included. Since a generic platform was considered and the
thesis team consisted only of system engineers and no design engineers, the process
stopped prior to physical architecture development and system design. The generic SE
process detailed in this thesis included a discussion of the user perspective, definition of
the operational concept, definition of user and system level requirements, requirements
feasibility analysis and development of some integrated system architectures.
5.2.1 User Part of SE Process. In developing the SE process the thesis team
had to wear the hats of several stakeholders. First, the thesis team played the role
of the user. The user would initiate the development program for an ISHMS. This
thesis assumed that the user had analyzed the alternatives for decreasing the costs
associated with maintaining aging aircraft while maintaining flight safety and the user
determined that an ISHMS had promise for solving the problem. When defining the
operational concept, the thesis team assumed the user sought to use an ISHMS to
monitor structural damage, specifically crack growth, as it occurred. As such, the
health of the aircraft structure could be constantly monitored and the maintenance
of the aircraft could be tailored to the individual aircraft based on the results of the
monitoring. Given the assumption of an ISHMS could help solve the problem and
how the user will use an ISHMS, the thesis team drafted the user requirements for
an ISHMS. As stated, the user requirements considered an generic aircraft platform
except when a specific platform was required. For example, when the proper sampling
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rate for the ISHMS was needed, the thesis team analyzed the A-37 to determine what
sampling rate was necessary to capture the peak loads.
5.2.2 System Requirements. After completing the user piece role in system
definition, the thesis team changed hats and played the role of the system engineers.
The user requirements and operational concept were then used to write the system
requirements. The thesis team ensured requirements traceability, that the system
requirements addressed each and every user requirement. As the system requirements
were developed, the thesis team had to go back and clarify some user requirements.
This simulated the process of the system engineers contacted the user for clarity
on requirements or more detail on how the system will be used. After the system
requirements were finalized, a basic feasibility check was performed ensuring that
each requirement could be verified during system level design.
5.2.3 System Architectures. To further define the ISHMS and aid in clari-
fying the problem, the thesis team developed system architectures. The architectures
developed followed the United States DoDAF. First, the AV-1, and AV-2 were created
that provided textual definitions and descriptions of the problem. The OV-1 served
as a graphical depiction of the operational concept. The remaining architectures de-
veloped the OV-2, OV-3 and OV-5 defined the functional processes, informational
exchange and node connectivity specific to an ISHMS. Further architectural products
would have delved into the physical design specifics of the ISHMS, and thus this the-
sis stopped the architecture development here. An interesting note, much like when
developing the system requirements, development of the system architectures often
identified gaps in the user and system requirements which were iteratively corrected
as the architectures were created.
5.2.4 Final Comments on SE Process. This thesis was successful in devel-
oping a generic SE process for ISHMS system definition. The SE process generated
a methodical, structured approach which allowed for the thesis team to effectively
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define an ISHMS for a non-specific aging aircraft. Thestrawman process serves as the
starting point for further system developers. After the completion of the SE process,
the thesis team sought to quantify the benefit of an ISHMS on aging aircraft. In
order to do so, the thesis team had to assume some system design details and created
simplified simulations to compare the status quo with an ISHMS installed aircraft.
5.3 Benefit Analysis (Cost & Safety)
In the background research on structural health monitoring performed for this
thesis, the potential benefit of a structural health monitoring system was not truly
addressed nor quantified. Most discussion on the topic assumed the potential benefit.
This thesis considered it important to attempt to quantify or show the potential
benefit from both the cost and safety perspective, especially for an ISHMS on aging
aircraft where installation of the ISHMS may be difficult and costly. To demonstrate
the benefit of an ISHMS on aging aircraft, two simplified mathematical simulations
were created, one simulating flying an aging aircraft without an ISHMS (baseline)
and one simulating flying with an ISHMS (ISHMS). In order to define the structure
monitored, quantify the material properties, and crack growth associated with that
structure, a specific aircraft had to be chosen for the simulations and the CAF A-37
was selected.
5.3.1 Simulation Inputs. The simulations created were greatly simplified,
however, since the same assumptions were made for both the baseline and ISHMS
simulations, basic comparative conclusions could be made between the two simula-
tions. Both simulations simulated a single edge crack beginning at some specified
length growing towards a critical length in one particular FCL on the A-37. The
FCL selected for the simulation was the number one FCL identified by the point of
highest stress in the A-37 wing. The Walker Fatigue crack growth model was used to
simulate crack growth. The material properties input into the model were the aver-
age properties for the Al 7075-T6 material of the FCL. The modeled input stresses
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were generated from the average mission profile stresses from the fighter spectra from
MIL-A-8866. The initial crack length used was calculated from 5000 hour growth
of the largest crack size undetectable by human sight. The critical crack length was
calculated from the highest possible stress on the FCL with a crack length that would
cause residual strength below the peak stress. While most other inputs to the model
were averages, the critical crack length modeled the worst case. The probability of
detection for the maintenance inspections was assumed to be 97%. Whereas the
probability of detection for the ISHMS was assumed to be 99.9%. The probability of
detection for the ISHMS encompassed both the system reliability and accuracy.
5.3.2 Final Comments on Benefit Analysis. A comparative analysis between
the two simulations run with the inputs described in the section previous showed that
an ISHMS may provide benefit over the current status quo with respect to an improve-
ment in safety, lower number of failures per million flight hours, and cost, decreased
total number of inspections. The cost benefit only considered the total number of
inspections performed between the two simulations and assumed the inspections per-
formed in the two simulations were identical. Of course, even given these assumptions,
a cost benefit would only be realized if the life-cycle costs of the ISHMS were less than
costs savings from reduced inspections over the life of the aging aircraft. The sim-
ulations assumed one crack growing in one FCL. In reality, an ISHMS will need to
monitor multiple FCLs with potentially multiple cracks in each FCL. In this case, the
realized benefits would most likely be lower than the benefits demonstrated with the
simulations. Additionally, the probability of detection for the ISHMS may be lower
than that assumed in the simulation given a suite of sensors attempting to accurately
detect surface and subsurface cracks growing in multiple directions. This lower prob-
ability of detection would lower the potential safety benefit. The true benefit will only
be known given a specific implementation of an ISHMS on a specific aging aircraft
fleet for a specific lifetime in flight hours.
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The generic system definition of an ISHMS for aging aircraft developed with
this thesis lays the groundwork for future development and research efforts in this
field. This thesis also determined that an ISHMS for aging aircraft will likely provide
a benefit with respect to cost and safety. However, much more work needs to be done
with respect to the problem of ISHMS and applying the SE process for developing
the right ISHMS for aging aircraft.
5.4 Recommendations for Further Research
5.4.1 Continuation of SE Process. Due to multiple constraints, this thesis
scoped the SE process developed to not include physical architectures and system de-
sign. Future SE efforts should continue the process developed here to include physical
architectures and system design. After the process is continued, technical feasibility
could be determined. Questions to be answered could include: Does the technol-
ogy exist to realize safety and/or cost benefits? How many FCLs and/or sensors are
necessary for system design? Is installation of the ISHMS technically feasible? Can
the ISHMS be effectively integrated with aircraft systems such as GPS and aircraft
power?
5.4.2 ISHMS Concept. This thesis assumed that the ISHMS would monitor
actual structural damage of the aircraft and most likely alert the aircraft crew of the
impending failures. The ISHMS could be designed to monitor aircraft use such as
loads, stresses, cycles, and flight hours, for instance. Inputting these monitored in-
puts into a model, tailored inspection criteria could be developed for each individual
aircraft tail number. This method would require accurate models that would first rely
on simulation models that would be continually refined as historical data is gained.
The models would estimate probable structural damage which would have to be ver-
ified with maintenance inspections. Current efforts in structural health monitoring
focus on monitoring damage as was done in this thesis. Research needs to be done
to determine the optimal implementation of an ISHMS. Should an ISHMS monitor
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damage, monitor aircraft use and predict damage, or some combination of monitoring
damage and use for a more complete picture of aircraft structural health?
5.4.3 Cost Benefit of ISHMS. The benefit analysis performed in this thesis
only considered reduced number of inspections and it assumed all inspections were
identical. More detailed analysis of the cost benefit of an ISHMS could be performed
considering a larger suite of sensors monitoring multiple FCLs simultaneously. The
detailed analysis should attempt to quantify the maintenance cost savings realized for
an ISHMS that achieves the same flight safety as the baseline configuration. Detailed
life-cycle costs estimates would need to be calculated to compare to the maintenance
cost savings estimated to generate a true cost savings over the life of the ISHMS. Since
the maintenance cost savings will depend on how the user will implement maintenance
changes with respect to the system, multiple estimates of costs savings could be
calculated with respect to different user system implementations.
5.4.4 ISHMS Impact on Maintenance. Assuming the development and in-
stallation of an ISHMS on aging aircraft occurs in the future, research efforts should
focus on the potential impacts to maintenance schedules and operations. Depend-
ing on the user’s implementation, the ISHMS may significantly reduce or eliminate
time-based scheduled inspections and subsequently move towards a tailored inspec-
tion schedule for individual aircraft tail numbers. What impact would such a shift
in maintenance philosophy have on maintenance manning and operations? Will an
ISHMS increase the number of unscheduled maintenance actions? These questions are
just a few of the possible questions that could be answered by a detailed investigation
into the ISHMS effects on aircraft maintenance.
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Appendix A. Matlab Code
This appendix contains the Matlabr code for both the baseline simulation and the
ISHMS simulation.
A.1 Baseline Code
Listing A.1: Here is the Matlabr code used for the baseline simulation.
(appendix1/baseline.m)
clear;
clc;
Inspection_Counter = 0; % ...
Tracks number of inspections occurring during all trials
C = 0.13E-7;
5 F = 1.1;
n = 2.791;
m = .65;
Delta_sigma = 20152;
Stress_Ratio = 0;
10 new_length = 0.0079;
initial_length = 0.02589371;
crack_critical = 0.4781;
Total_Flight_Hours = 0;
trial_hours = 0;
15
for i=1:1:1000; % ...
Number of trials
Total_Failures = 0;
for j=1:13;
Trial_Failure = 0;
20 crack_length = initial_length ; % ...
Initial crack length of 0.008 inches
Trial_Failure = 0; % ...
Changes to one when a trial failure occurs
t = 0; % ...
Initialize flight hour counter to zero
Inspection_Time = 0; % ...
Counter tracking time between inspections
while and(Trial_Failure == 0 , t <= 5000) % ...
No trial failures and time less than 5000 flight hours
25 if Inspection_Time == 300
p = rand (1); % ...
Rand detection probability
if p > .03 % ...
Check to see if crack is detected (97% are ...
detected)
crack_length = new_length ; % ...
If crack detected , resets length to new ...
length
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else
30 crack_length = crack_length;
end
Inspection_Time = 0; % ...
Resets inspection time
Inspection_Counter = Inspection_Counter + 1; % ...
Increments inspection counter
end
35 crack_growth = (C * ((F*Delta_sigma *(pi()*crack_length...
)^.5) /((1- Stress_Ratio)^(1-n)))^m); %Crack Growth...
Equation
crack_length = crack_length + ( crack_growth *100) ; ...
% Crack growth
if crack_length > crack_critical % ...
Checks to see if crack is greater than critical ...
length
Trial_Failure = 1;
Total_Failures = Total_Failures + 1;
40 end
trial_hours = t;
t = t + 1; % ...
Increment time
Inspection_Time = Inspection_Time + 1; % ...
Increment inspection time
end
45 Total_Flight_Hours = Total_Flight_Hours + trial_hours;
end
Results(i) = [ Total_Failures ]; % ...
Builds array with failure data from all trials
end
50 Average = mean(Results)
Std_Dev = std(Results)
Failures = sum(Results)
max = max(Results)
Inspection_Counter
55 Failures_Mln_Hours = ( Failures/Total_Flight_Hours)*1000000
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A.2 ISHMS Code
Listing A.2: Here is the Matlabr code used for the ISHMS simulation.
(appendix1/ISHMS.m)
clear;
clc;
Inspection_Counter = 0; % Tracks number of inspections occurring ...
during all trials
C = 0.13E-7;
5 F = 1.1;
n = 2.791;
m = .65;
Delta_sigma = 20152;
Stress_Ratio = 0;
10 new_length = 0.0079;
initial_length = 0.02589371;
crack_critical = 0.4781;
Total_Flight_Hours = 0;
trial_hours = 0;
15
for i=1:1:1000; % ...
Number of trials
Total_Failures = 0;
for j=1:1:13; % ...
Number of Aircraft in fleet
crack_length = initial_length ; ...
% Initialize crack length
20 Trial_Failure = 0; ...
% Changes to ...
one when a trial failure occurs
t = 0; ...
% ...
Initialize flight hour counter to zero
Inspection_Time = 0; ...
% Counter ...
tracking time between inspections
while and(Trial_Failure == 0 , t <= 5000) ...
% No trial failures and time less ...
than 5000 flight hours
if Inspection_Time == 700 % ...
Sets inspection timeframe
25 p = rand (1);
if p > .03 ...
% ...
Random number draw to see if crack is detected...
(97% detected)
crack_length = new_length;
end
Inspection_Time = 0;
30 Inspection_Counter = Inspection_Counter + 1;
end
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crack_growth = (C * ((F*Delta_sigma *(pi()*crack_length...
)^.5) /((1- Stress_Ratio)^(1-n)))^m); % Crack ...
growth equation
crack_length = crack_length + ( crack_growth *100) ; ...
% Crack growth equation cont.
if crack_length > .9* crack_critical ...
% ISHMS checks to see if ...
crack is greater than 90% of critical
35 p1 = rand (1);
if p1 > .999
Trial_Failure = 1;
Total_Failures = Total_Failures + 1;
else
40 crack_length = new_length;
Inspection_Time = 0;
Inspection_Counter = Inspection_Counter + 1;
end
end
45 trial_hours = t;
t = t + 1;
Inspection_Time = Inspection_Time + 1;
end
Total_Flight_Hours = Total_Flight_Hours + trial_hours;
50 end
Results(i) = [ Total_Failures ];
end
Average = mean(Results)
55 Std_Dev = std(Results)
Failures = sum(Results)
Inspection_Counter
Failures_Mln_Hours = ( Failures/Total_Flight_Hours)*1E6
Max_Failures = max(Results)
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Appendix B. Integrated Data Dictionary (AV-2)
Functional Activities Listed in Alphabetical Order
Determine Aircraft Inspection Intervals - an ISHMS may be able to
reduce the inspection burden, but not eliminate the need for some
inspections. As such, one of the potential benefits of an ISHMS
come from cost avoidance of inspection and maintenance costs.
Determine Aircraft Structural Condition - once an
aircraft’s ISHMS data has been collected and analyzed,
then the aircraft’s structural condition should be
determined.
Determine Available Sensor Technology - sensor
selection for each FCL will be limited by the technology
that is available in the market; either existing or emerging
technology.
Determine Data Analysis Requirements - define the
purposes of the data, the methodology for any
calculations required, organizations responsible for
conducting, verifying, and validating the analysis, etc.
Determine Data Processing Requirements - manipulating
the ISHMS sensor data such that it would be suitable to
conduct the appropriate analysis.
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Determine Data Requirements - design aspects relating
to data format, data storage, data filtering, etc.
Determine Data Storage Requirements - data from the
sensors must be stored somewhere. Several data
characteristics will determine the storage requirements
needed for the ISHMS.
Determine Desired ISHMS Accuracy - this refers to the
desired level of confidence of the ISHMS in detecting
failures on structural members.
Determine Failure Mode to be Detected - each sensor
must be tailored to the specific fatigue location that it will
be monitoring.
Determine ISHMS Calibration Requirements - validation
and verification of the ISHMS.
Determine ISHMS Maintenance Requirements - details
about system sustainment, calibration, maintenance and
the respective organizations or systems responsible of
providing the maintenance services.
Determine ISHMS Operational Requirements - this is the
activity in which stakeholders express their expectations
of how the ISHMS should operate and what services it
should provide. More detailed information will most likely
translate into a more satisfied customer.
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Determine ISHMS Reliability - calculations made to
determine the expected operational availability of the
system. Redundant systems are usually more reliable,
but also more complex and costly.
Determine ISHMS Routine and Preventive Maintenance
Procedures - procedures for the sustainment and
maintenance of the ISHMS. Includes repairing the
ISHMS and keeping it fully operational.
Determine Monitoring Requirements - design aspects
relating to the placement, quantity, and sensor type
selection. These characteristics will define to a great
extent the physical systems necessary to build an ISHMS
that would satisfy stakeholders.
Determine Operating Environment - environmental
factors, both internal and external, may influence the
sensor selection for each critical location. Examples of
environmental factors are humidity, vibration,
temperature, etc.
Determine Safety of Flight - SOF is measured in
statistical terms. The ISHMS should be able to at least
maintain the level of SOF that is currently attained with
the inspections. It would probably take into consideration
several factors to include the reliability of the ISHMS.
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Determine Sensor Locations - establishing the placement
of the sensors will be a critical design feature of the
ISHMS.
Determine Sensor Properties Requirements - each
individual sensor must be tailored to the specific fatigue
critical location that it will be monitoring. Sensor types
may differ due to differences in failure modes, loading
stresses, environmental factors among other issues that
may vary among fatigue critical locations. Response
time must also be considered as a potential driving
requirement to satisfy the near-real time user
requirement.
Determine Sensor Quantity - answers how many sensros
will be needed. Obviously this activity involves trade-offs
between costs and robustness of the system. Ideally,
more sensors will do a better monitoring job; however an
increasing number of sensors will increase the cost and
complexity of the ISHMS.
Determine Sensor Selection - the activity of matching a
specific sensor to an FCL.
Identify Fatigue Critical Locations - weakened areas in
an aircraft’s structural members whose failure can lead to
a catastrophic event. Usually, historical failure trends
could be used to identify some FCLs on an airframe.
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Identify ISHMS Requirements - This is the context
diagram for the ISHMS architectures and defines the
boundaries of the subsequent decompositions. Notice
the purpose of the architectures is to establish a
systematic approach to generate or identify stakeholder
requirements. Engineers shall incorporate these
requirements into the system design to ensure
stakeholder satisfaction when the final ISHMS solution is
delivered.
Identify Other Critical Locations - do not limit the
research of catastrophic failure to only FCLs. Include in
the analysis other components that may be beneficial to
monitor with the ISHMS.
Make Informed Fleet-wide Decisions - this refers to the
thesis scenario in which commanders may be able to
switch aircraft tail numbers in order to maintain an even
wear and tear among aircrafts organization-wide
according to ISHMS information.
Prioritize Critical Locations - a risk management analysis
would probably be most suitable in accomplishing this
activity. Monitoring Emphasis should be placed on thos
FCLs that have a higher risk of catastrophic failure.
Provide Necessary Aircraft Maintenance - plan follow-on
repair/maintenance procedures based on the ISHMS
assessment and any additional inspections. In other
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words, an ISHMS may help in the planning and
scheduling of aircraft maintenance operations.
ICOMs Listed in Alphabetical Order
Aircraft Design Characteristics - design features that make an
aircraft design unique or different. Can also be thought of as an
aircraft implementation. Includes criteria such as weight and
balance limits, electronic- magnetic interference (EMI)
constraints, aircraft power limits, etc.
Aircraft Inspection Intervals - the amount of time (often
measured in flight hours) between required aircraft
inspections. These inspections are often required as
part of the ASIP and SLEP, or any other program
designed to extend the life of an aircraft beyond the original design life.
Aircraft Maintainers - flightline personnel dedicated to repairing
or reconditioning aircraft to an operational status.
Aircraft Maintenance Report - report generated to log the
maintenance performed on an aircraft. This data may be
used to identify new FCLs.
Aircraft Structural Health Condition - the resulting
assessment from the ISHMS data analysis combined
with any other inspections performed.
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Analyzed Data - the results or outcomes of the ISHMS
data analysis.
Bandwidth Availability - the amount of ISHMS sensorial
data that can be passed along a communications
channel in a given period of time.
Assessment of the damage the aircraft specimen
currently has prior to test.
Calibrated Instrument - verification and validation that the
ISHMS is making accurate measurements.
Cost / Budget - the total sum of money allocated for a
particular purpose or period of time.
Critical Locations Priority List - a list of critical locations in
order of importance. The order of importance will most
likely be determined by factors such as frequency of
occurrence and potential for damage (Risk
Management).
Current Fleet Status Report - one of the outputs that the
ISHMS would be expected to generate. An ISHMS could
potentially allow commanders assess their unit’s
readiness with the click of a button.
Data Acquisition Unit - a hypothetical component that will
store sensor data. This mechanism can be performed by
an automated system or by some human organization, or
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a combination of both.
Data Format - the computer language and structure in
which the data must be written. This may be important in
preventing software compatibility issues, especially if the
ISHMS needs to interact with legacy systems.
Data from Sensors - raw signal inputs coming from each
ISHMS sensor.
Engineering Analysis - scientific studies performed to
determine ISHMS design characteristics.
Engineers - are a subset of stakeholders. May be either
contractors, military or government civilian. Probably
composed of a multi-disciplinary mixture of mechanical,
aeronautical, electrical, computer and system engineers.
Perhaps some scientists may also be included in this
category (i.e., experts in ceramics, computer networks,
maintainers, etc.)
Environmental Factors - a combination of surrounding
conditions that may affect the state of the systems that
compose the ISHMS. Environmental factors can be
either internal or external. Internal factors refer to the
localized environmental factors within the airframe
structure. For example, a fatigue critical location that
needs to be monitored may be submerged in hydraulic
fluid, or may experience a high vibration frequency and
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temperature due to its proximity to the engine, etc.
External factors refer to the operational environment
area. For example, proximity to sea water may promote
corrosion problems, a dusty environment may require a
more robust sensor, extremely cold temperatures may
affect the electronic properties of the sensor, etc.
Failure Mode - the most probable failure mode or modes
that the FCL may experience (i.e., corrosion, shear or
load stress, vibration, etc.)
Fatigue Critical Locations - areas where structural
members are more vulnerable to damage that can lead
to catastrophic failure. Each FCL may have one or
multiple failure modes. Failure may be due to crack
growth, corrosion, fatigue stress, load stress, etc.
Flight Profile - refers to the severity or level of
aggresiveness with wich the aircraft is being flown.
Usually this will depend on the aircraft’s role or
operational mission.
Historical Data - information based on a record of
previous events. In the case of the development of an
ISHMS this may include maintenance records, accident
reports and any other aircraft information that has been
logged through time. Emphasis should be placed on
identifying trends of repetitive safety issues.
ISHMS Design Requirements - a compilation of all
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stakeholders’ requirements. This will help constraint the
design space (i.e., the number of acceptable ISHMS
solutions), thus simplifying the development phase.
List of Sensors Available - the list would show the range
of sensor that have the potential of being part of an
ISHMS.
Maintenance Practices - the rigor or lack of efficient
maintenance practices will most likely have an impact of
the number and priority of potential structural problematic
areas.
Maintenance Procedures - should be included early on
the design phase as part of the lifecycle design
requirements. Inevitably, some components of the
ISHMS will fail and will have to be replaced.
Consideration of maintenance procedures will prevent
the creation of a remedy (i.e., ISHMS) that is worst than
the cause (i.e., inspections).
Operating Environment - external and internal
environmental factors that affect sensor selection
Operational Aircraft - an aircraft 100% ready for
operational use.
Other Critical Locations - these are non-FCL locations
that historically have experienced high failure rates and
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have the potential to capitalize on the implementation of
an ISHMS.
Other Inspections - inspections required to have a
complete assessment of an aircraft’s condition. Other
inspections may be prompted as a result of ISHMS data
analysis or may be required because of ISHMS
deficiencies.
Policies & Regulations - established principles, rules, or
laws designed to control or govern conducts or
procedures.
Probability of Detection - the ability of the ISHMS to
detect a failure only when there is actually a potential
failure or not detecting failure when there is none. This
relates to the probability concept of confidence level
(false-false and false-true).
Processed Data - raw data that has been converted.
Examples are time stamping the data for synchornization
purposes, sorting data, filtering the data, etc.
Research Practices - the skills, knowledge and
professionalism of whoever is conducting a scientific
research or analysis may have an impact on the final
outcome.
Safety of Flight - the level of safety expected that the ISHMS
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must sustain for aircraft operation. Most likely will be
established by the user and is usually measured in statistical or
probabilistic terms.
Sensor Quantity - the number of sensors that the ISHMS
will require to satisfy stakeholder’s needs.
Sensor Selection - a match of a sensor tailored to the
FCL it will monitor.
Stakeholders - anyone who has a share or an interest in
the ISHMS. Usually includes developers, designers,
users, contractors, etc.
Stakeholder’s Inputs - preferences established by the
stakeholders. Extreme care must be taken to properly
justify all stakeholders’ inputs. The ISHMS design must
not be influenced by an individual’s will nor by group
think.
Stored Data - data that has been stored in the data
acquisition unit.
Technology - defined as the practical application of science to
commercial or industrial purposes. Technology can be classified
into emerging or existing. Existing technology is usually more
readily available and cheaper. Existing technology usually needs
to be validated before integrating it into a design.
197
Upper Management - a subset of the stakeholders that
have an authority beyond normal. These people may
have the influence to implement major decisions that
have the potential to effect changes on other systems or
organizations.
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Appendix C. Performance Indices
This appendix contains the Performance Indices for the requirements Weighted
Objectives Hierarchy. First, the cost indices are presented, followed by the perfor-
mance indices and finally the schedule index.
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Figure C.1: Development Cost Performance Index
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Figure C.2: Acquisition Cost Performance Index
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Figure C.3: Installation Cost Performance Index
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Figure C.4: Operation Cost Performance Index
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Figure C.5: Disposal Cost Performance Index
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Figure C.6: Probability Of Detection Performance Index
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Figure C.7: Crack Length Detection Performance Index
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Figure C.8: Sampling Rate Performance Index
F
lig
h
t 
H
o
u
rs
 (
H
o
u
rs
)
0 1
600
700
Performance Weight
Figure C.9: Data Storage Performance Index
203
S
y
s
te
m
 R
e
lia
b
ili
ty
 (
%
)
0 1
99
100
Performance Weight
Figure C.10: System Reliability Performance Index
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Figure C.11: Low Operating Temperature Performance Index
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Figure C.12: High Operating Temperature Performance Index
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Figure C.13: Mean Time Between Failure Performance Index
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Figure C.14: 24 Hour Fix Rate Performance Index
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Figure C.15: Calibration Interval Performance Index
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Figure C.16: Analysis Ease of Use Performance Index
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Figure C.17: Pilot Cuing Performance Index
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Figure C.18: Schedule Performance Index
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